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Abstract
This body of research presents robust approaches for measuring and comparing socio-economic well-being
across distributions, and stresses the importance of the need for more accurate statistical inference. It
contains six separate, but closely related research papers categorized into two broad themes: Theme 1:
Income-based well-being indicators (Paper 1A, Paper 1B, and Paper 1C), and Theme 2: Multidimensional
well-being indicators (Paper 2A, Paper 2B, and Paper 2C). Theme 1 research papers develop asymptotic
frameworks for comparing inequality and poverty using income as the well-being indicator. Paper 1A
and Paper 1B contribute to the economics literature by providing an alternative, and in some cases,
more powerful way to undertake hypothesis testing on income distributions that does not require the
derivation of complex covariance structures. Paper 1C develops the asymptotic framework for comparing
poverty between distributions that share a common relative poverty line—it is argued that this approach
permits for more valid comparisons as opposed to alternate approaches which assume separate poverty
lines for each distribution. Theme 2 research papers go beyond material standard of living, and examine
well-being in a more generalized multidimensional setting using objective as well as subjective welfare
indicators. Paper 2A and Paper 2B utilizes the data-driven technique of stochastic dominance efficiency
to assess the equal-weighting schemes of Save the Children UK’s Child Development Index and OECD’s
Better Life Index, which are two composite indices used for monitoring policy and making cross-country
comparisons. Paper 2C examines well-being with respect to the labour market. Inspired by international
literature, over 20 indicators are utilized to assess job quality in Canada, an OECD country for which a
comprehensive job quality study has not been done in the past. Paper 2C fills this gap in the literature
and contributes to Canadian labour policies with respect to precarious work.
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Introduction
There is growing consensus that individual well-being is irreducible to a single factor (e.g., Boarini
& D’Ercole, 2013; Fleurbaey, 2012). The well-being of individuals is something that is intrinsic to a
prosperous nation. However, there are differences of opinion as to what exactly constitutes “well-being”
as pointed out by Bourguignon & Chakravarty (2003) and Boarini & D’Ercole (2013).
At the root of it, there are essentially two strands of literature that deal with socio-economic well-
being: philosophical and empirical. Philosophical discussions surrounding well-being address the im-
portance of individual differences in capabilities, multivariate nature of what it means to be “happy”,
balance of materialistic and non-materialistic factors, and distribution of opportunities (e.g., Sen, 1976).
The empirical spectrum of the literature considers such factors and focuses on quantifying or “putting
a number” on well-being (e.g., Maasoumi, 1999; Zheng, 2001). This body of research is aimed at the
latter.
In the absence of an optimal measure of well-being, researchers who focus on the empirical side
of the literature, have and continue to develop indicators aimed at quantifying it (e.g., OECD, 2017).
Such ongoing works have attracted the attention of international organizations such as the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Save the Children, United Nations (UN), and
World Bank, all of which became the forefront for developing well-being measures. Given the plethora
of well-being measures that are available, the need for more reliable and accurate ways of assessing them
becomes vital.
Indicators of well-being can be either objective or subjective. The former is usually measured by
income, consumption, or wealth. Subjective indicators are those based on individual perceptions (e.g.,
self-reported life satisfaction, or self-reported health) and capture aspects of quality of life unaccounted
for by objective indicators such as income (see, e.g., Boarini et al., 2012; Boarini & D’Ercole, 2013).
Although there is recognition that poverty and inequality—important aspects of well-being—are
multi-faceted phenomena, it was primarily income that gave rise to the concepts (e.g., Atkinson, 1970,
1987; Davidson & Duclos, 2000; Duclos et al., 2006; Thompson, 2012; Zheng, 2001). Poverty places
emphasis solely on the “poor” while inequality involves measuring how even or uneven resources (e.g.,
income) are distributed in society (see, e.g., Bourguignon & Chakravarty, 2003; Foster, 1984; Sen, 1976;
Zheng, 1997).
Early works on poverty such as Foster et al. (1984) and Sen (1976) focused mainly on the identification
of the poor. That is, they were mainly concerned with where to set the poverty line—an income level
below which an individual is deemed poor. There are two types of poverty lines: absolute and relative.
The former is a fixed income level usually determined by experts in conjunction with public officials.
Relative poverty lines are based on some fraction of the mean or a quantile of the underlying distribution
(e.g., 50% of the mean, 50% of the median, etc.).
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There have been several classes of poverty measures put forth in the literature (e.g., Watts, 1968;
Sen, 1976; Clark et al., 1981; Foster et al., 1984) and it is not often clear which measures to use when
analyzing poverty outcomes. However, such concerns may be alleviated by taking an axiomatic approach
to poverty measurement. That is, the choice of poverty measures can be partially guided by some well-
known axioms of poverty set out in the literature (e.g., Sen, 1976). The first widely known axiom is the
“focus axiom” which requires poverty measures to be insensitive to incomes above the poverty line. The
second axiom is the “monotonicity axiom” which states that if a person below the poverty line experiences
an increase in their income, the poverty measure should decrease accordingly. The third axiom known as
the “transfer axiom” requires the poverty measure to decrease after a progressive income transfer (and
increase after a regressive income transfer).
Another aspect of poverty measures to consider is whether or not they are decomposable. That is,
whether or not the poverty measure is additively separable. The Foster et al. (1984) class of poverty
measures are of this type and an appealing feature of additively separable poverty indices is that they
allow analysts to study the quantitative and qualitative assessment of the effect of changes in subgroup
poverty on total poverty. This is useful when studying poverty outcomes along geographic, ethnic, or
other lines.
While identification of the poor is important, recent works such as Biewen (2002), Davidson &
Duclos (2000), and Davidson (2007) have highlighted the need for more accurate statistical inference
when measuring poverty, especially since such metrics are typically estimated from household surveys
which can have rather small sample sizes, especially in developing countries (see, e.g., Biewen, 2002).
Inequality is something that is closely related to poverty but it is conceptually different and has its
own strand of literature. The concept can be subject to different economic interpretations. Economic
inequality, in particular, mainly refers to inequality in access to economic resources. And “economic
resources” are typically measured by income so income inequality indices are summary statistics for
measuring dispersion of incomes in a given society. Much like poverty, there have been numerous income
inequality indices proposed in the literature (Cowell, 2000). A simple way to measure income inequality
is to sort individuals according to their income and then calculate ratios of the different income quantiles
such as the 90th percentile to the 10th to track the interdecile income gap. Another simple approach is
to track the share of income held by different income groups like the top 1%, top 10%, bottom 50%, etc.
Some examples of indices include the Gini (a ratio based on the Lorenz curve), coefficient of variation, or
the generalized entropy class of inequality measures. And similar to poverty, income inequality indices
can also be chosen based on axiomatic grounds. The first widely known axiom is the “transfer principle”
(also known as the Pigou-Dalton principle, e.g., Pigou, 1912; Dalton, 1920) which requires the inequality
index to decrease when a progressive transfer occurs (i.e., transfer of income from a rich person to a poor
person). The second axiom is “scale-invariance” which requires the inequality measure to be invariant
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to scaling of the original income vector (i.e., doubling every person’s original income level should not
change the inequality index). The third axiom of income inequality indicators is “translation invariance”
which require the index to be invariant to uniform additions or subtraction to original income levels.
The fourth axiom is the “principle of population” which requires the inequality measure to be invariant
to replications of the original population (see, e.g., Cowell & Kuga, 1981).
Much like poverty measures, inequality measures can also have the decomposability feature. However,
this feature as it pertains to inequality measures differs from poverty measures. Decomposable inequality
measures, such as the generalized entropy class of measures, have the desirable property that the total
measured inequality can be decomposed into their “within” and “between” group components. This
feature is particularly useful for analysts interested in studying inequality amongst certain subgroups
of a population. The decomposability feature allow analysts to quantify exactly what portion of total
inequality are due to inequality within those subgroups and what portion are due to inequality between
those subgroups.
Income-based approaches to measuring poverty and inequality ultimately rely on income quantiles as a
starting point since quantiles indicate an individual’s position relative to others in an income distribution.
For example, the interdecile ratio of the 90th percentile income to the 10th percentile income is a common
indicator of income inequality (e.g., OECD, 2010). As such, there is a need for reliable and accurate
statistical inference for estimates derived from sample data.
Prior to producing indicators, it is essential to be familiar with how the data was collected. Concep-
tually, simple random sampling is the most straightforward household survey design. But often, complex
survey designs are favoured in order to alleviate sampling bias (i.e., guard against over-sampling or
under-sampling of certain populations or households).
Stratification and clustering are two of the more popular complex household survey designs. Each
type of design can be done either through single-stage or multi-stage sampling. The complexity induced
by such survey designs invalidate the typical standard errors synonymous with classical statistics. Careful
adjustments must be made to the estimates, depending on the survey design and weights, in order to
draw statistical inferences on indicators. There has been a wide array of research devoted to accurate
statistical inference on estimates derived from complex surveys (e.g., Gross, 1980; Deaton, 1997; Chen
& Sitter, 1999; Bhattacharya, 2005, 2007). Such works highlight the methodological considerations that
must be made when dealing with data arising from complex survey designs and show the consequences
of ignoring the special survey structures. When measuring income inequality, in particular, it is quite
important to be aware of potential sorting that goes on between rich and poor areas and ignoring this
in a survey design could result in misleading estimates and conclusions (Bhattacharya, 2007).
Theme 1, which comprises Paper 1A, Paper 1B, and Paper 1C, presents statistical inference methods
for robust income-based measures of poverty and inequality. Theme 1 explores the following research
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questions:
1i) How can hypothesis tests regarding quantiles that arise from stratified random samples be undertaken?
1ii) How can inequality between income distributions be reliably compared?
1iii) Can poverty comparisons between distributions be made if the poverty line depends on the pooled
distribution?
Paper 1A introduces an empirical likelihood-based statistical inference method for testing hypotheses
regarding quantiles arising from stratified random samples—one of the most common household sampling
schemes (see Chen & Sitter, 1999; Francisco & Fuller, 1991; Zhong & Rao, 2000). Paper 1B builds on
empirical likelihood and proposes a method for comparing a wide class of decomposable inequality indices
among two populations. Paper 1C shifts the focus to poverty which concerns only the portion of the
income distribution below a chosen poverty line. While existing approaches for making relative poverty
comparisons between distributions assume separate poverty lines defined for each of the distributions
(e.g., Zheng, 2001), Paper 1C develops an asymptotic framework for making poverty comparisons between
distributions that share a common relative poverty line (e.g., 50% of the pooled median income level).
There is growing recognition that well-being is a manifestation of more than income per capita or
material standards of living as pointed out in works such as Atkinson & Bourguignon (1982), Fleurbaey
(2012), and Maasoumi (1999). There is mounting evidence that individual happiness may not necessarily
be tied to income (e.g, Dutta & Foster, 2013) and quality of life is paramount to social well-being. In
light of this, international organizations have started initiatives aimed at better measuring well-being
(e.g., Stiglitz et al., 2009; OECD, 2017; Alkire, 2020). Some examples of multidimensional indices include
UN’s Human Development Index and Multidimensional Poverty Index, World Bank’s World Governance
Indicators, OECD’s Better Life Index (BLI), and Save the Children UK’s Child Development Index
(CDI). Such indices are constructed for a select set of countries for which data is available, and then these
indices are used for measuring and monitoring social progress, and cross-country well-being comparisons
(e.g., OECD, 2017; Save the Children UK, 2012).
Multivariate approaches to well-being entail selecting a set of indicators which measure well-being
and then assessing the dimensions separately without imposing any hierarchy across the dimensions, or
by aggregating them into a single summary index. However, multivariate approaches to measuring well-
being have their own set of limitations and challenges (Alkire et al., 2015; Alkire, 2020). Identification of
the dimensions of well-being involves value judgment so it can be a rather arduous process. Even if the
dimensions are agreed upon, it is not often clear how to communicate those indicators to the public. The
“dashboard” approach, which involves assessing dimensions individually without giving preference to any
one dimension, suffers from the possible heterogeneity of indicators. Since indicators maybe designed to
measure vastly different dimensions of well-being, it becomes harder to communicate the disjoint nature
of the indicators without a clear hierarchy system for the dimensions.
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According to Stiglitz et al. (2009), one of the reasons why gross domestic product (GDP) came
to be such a powerful and featured headline figure is that it is a single indicator that allows simple
comparisons of socio-economic performance cross-nationally and across time. International composite
indices have become highly influential tools for assessing and comparing achievements across countries
and across time, and go some ways towards addressing the heterogeneity and communications challenges
of the “dashboard” approach. Unlike that approach, composite indices do impose relative (non-negative)
weights on each indicator and then convert the individual dimensional scores into a single real number
which can be seen as appealing and easy to communicate, but there is nothing that makes such indices
inherently more sophisticated than alternative approaches to multivariate measurement of well-being. A
common disadvantage shared by both composite indices and the “dashboard” approach is that neither
accounts for the joint distribution of the indicators. The weights imposed on the indicators govern trade-
offs across aggregate dimensions and give a sense of hierarchy amongst the dimensions. However, such
normative choices can be viewed as very demanding and have been called into question (e.g., Ravallion,
2011; Alkire et al., 2015). Nonetheless, there has been a proliferation of literature related to composite
indicators just over the past two decades alone according to meth.
A significant number of multidimensional well-being indices are aggregated by equally weighting the
achievement scores which is tantamount to taking the arithmetic mean of the indicators (see, e.g, Save
the Children UK, 2008; OECD, 2017). Indeed, a single measure that synthesizes information on broad
aspects of well-being is appealing for benchmarking policies and assessing welfare, but how each dimension
is weighted or prioritized and the reliability of the orderings they produce remains a point of contention
(see Greco et al., 2018; Maasoumi, 1999). While it is difficult to communicate disjoint indicators designed
to measure very different aspects of well-being, it is straight-forward to rank countries on the basis of just
a single indicator. What is not so straight-forward is comparing socio-economic performance of countries
on the basis of composite indices which have normative judgments underlying them brought on by the
arbitrary choice of weights imposed on each dimension governing their hierarchy.
Recognizing the multidimensional nature of well-being, Theme 2, which comprises Paper 2A, Paper
2B, and Paper 2C, delves into well-being by considering multiple indicators rather than just income.
Theme 2 posits the following research questions:
2i) How sensitive are multidimensional well-being indices to the choice of weights?
2ii) Can any country achieve a good index score just by varying the indicator weights?
2iii) Is there a “best” way to select weights for the various dimensions of well-being?
2iv) Can multidimensional well-being be measured without weights?
Different weighting schemes can result in drastically different composite indices and ultimately very
different rankings depending on the unit of analysis (e.g., countries, institutions, etc.). There are a
number of different methods available for assessing weighting schemes and rank robustness (e.g., Alkire
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et al., 2015; Greco et al., 2018). Generalized mean aggregation methods shed light on the interactions
between different well-being dimensions by letting researchers tune the substitutability and complemen-
tarity amongst dimensions (e.g., Pinar, 2019). Then there are methods aimed at checking sensitivity of
weights to rank reversals. For example, Foster et al. (2013) examines empirically cases where the initial
vector of a given composite index is changed that result in rank reversals and cases where the ranking
is robust to plausible weight changes. Similarly, there are techniques that posit reasonable ranges for
weights and begin by examining the “corners” where full weight is shifted to a single dimension and
then weights are altered (e.g., Seth & McGiillivray, 2018). Since selection of well-being dimensions is
inherently subjective, there is another strand of literature that considers imposing dimensional weights
on the basis of societal preferences (e.g., Yang, 2018). While much of the discussion up to this point has
been focused on exogenous treatment of weights, there are data-driven methods like principal compo-
nents analysis (e.g., Biswas & Caliendo, 2002), factor analysis, I -distance (e.g., Markovic et al., 2016), or
data envelopment analysis (e.g., Mizobuchi, 2014) that treat the weights as endogenous. Such methods
are sometimes seen as more “objective” but they are only seen as such due to the fact that data-driven
procedures are agnostic and rely solely on the raw indicator data.
The data-driven method known as stochastic dominance efficiency (SDE) is used to assess the official
equal-weighting schemes of the popular CDI and BLI composite indices in Paper 2A and Paper 2B,
respectively. The CDI, developed by Save The Children UK, is a composite index for measuring child
development and has been produced periodically for nearly 100 countries since 2008. The BLI, developed
by the OECD, is a general measure of composite well-being limited to OECD countries and has been
published annually since 2011. SDE stems from the idea of stochastic dominance which is a robust ranking
method that entails comparing entire cumulative distribution functions. While stochastic dominance is
for making pairwise comparisons of distributions, SDE extends the method by permitting comparison of
a linearly-weighted benchmark distribution against all other possible linear weighting schemes. Unlike
other methods, those based on stochastic dominance (like SDE) have the advantage of making use
of all moments of the underlying index distributions and SDE, specifically, permits comparison of a
benchmark weighting scheme (e.g., equal-weighting) against all other possible weighting strategies. The
implicit (endogenous) weights generated by SDE analysis allows the evaluation of two extreme weighting
scenarios: a best-case scenario where the weights are allocated such that more countries achieve better
measured outcomes based on the least variable combination of indicators, and a worst-case scenario where
weights are distributed in a way that decreases measured cross-country performance. This should not
be seen as synonymous with maximizing or minimizing true well-being as there is no way of quantifying
actual well-being. Thus, SDE should be seen as a guidance tool for assessing the sensitivity and tendencies
of actual measurable indicator data which are thought to approximate well-being. SDE assesses composite
indices and allows researchers to identify the indicators of measured well-being leading to collective
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improvements and indicators which are difficult to improve—something that would be of great interest
for economic and social policy. This permits greater transparency by revealing exactly how the imposed
weights govern the trade-offs and inter-dependency amongst the dimensions. The end goal is not to
prescribe a specific set of weights or preferences for well-being dimensions but rather it is to provide
greater transparency and to underscore the need for more scrutiny of composite indicators. SDE in the
context of multidimensional well-being introduces a novel approach and results from Paper 2A and Paper
2B, combined with earlier works of Pinar et al. (2013, 2017), Pinar (2015), Pinar et al. (2015), and Pinar
et al. (2019) demonstrate promising progress for the field.
Paper 2C examines a specific aspect of well-being: work. Work-life balance is a significant part
of well-being and more emphasis is increasingly being placed on the quality of jobs as opposed to the
quantity of jobs (e.g., Drobnic et al., 2010). Organizations such as the OECD and Eurofound frequently
publish job quality indicators for its member countries (see OECD, 2014; Eurofound, 2016). Eurofound
administers the European Working Conditions Survey to a number of European countries in order to
gather a unified set of indicators with which to assess job quality. Inspired by Eurofound’s framework,
Paper 2C takes a “dashboard” approach and utilizes data from the 2016 Canadian General Social Survey
(CGSS) to construct over 20 job quality indicators for Canada—an OECD country for which a detailed
job quality study has never been done. Paper 2C fills this gap in the international literature and makes
a contribution to Canadian labour policies pertaining to precarious work.
Conditions under which this body of research was undertaken
Paper 1A and Paper 1B were the end results of research into economic inequality undertaken in the
Department of Economics and Finance at University of Guelph. Professor Thanasis Stengos contributed
to Paper 1B by providing editorial assistance. Paper 1A and Paper 1B support the department’s repu-
tation for research excellence in econometrics and economic measurement of well-being. Paper 1C was
completed in the Department of Economics at University of Waterloo and contributes to the department’s
strengths in applied economics research.
Research presented in Paper 2A and Paper 2B were undertaken in the Department of Economics at
Ryerson University and contributes to the department’s research in the areas of econometrics and inter-
national economics. Paper 2C was the result of a collaboration with Wen-Hao Chen at Statistics Canada
and contributes to one of the agency’s mandates which entails analyzing and disseminating statistical
information to the public. Paper 2C also contributes to the Government of Canada’s broader policies
surrounding the labour market as evidenced by the fact that Paper 2C became a topic of discussion in
the Canadian House of Commons (see May, 2019).
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Theme 1: Income-based well-being indicators
Paper 1A
Ever since the seminal work of Atkinson (1970), there has been a proliferation of literature surround-
ing income inequality—the measurement of how evenly or unevenly income is distributed in society (e.g.,
Cowell, 1989, 2011; Maasoumi, 1999; Davidson & Duclos, 2000; Thompson, 2010). Accurately character-
izing and assessing income distributions has long been a subject of great interest among researchers and
policy makers (e.g., Brachman et al., 1996; Maasoumi, 1999; McDonald, 1984). One of the most basic
ways of characterizing an income distribution is to compute income quantiles which divide the distribu-
tion into equally-numbered units ranked according to income level (e.g., Gross, 1980). These threshold
levels of income can then be compared with other distributions or across time to gauge whether they
have gone up or down.
Since researchers rarely have access to population level data, they rely on representative samples
drawn from the population. Although random sampling is arguably the most well-known sampling
technique, other methods such as stratified random sampling have become the sampling method of
choice for many national statistical agencies (see Cochran, 1977). Since there may be variation or
heterogeneity among subgroups of populations (e.g., socio-demographics, neighbourhoods, etc.), stratified
random sampling can aid in producing more accurate estimates (see, e.g., Zheng, 2001). Since the strata
have different proportional representations in the population, calculating sample statistics is a bit more
involved than simple random sampling. The strata sampling fractions must be accounted for in order to
produce accurate estimates for proper statistical inference (see, e.g., Zhong & Rao, 2000).
Paper 1A considers weighted empirical likelihood as a method of inference for income quantiles arising
from stratified random samples. Paper 1A contributes to the survey sampling literature by offering a
more accurate way to make inferences on stratified quantiles. It also contributes to the literature on
income distribution and inequality which rely on estimates of quantiles for examining and monitoring
inequality (e.g., Zheng, 2001).
Empirical likelihood is a data-driven non-parametric counterpart to maximum likelihood. It is a sta-
tistical inference procedure that does not require the derivation of any asymptotic covariance structure
for hypothesis testing (see Owen, 1988, 1990, 1991, 2001). As explained in Owen (2001), forgoing the
calculation of complex covariances also allows empirical likelihood to excel in small samples. Unlike the
mean of a distribution, inference on quantiles require the estimation of densities of the underlying distri-
bution in order to compute the covariance (i.e., the standard error of a quantile is not a straightforward
calculation). And estimation of densities require the selection of an exogenous bandwidth (smoothing
parameter) which introduces more complexity (see, e.g., Li & Racine, 2007).
Paper 1A illustrates, through a Monte Carlo study, that the 95% confidence intervals for any given
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income quantile are indeed accurate even with small sample sizes. Paper 1A also shows that the weighted
empirical likelihood approach, under some mild conditions, outperforms Woodruff’s (1952) method for
stratified random sample quantiles. Paper 1A’s contribution is an important one for economics for
two reasons: (1) it provides for an accurate data-driven procedure for making inferences on a quantile
(e.g., the median income level) drawn from a stratified random sample without having to estimate
distribution densities, and (2) it bridges the gap between economics and statistics by bringing more
attention to empirical likelihood as a valid method of inference which is more often used by statisticians
than economists (e.g., Fu et al., 2009; Wu, 2004a,b).
Paper 1B
Robust well-being comparisons entail examining multiple socio-economic indicators. While income
quantiles offer a simple and effective way for comparing well-being across distributions, there exist other
scalar measures in the literature which have been developed based on axiomatic grounds (e.g., Cowell,
2000; Thompson, 2010).
Paper 1B employs empirical likelihood in a two-sample setting and proposes a statistical inference
procedure for comparing inequality outcomes between two populations. The procedure is developed for
the generalized entropy class of inequality measures which satisfy the most widely accepted set of axioms
in the income inequality literature (see Cowell, 2011; Thompson, 2010). Paper 1B tests income inequality
between any two distributions and allows for a vector of inequality indicators to be tested. As pointed
out by Davidson & Duclos (2000), when comparing welfare across distributions, judgments regarding
which distribution is better or worse off should only be made when a wide class of indices point towards
the same conclusion. Relying on single scalar measures can be problematic since different measures can
point to contradictory conclusions and lead to rank reversals when comparing distributions. By allowing
for multiple inequality indicators to be tested, Paper 1B alleviates this problem. Prior to Paper 1B,
entropy measures of inequality could only be compared using the delta method (t–test) which require
the computation of standard errors. Paper 1B shows that the empirical likelihood approach not only
avoids the use of standard errors, but the approach also has greater sampling power when faced with
relatively small samples.
Through a Monte Carlo study, Paper 1B illustrates that under some mild regularity conditions,
empirical likelihood outperforms the traditional delta method in terms of statistical size and power. Paper
1B offers a statistically powerful test for comparing income inequality, which has significant importance
and relevance in economics given that the discipline often has to rely on small samples, especially in
developing countries and rural areas. Paper 1B also offers a new inference tool for economists for
assessing inequality, who may not be aware of empirical likelihood techniques rooted in mathematics and
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statistics.
Paper 1C
Other than income inequality, the other leading topic of interest among all economists invariably is
poverty—which focuses on the portion of the income distribution below the poverty line. Alleviating
and eradicating poverty remains an ambitious goal for policy makers across the world (it is one of the
UN’s sustainable development goals; UN, 2015).
Since poverty measurement places full emphasis on the portion of the distribution that fall below
the poverty line, the specification of the poverty line itself becomes a point of debate (see, e.g., Zheng,
2001; Thompson, 2012). This becomes even more problematic when comparing poverty between two
subgroups of a population. A decision has to be made as to whether the two groups should have two
distinct poverty lines or one common poverty line (see, e.g., Thompson, 2012; Zheng, 2001).
Since absolute poverty lines are fixed and therefore independent of the underlying distribution, sta-
tistical inference is rather straightforward as the asymptotic covariance structure is simple. However,
more countries have adopted the use of relative poverty lines—those based on some fraction of the mean
or a quantile from the underlying income distribution (see, e.g., Davidson & Duclos, 2000; Zheng, 2001).
International organizations and local governments are increasingly using such poverty lines to report
poverty estimates (e.g., OECD and the UN) since unlike absolute poverty lines, relative poverty lines
do not depend on value judgments of policy makers regarding what is viewed as a necessity to achieve a
minimum standard of living (see Zheng, 2001).
When using relative poverty lines, inference on poverty measures require the derivation of the asymp-
totic covariance structure since the poverty estimate itself relies on an estimate of the mean or quantile of
the underlying income distribution (i.e., the standard error is not a straightforward calculation). Zheng
(2001) developed the asymptotic framework for exactly such cases and his work is relied upon by poverty
researchers interested in hypothesis tests involving relative poverty measures. Under Zheng’s (2000)
approach, poverty comparisons can be made but under the assumption that the two distributions are
independent, and therefore each has its own poverty line.
Paper 1C adapts Zheng’s (2000) approach to the case where interest is on comparing poverty outcomes
between distributions that share the same relative poverty line. For example, if there is interest in
comparing poverty outcomes among males and females that arise from the same distribution, Paper 1C
argues that it is much more sensible to set a common poverty line rather than males and females having
differing sets of poverty lines (this argument is supported by Thompson, 2012). Suppose a poverty line
is set equal to 50% of the median income level. Under Zheng’s (2000) approach, poverty estimates for
males would be based on 50% of the male median income, and poverty estimates for females would be
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based on 50% of the female median income. Under Paper 1C’s approach, the poverty line would be set
equal to 50% of the pooled median income from males and females.
Prior to Paper 1C, the conventional practice was to allow each group to have its own poverty line even
though this could lead to potentially invalid comparisons, or set a common absolute poverty line which is
not dependent on the underlying distributions (e.g., Kakwani, 1993). That is, there was no asymptotic
framework for comparing poverty levels between two groups under a common relative poverty line.
Consider males and females in a certain population with female incomes much more evenly distributed
but still lower than male incomes. Females would have a lower poverty line than males if we consider a
relative poverty line such as 50% of the median female income. When calculating the poverty measures,
it is conceivable that an incongruous conclusion could be reached that males have higher poverty than
females (see Thompson, 2012).
Using asymptotic theory and partial guidance from the work of Zheng (2001), Paper 1C derives
the covariance matrix for testing poverty levels between two distributions with a commonly set relative
poverty line. Unlike Thompson’s (2012) test which can only detect equality (=) or inequality (6=) of
poverty outcomes, the test proposed in Paper 1C is able to detect whether one subgroup actually exhibits
weakly higher (≥) or weakly lower (≤) levels of poverty than another. The testing procedure shows good
size and power properties even under small samples. Paper 1C illustrates the testing procedure by
comparing poverty outcomes among males and females using data from the 2012 American Community
Survey and finds that, indeed, when the two subgroups are treated as having separate poverty lines (e.g.,
Zheng, 2001), one invariably comes to the conclusion that males have higher poverty even though females
have lower incomes than males in the sample. But under Paper 1C’s approach of a common relative
poverty line, the results are reversed in that females exhibit higher poverty.
Since there are often differences of opinion as to the choice of poverty line (e.g., Thompson, 2012),
Paper 1C’s test is robust in the sense that it allows the researcher to set and simultaneously test multiple
poverty lines (e.g., one could be 40% of the median, another could be 50% of the median, another
could be 60% of the median, etc.). Paper 1C advanced the literature on economic poverty and raises
issues regarding the choice of poverty lines. Paper 1C’s major contribution to the literature is that
policy makers no longer have to rely on constructing different poverty lines for different groups of the
population. Instead, a vector of commonly set relative poverty lines can be placed into Paper 1C’s
framework and the outcomes maybe compared without worrying about the differences in characteristics
of the distributions.
Theme 1 summary
It is a common assertion now that individual well-being is multidimensional. Income remains among
the strongest indicators of well-being since it often permeates so many aspects of it (see, e.g., Barrett
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& Donald, 2003; Davidson & Duclos, 2000). Drawing from the statistics literature, Theme 1 develops
statistical inference procedures for quantiles arising from complex survey schemes and for comparing
inequality between distributions, using the data-driven non-parametric technique of empirical likelihood
which does not impose any assumption on the underlying distributions (e.g., Owen, 2001). Theme 1
also makes a contribution to the poverty literature by proposing a statistical test for comparing poverty
between distributions that share a common relative poverty line (such as 50% of the median income
level of the pooled distributions). Theme 1 highlighted the importance of accurate and robust statistical
inference procedures in the well-being literature and Monte Carlo studies confirm the statistical reliability
of the methodologies presented in Theme 1.
Theme 2: Multidimensional well-being indicators
Paper 2A
While income-based measures have their respective merits and are important aspects of individual
well-being, they do not capture subjective aspects of quality of life (e.g., environment quality, leisure,
personal relationships, health, etc.) (see, e.g., Boarini et al., 2012; Decancq, 2017; Fleurbaey, 2012;
Mizobuchi, 2014). Subjective well-being indicators have recently been elevated in importance as they
relate strongly to quality of life (e.g., OECD, 2017; Monika, 2018). Life satisfaction, a subjective indicator
of well-being, is a manifestation of multiple life domains and is rather difficult to synthesize into just
one metric. Nonetheless, aggregating several dimensions into a single measure provides policy makers
with a simple tool which is easy to communicate, and allows them to benchmark and monitor progress
in composite well-being. One of the most pressing issues when it comes to multidimensional well-being
indices is how to weight the individual component indicators (e.g., Biswas & Caliendo, 2002; Decancq &
Lugo, 2013; Lorenz et al., 2017).
The CDI, developed by Save the Children UK, is a composite index for measuring and monitoring the
well-being of children across various countries. The CDI is composed of 3 equally-weighted dimensions:
health, education, and nutrition. Paper 2A uses consistent tests of SDE proposed by Scaillet & Topaloglou
(2010), and finds that equally weighting the dimensions is not stochastic dominance efficient—there exists
other weighting vectors that result in more countries achieving better measured outcomes.
SDE is a direct extension of stochastic dominance which is a robust method of ranking distributions
that account for all moments of the underlying distributions and is quite commonly used in making
pairwise comparisons of welfare (e.g., Barrett & Donald, 2003; Davidson & Duclos, 2000). SDE extends
the concept by making it possible to compare a benchmark distribution of multiple aggregated variables
against all possible linear combinations of those variables (see Scaillet & Topaloglou, 2010). There has
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been burgeoning literature on the use of SDE for well-being comparisons and ranking in general (e.g.,
Pinar et al., 2013, 2015; Pinar, 2015; Pinar et al., 2017, 2019).
In Paper 2A, the official equal-weighting scheme of the CDI is considered as the “benchmark” distri-
bution and is statistically tested against all other possible weighting combinations. Unlike other methods
such as generalized mean aggregation, preference-based approaches, principal components analysis, fac-
tor analysis, or data envelopment analysis which only consider the first few moments of the distribution,
stochastic dominance utilizes all moments of the underlying distribution and SDE reveals what type of
weighting scheme it takes to induce the most optimistic scenario where more countries achieve better
measured outcomes based on the least variable combination of components. SDE also reveals what it
takes to achieve the most pessimistic scenario where more countries achieve worse measured outcomes.
This is not synonymous with actually maximizing or minimizing well-being (no method can actually mea-
sure or assess true well-being). But rather SDE is a data-driven method and as such it provides intuition
into the tendencies of the index data which are thought to partially represent well-being. Applying SDE
reveals which measured aspects or dimensions of well-being have driven the most overall improvements
and which aspects are hindering more countries from achieving better measured outcomes. Another
advantage of SDE is that under the most optimistic scenario, the weights are allocated such that most
countries achieve a better measured outcome so in a sense it is the measured outcomes that are “opti-
mized” under a fixed weighting scheme for every country. Sometimes, national policy makers take issue
with the fact that equal-weighting masks achievements in dimensions they think they excel in. SDE
partially addresses such concerns by optimizing most countries’ indices.
In order to induce the most optimistic scenario where more countries achieve higher index scores,
Paper 2A finds that relatively more weight needs to be shifted towards education. This finding suggests
that the upper bound of the education sub-index is more achievable compared to health or nutrition. In
other words, more countries find it easier to achieve better index scores when education receives more
weight than the other dimensions of the CDI.
At the other extreme, shifting more weight towards health induces the most pessimistic scenario where
index scores are worsened for more countries. This suggests that compared to education, improvements
in the health sub-index have not kept pace with what is observed in the education sub-index data.
Paper 2A provides re-weighted rankings using the SDE weights from the two extreme scenarios (i.e.,
best-case and worst-case). Countries that excel in all aspects of the CDI (i.e., health, education, and
nutrition) show little deviation in rankings since they achieved a balanced set of measured outcomes
across the different aspects of the CDI. Again, the key word here is “measured” because the CDI, just
like any other composite index, provides an approximation of well-being and thus the country rankings
should also be viewed as approximate. Countries that posted poor scores in education, generally moved
down in ranking. These findings are in line with Pinar et al. (2013) who found education to be the
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dominant indicator for UN’s Human Development Index. Paper 2A’s findings help shed light for policy
makers who may be unaware of their nation’s strengths and weaknesses when it comes to indicators
that are supposed to partially represent child development outcomes, and allows policy makers to better
target areas in need of improvement.
Paper 2A takes SDE from the finance literature (Scaillet & Topaloglou, 2010) and applies it in an
economic setting. SDE is rooted in the finance literature where it is used for portfolio optimization, but
Paper 2A’s contribution along with those of Pinar et al. (2013, 2017), Pinar (2015), Pinar et al. (2015),
and Pinar et al. (2019) demonstrate the possibilities of SDE as a tool for assessing weighting schemes
in economics, particularly when it comes to assessing the choice of weights in constructing composite
indices.
Paper 2B
While the CDI measures and monitors the well-being of children, The OECD’s BLI is aimed at
measuring and monitoring multidimensional well-being for the broader population. Introduced in 2011,
the BLI is by far one of the most well-known multidimensional indices and several researchers have
assessed its efficacy (e.g., Decancq, 2017; Kasparian, 2012; Lorenz et al., 2017; Markovic et al., 2016;
Mizobuchi, 2014; Monika, 2018; Nikolaev, 2014; von Reumont et al., 2017). It comprises 11 dimensions
with each dimension consisting of 1 to 4 indicators. Countries are assigned a score in each dimension by
taking the arithmetic average of the component indicators (i.e., equally-weighting the indicators).
Paper 2B not only analyzes each of the 11 dimensions separately but also constructs an aggregate
BLI index that encompasses all 24 BLI indicators, something not done by the OECD. The BLI allows
its website (www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org) users to create their own BLI by adjusting the normalized
weight assigned to each of the dimensions. But in constructing the overall BLI index in Paper 2B, it is
argued that due to embedding effects (e.g., von Reumont et al., 2017), it would be more beneficial to
allow users to assign importance to dimensional indicators as opposed to just the dimensions alone. A
preference for dimension A over dimension B does not necessarily imply a preference for all indicators
in dimension A over those of dimension B.
In constructing the aggregate composite indicator, Paper 2B actually weights all 24 indicators as
opposed to weighting the 11 dimensions. BLI country rankings by dimension, are reported in Paper 2B
under the two extreme scenarios. SDE reveals that due to unbalanced achievements (as measured by
the BLI), most OECD countries experience drastic shifts in rankings, depending on how the indicators,
thought to be representative of well-being, are actually weighted. The rankings serve as a tool for policy
makers looking to improve their relative standing among OECD countries by setting targets that address
their weaknesses. It lets policy makers see which aspects of well-being their country is lacking in and
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which ones they excel in. By focusing on the weak indicators identified by SDE, countries can move
towards improving their relative standing in future editions of the BLI.
Paper 2C
One of the dimensions of the BLI is jobs. Work-life balance and job satisfaction are important aspects
of well-being as pointed out by Drobnic et al., 2010, OECD (2014), and OECD (2017). Chen & Hou
(2019) investigate the effects of unemployment on well-being and establishes an association between
an individual’s own employment status and their life satisfaction. The amount of time spent working
during a person’s lifetime is not trivial and therefore working-time quality becomes a significant factor
of individual well-being.
There is growing recognition that employment should not only be judged by the number of jobs
created or how much these jobs pay but they should also be judged by the quality of jobs created (see,
e.g., Drobnic et al., 2010). While much of Europe has consistently published a unified set of job quality
indicators, countries like Canada have lagged behind, primary due to a lack of unified data source (such as
that of Eurofound). With increasing concern regarding so-called “precarious” work (e.g., term, contract,
seasonal) in Canada, a lack of job quality indicators make it difficult to assess working conditions (May,
2019).
Paper 2C not only fills a gap in the academic literature but also offers indicators and analyses for
guiding policy. Paper 2C uses the Eurofound framework (Eurofound, 2016) to develop job quality indica-
tors from the 2016 CGSS which had a module similar to Eurofound. Paper 2C adopts a multidimensional
approach to measuring job quality in Canada by examining 6 broad dimensions used by Eurofound.
By constructing indicators for Canada similar to Eurofound, Paper 2C opens up possibilities for
international comparisons of job quality with Canada. Paper 2C makes an important contribution to the
Canadian labour literature and policy by focusing on indicators other than wages. Paper 2C serves as
an important policy guide as evidenced by the fact that it has been recently cited in an official Canadian
government report on precarious jobs from the House of Commons (May, 2019).
Paper 2C not only presents descriptive statistics of job quality but also illustrates the possibilities
of incorporating machine learning into economics. Paper 2C borrows a technique known as latent class
analysis from computer science and provides predictions of workers likely to be in good or poor quality
jobs. With the advent of technology and increasing computing power, disciplines such as computer
science have dramatically boosted the capabilities of machine learning algorithms. Through the use of
a machine learning technique, Paper 2C takes a step towards bridging this gap between economics and
computer science.
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Theme 2 summary
With increased interest in developing well-being measures within a multidimensional framework (e.g.,
Boarini & D’Ercole, 2013; OECD, 2017), there is a growing need for methods aimed at aggregating and
assessing such measures. Multidimensional well-being measures, as the name suggests, comprise two
or more dimensions related to well-being. The final index is typically computed by taking a weighted
average of the dimensions. The dimensional weights are often contested given differences in people’s
preferences with regards to the different aspects of well-being. Theme 2 assesses OECD’s BLI and Save
the Children UK’s CDI, which are two indices that exemplify multivariate well-being. Rather than
advocating for a single weighting vector, SDE is used to examine the type of weighting scheme necessary
to collectively improve or worsen the outcome scores as measured by the respective indices. By uncovering
dimensions most or least responsible for improving trends in measured outcomes over time, this allows
policy makers to better target areas in need of improvement. Theme 2 made an additional contribution
to the well-being literature by developing multidimensional indicators for assessing an important aspect
of well-being: work. The indicators were aimed at assessing job quality in Canada which is an OECD
country that, up until now, lacked internationally comparable job quality indicators.
Conclusion
This body of research presents robust approaches for making comparisons of socio-economic well-
being outcomes by blending theory and applications. Theme 1 research papers propose novel statistical
inference methods for comparing inequality and poverty outcomes using income as the welfare measure.
Theme 2 research papers addressed the growing recognition that well-being manifests along multiple
dimensions rather than wealth alone.
Measuring and monitoring well-being—whether it is univariate or multivariate—is important for pol-
icy makers since the economic success of a nation ultimately comes down to the welfare of its citizens.
With increasing data availability in the age of “big data”, governments and international organizations
continue to develop indicators for approximating individual well-being. Given the proliferation of com-
posite indices for measuring well-being, there is a growing need for more reliable and accurate statistical
methods for assessing such measures. Theme 1 and Theme 2 research papers recognize this and highlight
the importance of robust statistical inference and accurate estimation.
Although multidimensional approaches to measuring well-being are now more pervasive, income-
based measures still have their place in the literature given the reliance on metrics such as GDP and the
fact that income is thought to permeate many aspects of well-being. Measuring well-being ultimately
comes down to first collecting reliable data. And data is typically drawn from household surveys which
can have complex designs. Stratified sampling is one such design. Theme 1 presents a cohesive body of
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research aimed at better measuring and comparing inequality and poverty outcomes using income as a
measure of well-being, with the following questions in mind:
1i) How can hypothesis tests regarding quantiles that arise from stratified random samples be undertaken?
1ii) How can inequality between income distributions be reliably compared?
1iii) Can poverty comparisons between distributions be made if the poverty line depends on the pooled
distribution?
To answer question (1i), Theme 1 begins by proposing an empirical likelihood approach for making
inferences on income quantiles drawn from stratified random samples. Since empirical likelihood relaxes
distributional assumptions regarding the underlying data and does not rely on covariances, it avoids
such complexities synonymous with stratified sample quantiles. Question (1ii) is addressed by applying
the empirical likelihood method for making comparisons of distributions using a wide class of inequality
measures that satisfy the most widely accepted axioms of inequality in the literature. Reliable well-being
comparisons entail comparing multiple measures. The proposed methodology is reliable and robust in the
sense that it permits simultaneous comparison of multiple inequality measures, while at the same time it
avoids having to compute complex covariance structures. Shifting the focus from inequality to poverty,
question (1iii) is answered with the conclusion of Theme 1 which develops an asymptotic framework
for testing whether one distribution has higher or lower poverty than another given a common relative
poverty line—which was not possible in the past. The use of a shared poverty line between distributions
enables more valid comparisons of poverty outcomes.
Building on Theme 1, Theme 2 goes beyond material standard of living and aims at assessing well-
being measures that incorporate more than just income indicators, with these questions in mind:
2i) How sensitive are multidimensional well-being indices to the choice of weights?
2ii) Can any country achieve a good index score just by varying the indicator weights?
2iii) Is there a “best” way to select weights for the various dimensions of well-being?
2iv) Can multidimensional well-being be measured without weights?
Since multidimensional indices are usually the weighted sum of all the components, the choice of
weights becomes a point of contention. A distributional robust ranking method known as stochastic
dominance efficiency is used to assess the official equal-weighting schemes of Save the Children UK’s
Child Development Index and OECD’s Better Life Index, which are two examples of composite welfare
measures. Question (2i) is answered by presenting a best-case and worst-case weighting scenario for
each index to reveal the aspects of well-being responsible for improving measured outcomes and aspects
hindering improvements across countries. Analyses show that multivariate well-being measures are highly
influenced by choice of weights and policy makers need to be aware of such sensitivities when basing policy
targets on multivariate well-being measures. The answer to question (2ii) is: no. Although going from
the equal-weight to the best-case or worst-case scenario can drastically change index scores and country
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rankings, a country must excel in at least one of the dimensions to achieve a relatively good index score.
In response to (2iii), an optimal way of selecting weighting vectors does not exist for multidimensional
well-being measures given that there is often disagreement as to what dimensions should be included and
individuals assign different relative importance to dimensions. In the absence of an optimal measure,
methods such as SDE do, however, go some ways towards assessing existing empirical procedures. To
answer question (2iv), Theme 2 concludes by offering a deeper look at one of the dimensions of well-
being: work. The assessment is done by examining the joint distribution of the indicators rather than
aggregating indicators into a single index. Canada is an OECD country which until now, lacked data on
job quality. Constructing a suite of Canadian job quality indicators, largely consistent with those used
by several European countries, unlocks the potential for international comparability. It also marks the
first comprehensive job quality study in Canada based on wage as well as non-wage indicators
With surging interest on measuring and assessing societal well-being, there exists a growing need for
more accurate and reliable methods of measurement and inference. This body of research which blends
theory and applications, has important implications for researchers as well as policy makers who rely on
welfare measures for setting policy targets. The power and breadth of the empirical likelihood technique
was showcased and its application to inequality and poverty analysis illustrates the versatility of the
method. Robust poverty comparisons can now be made between distributions by setting a common
poverty line relative to the combined distribution. The technique of stochastic dominance efficiency
shows potential for economic applications, especially with regards to assessing multidimensional welfare
indices which have proliferated with the advent of richer and better data availability.
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1 Introduction
Ever since the pioneering work of Owen (1988, 1990), there has been a proliferation of literature on empirical
likelihood (EL), which is a powerful nonparametric statistical tool. An advantage of this method is that one
does not need to assume anything about the underlying distribution of the data. The EL ratio is entirely
data driven. The main focus of Owen (1988) was to construct confidence intervals for a population mean
given a single sample of independent and identically distributed (iid) observations. For a detailed overview
of EL, see Owen (2001).
EL methods for complex surveys are yet to be investigated to their full extent. Chen and Sitter (1999)
and Zhong and Rao (2000) were among the first to consider EL in the context of complex survey designs.
Complex survey designs pose additional difficulties for the conventional EL approach. Asymptotic results
from conventional EL are not directly applicable to complex surveys as special types of constraints may need
to be imposed, depending on the survey design. Generally, the EL ratio in such cases will not have the same
calibration as in the case of simple random sampling. Also, existing computational procedures may not be
readily applicable. To alleviate such problems, Fu et al. (2008) introduced a weighted empirical likelihood
method and developed an unified approach for making inferences on population means in the presence of
multiple samples. One of the cases they consider is stratified random sampling where the focal point of
interest is on the overall population mean. Their approach relies on the augmentation of the special types
of constraints induced by stratified samples.
Though a large body of literature exists regarding inference on population means, quantiles have received
relatively less attention. This is especially true in the case of complex survey designs. Such designs could
conceivably give rise to multiple distribution functions (as is the case with stratified random sampling)
instead of just one. Thus, deriving asymptotic expressions for quantiles can get quite tedious and sometimes
may not even be possible. For simple random sampling, (Owen, 2001, Ch. 3.6) provides a good introduction
to EL methods for quantiles.
The promising results of Fu et al. (2008) warrant further research into the weighted empirical likelihood
approach. Drawing upon their work, we propose a weighted empirical likelihood-based inference method for
quantiles under stratified random sampling. Our results rely on very similar asymptotic expansions.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our proposed methodology and
establish some asymptotic results under stratified random sampling. In Section 3, we present a Monte Carlo
study which assesses the accuracy of the confidence interval obtained from our method. Section 4 concludes.
2 Inference for a quantile
Suppose that a population is divided into k mutually exclusive strata of known sizes N1, ..., Nk. The weight
associated with the ith stratum is wi = Ni/N , where N =
∑k
i=1 Ni is the overall population size. Let
{Yij , j = 1, ..., ni}, i = 1, ..., k, be k independent samples of size ni extracted from the strata and let n =∑k
i=1 ni be the pooled sample size. Assume the strata sampling fraction ni/Ni is negligible so that {Yij , j =
1, ..., ni} is regarded as an iid sample generated by the continuous random variable Yi with distribution
function Fi. The overall distribution function is then given by F (y) =
∑k
i=1 wiFi(y). Let Qα denote the
α-quantile of F . This quantile is implicitly characterized by F (Qα) = α. Our focal point of interest is on
constructing confidence intervals for Qα given α.
The weighted empirical log-likelihood (WEL) function of Fu et al. (2008) is given by
lw(F1, ..., Fk) =
k∑
i=1
wi
ni
ni∑
j=1
log(pij), (1)
where pij is the probability associated with Yij . The formulation of (1) was motivated using the argument
of Chen and Sitter (1999). See Fu et al. (2008) for more on this.
An advantage of using the WEL function is that the usual large sample properties of EL can be established
under the special type of constraints induced by stratified samples. If the constraints are reformulated in a
suitable way, computational procedures are also readily available.
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To construct a confidence interval for Qα, we maximize (1) subject to pij > 0 and
ni∑
j=1
pij = 1, i = 1, ..., k, (2)
k∑
i=1
wi
ni∑
j=1
pij1Yij≤Qα = α, (3)
where 1(·) is an indicator function which evaluates to one if the argument (·) is true, and zero otherwise.
Constraint (3) identifies the quantile Qα and its use can be justified by arguments similar to (Owen, 2001,
Ch. 3.6). Since Ei(1Yi≤Qα) = Fi(Qα), where Ei denotes the expectation under distribution Fi, constraint
(3) indeed identifies Qα.
To construct confidence intervals for Qα, we require the asymptotic distribution of the WEL ratio which
Fu et al. (2008) defines as
rw(Qα) =
k∑
i=1
wi
ni
ni∑
j=1
log(np̂ij),
where p̂ij given by (7) solve the maximization problem. Assume ni/n → x 6= 0, so that it is unnecessary
to distinguish between O(n−1/2) and O(n−1/2i ), and between o(n−1/2) and o(n
−1/2
i ). The following theorem
establishes the asymptotic distribution of rw(Qα) at Qα = Qα0 .
Theorem 2.1. Suppose {Yij , j = 1, ..., ni} is an iid sample, with finite variance, from Fi, i = 1, ..., k, and
the k samples are independent of each other. If Qα0 is the α-quantile of the overall distribution function F ,
then −2rw(Qα0 )/c
d−→ χ2(1), where the scaling constant c is given by (12).
Proof. Our proof follows very closely the proof of Fu et al. (2008) for stratified sampling. For ease of notation
and without loss of generality, consider k = 3. Constraints (2) and (3) can be reformulated as
3∑
i=1
wi
ni∑
j=1
pij = 1, (4)
3∑
i=1
wi
ni∑
j=1
pijZij = η, (5)
where the vector-valued variables Zij and η are given by
Z1i = (1, 0, 1Y1i≤Qα)′,
Z2i = (0, 1, 1Y2i≤Qα)′,
Z3i = (0, 0, 1Y3i≤Qα)′,
and
η = (w1, w2, α)′.
Equation (5) can be re-written as
3∑
i=1
wi
ni∑
j=1
pijuij = 0, (6)
where uij = Zij − η. The reformulation of constraints (2) and (3) ensure that the probabilities in each
of the stratum sum to unity. The maximization of (1) subject to (4) and (6) can be carried out using the
Lagrange multiplier technique. For a given Qα, it can be shown that the optimized probabilities are
p̂ij(Qα) =
1
ni(1 + λ′uij)
, (7)
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where the vector-valued Lagrange multiplier λ is the solution to
3∑
i=1
wi
ni
ni∑
j=1
uij
1 + λ′uij
= 0. (8)
The above equation can be solved using the algorithm described in Wu (2004). Rewriting the numerator uij
in (8) as uij [(1 + λ′uij)− u′ijλ], equation (8) can be expressed as 3∑
i=1
wi
ni
ni∑
j=1
uiju
′
ij
1 + λ′uij
λ = 3∑
i=1
wi
ni
ni∑
j=1
uij . (9)
Noting that
∑ni
j=1[ni(1 +λ
′uij)]−1 = 1, for i = 1, 2, 3, the order of λ is related to the right-hand side of (9),
which can be written as
U =
3∑
i=1
wi
ni
ni∑
j=1
uij =
(
0, 0, F̂ (Qα)− α
)′
, (10)
where (for k = 3) F̂ (Qα) =
∑3
i=1(wi/ni)
∑ni
j=1 1Yij≤Qα . Since α = F (Qα), it immediately follows that
U = Op(n−1/2) (component-wise) when Qα = Qα0 .
LettingD =
∑3
i=1(wi/ni)
∑ni
j=1 uiju
′
ij and noting that it is Op(1), from (9) we have that λ = Op(n−1/2).
The finite variance assumption allows us to have maxij |uij | = op(n1/2) and λ′uij = op(1) uniformly over all
i and j (see Owen, 2001, Ch. 11.1). An asymptotic expression for the Lagrange multiplier is obtained as
λ = D−1U + op(n−1/2). (11)
The WEL ratio function at Qα0 is
rw(Qα0 ) = −
3∑
i=1
wi
ni
ni∑
j=1
log(1 + λ′uij).
Using a second order Taylor expansion on log(·), we obtain the following asymptotic expansion of the WEL
ratio,
−2rw(Qα0 ) = 2
3∑
i=1
wi
ni
ni∑
j=1
log(1 + λ′uij)
= 2
3∑
i=1
wi
ni
ni∑
j=1
log
(
λ′uij −
1
2λ
′uiju
′
ijλ
)
+ op(n−1)
= U ′D−1U + op(n−1)
= d33(F̂ (Qα0 )− α)2 + op(n−1),
where the last step is a consequence of (10) and d33 is the last (third for k = 3) diagonal element of D−1.
If we let
c = d33
3∑
i=1
w2i
ni − 1
Fi(Qα0 )(1− Fi(Qα0 )), (12)
it immediately follows that −2rw(Qα0 )/c will have a limiting χ2 distribution with one degree of freedom.
The scaling constant c involves the true distribution function Fi and quantile Qα0 . Replacing Qα0 by its
weighted sample quantile Q̂α = F̂−1(α) and Fi by its empirical counterpart F̂i(Q̂α) = n−1i
∑ni
j=1 1Yij≤Q̂α
will not affect the limiting distribution of the test statistic.
Under the WEL approach, a 100(1 − ρ)% confidence interval for Qα0 can be constructed as {Qα| −
2rw(Qα)/c < χ2,ρ(1)}, where χ
2,ρ
(1) is the ρ-quantile from the χ
2 distribution with one degree of freedom. The
ratio rw(Qα) is computable for any Qα such that Qα is in the convex hull formed by the overall sample. A
bootstrap calibration of the confidence interval is also a possibility. See Fu et al. (2008) for details.
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3 Simulation study
To assess the finite sample performance of our proposed methodology, we now present the results of some
Monte Carlo simulations. As a benchmark, we consider the approach of Woodruff (1952) who basically
suggested constructing confidence intervals for quantiles of complex surveys by inverting the confidence
intervals of the distribution function. Sitter and Wu (2001) found this method to be quite reliable even in
the moderate to extreme tail regions of distributions.
We consider a population divided into three strata with weights 0.50, 0.30, and 0.20. The samples for the
strata are independently generated from three lognormal distribution functions with means and standard
deviations (1.5, 0.3), (2, 0.4), and (2.1, 0.4). We use pooled sample sizes of n = 50, n = 100, n = 200, and
construct 95% confidence intervals for seven different quantiles. For each specification, we conduct 5, 000
simulations. Table 1 reports the simulated coverage probability (CP), lower tail error rates (L), upper tail
error rates (U), and the average length (AL) of the intervals. With the exception of the case where n = 50 and
α = 0.05, both confidence intervals seem to have excellent coverage rates even in the tails of the distribution.
Interestingly, the tail error rates of the WEL interval seem to be much more balanced than Woodruff’s.
In the moderate to extreme tail regions (i.e., α = 0.05, 0.10, 0.90, 0.95), WEL tends to slightly outperform
Woodruff as WEL’s coverage probabilities are closer to the nominal level of 95%. This is not true for all
instances but the “overall picture” gives WEL a slight advantage. The quantiles towards the center of the
distribution do not pose much problems (which is expected). The WEL intervals are roughly on par with
Woodruff’s.
Table 1: Simulated coverage and tail error rates for 95% confidence intervals
(n1, n2, n3) Q0.05 Q0.10 Q0.25 Q0.50 Q0.75 Q0.90 Q0.95
Woodruff Confidence Interval for Quantile Qα
(20, 20, 10) CP 82.94 94.58 95.48 95.52 95.42 96.24 94.86
L 11.34 0.78 1.08 1.52 1.56 1.92 1.02
U 5.72 4.64 3.44 2.96 3.02 1.84 4.12
AL 0.91 1.34 1.28 1.56 2.66 5.30 7.51
(40, 40, 20) CP 93.90 94.72 95.04 95.42 95.12 95.98 96.64
L 0.98 0.68 1.38 1.84 1.96 1.72 1.72
U 5.12 4.60 3.58 2.74 2.92 2.30 1.64
AL 1.01 0.93 0.88 1.10 1.84 3.39 5.85
(80, 80, 40) CP 94.62 94.36 94.92 95.26 94.70 95.60 95.60
L 0.98 1.62 1.74 1.78 2.22 2.06 2.16
U 4.40 4.02 3.34 2.96 3.08 2.34 2.24
AL 0.73 0.62 0.62 0.77 1.28 2.31 3.59
WEL Confidence Interval for Quantile Qα
(20, 20, 10) CP 87.34 94.38 95.56 94.56 94.74 94.50 94.00
L 11.34 3.06 2.38 2.38 2.20 2.52 1.88
U 1.32 2.56 2.06 3.06 3.06 2.98 4.12
AL 1.09 1.30 1.28 1.57 2.65 5.08 7.36
(40, 40, 20) CP 96.08 95.10 94.80 95.18 94.78 95.26 94.88
L 1.84 2.78 2.64 2.32 2.56 1.94 2.18
U 2.08 2.12 2.56 2.50 2.66 2.80 2.94
AL 1.06 0.88 0.87 1.10 1.84 3.37 5.43
(80, 80, 40) CP 94.64 94.78 95.10 95.18 94.48 95.22 94.68
L 3.18 3.04 2.40 2.24 2.56 2.32 2.52
U 2.18 2.18 2.50 2.58 2.96 2.46 2.80
AL 0.66 0.61 0.62 0.77 1.28 2.28 3.44
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4 Conclusion
Following up on the work of Fu et al. (2008), we proposed a weighted empirical likelihood-based inference
method for quantiles in the presence of a stratified random sampling design. Our method is very easy to
implement as computational routines are readily available. Through simulations, we were able to show that
the confidence intervals obtained from our method perform just as well (and slightly better in some cases) as
the popular method of Woodruff (1952). Thus, the WEL approach is a perfectly reliable method of inference
for quantiles arising from stratified random samples.
So far, we have limited ourselves to inferences on a single measure (i.e., one quantile or one mean). But
one may be interested in making simultaneous inference on multiple quantiles or means. The nature of
complex surveys make the asymptotics much more difficult in such cases. Our work along with the work of
Fu et al. (2008) provide partial guidance for future research into inference for a vector of measures.
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1. Introduction
Ever since the work of Atkinson (1970), there has been sig-
nificant research interest in economic inequality and poverty. Al-
though the measurement of inequality and poverty are important,
statistical inference for such measures have gained considerable
interest in recent years. Thework of Kakwani (1993), Zheng (2001),
Biewen (2002) and Davidson and Flachaire (2007) serve to high-
light the importance of statistical inference in measuring inequal-
ity and poverty rather than just the incidence.
The growing body of literature surrounding the theory of
inequality measurement has been accompanied by increasing
availability of income data distribution which have armed
researchers with the capability to conduct more sophisticated
analyses. Statistical inference for inequality measures was largely
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 519 824 4120x53917; fax: +1 519 763 8497.
E-mail addresses: tmehdi@uoguelph.ca (T. Mehdi), tstengos@uoguelph.ca
(T. Stengos).
neglected until the work of Cowell (1989). Recently, Thompson
(2010) derived the asymptotic properties of vector measures of
inequality (and poverty). He argued that since there is often no
‘‘best’’ measure of inequality or poverty, multiple measures could
be used.
Our method of inference relies on empirical likelihood (EL),
a powerful nonparametric statistical method pioneered by Owen
(1988, 1990). An advantage of empirical likelihood is that no
assumptions are needed regarding the underlying distribution of
the data. Thompson (2013) used the approach formaking inference
on poverty measures which utilize relative poverty lines. His
main focus was to compare poverty between two subgroups of
a population that share a common poverty line. We depart from
focusing on poverty measures and turn our attention to inequality
measures (more specifically, we limit our focus to the generalized
entropy class of inequality measures).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we provide a brief overview of inequality measures. In Section 3,
we present our methodology. In Section 4, we examine the
finite sample performance of our method using a Monte Carlo
0165-1765/$ – see front matter© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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simulation. In Section 5, we demonstrate the practicality of our
method using an empirical application.
2. Inequality measures
In this section,we provide a basic overview of themeasurement
of inequality. For a more thorough treatment of the literature,
see Cowell (2011) or Cowell (2000). Before proceeding, we need
to introduce some notation. Following Thompson (2010), we
generalize our approach for vector measures of inequality. Let Y =
(Y1, . . . , YJ)′ be a random vector whose value is determined by
a set of attributes (e.g., income, education, etc.) for an individual
from a certain population. In the case where we are interested in
only one attribute but we want to consider J distinct measures, we
will have Yj = Yk for all j, k. Let Fj be the distribution function of Yj.
There are several different scalar measures of inequality that
exist in the literature. We focus exclusively on the generalized
entropy class of measures which fulfill the most widely accepted
axioms including decomposability (see, e.g., Cowell, 2000).1 For
the random vector Yj, such measures can be written as Ij =
Ej(hj(yj, µj, αj)) where Ej denotes expectation under distribution
Fj, hj(yj, µj, αj) is some real-valued function, µj is the mean of
Fj, and αj is an exogenous parameter (and thus its choice is
subjective). Formally, we have
Ij =

hj(yj, µj, αj)dFj(yj),
where µj =

yjdFj(yj) and
hj(yj, µj, αj) =
[(yj/µj)
αj − 1]/(α2j − αj) αj ≠ 0, 1
− log(yj/µj) αj = 0
yj log(yj/µj)/µj αj = 1.
Let µ = (µ1, . . . , µJ)′ be the vector of means. A vector of
inequality measures can be written as I = (I1, . . . , IJ)′.
3. Empirical likelihood-based inference
The empirical likelihood method was first brought to the
forefront by Owen (1988, 1990). It is a nonparametric method of
inference and an alternative to the bootstrap. For an extensive
overview, see Owen (2001).
The basic framework can be explained as follows. Let y1, . . . , yn
be independent observations with common distribution function
F0. For any distribution function F , let pi ≥ 0 be the probability
associated with yi, with
n
i=1 pi = 1. Define L(F) = Π
n
i=1pi
as the nonparametric likelihood function for F . Maximizing L(F),
subject to the constraints on pi, yields pi = n−1. In other words,
the nonparametric likelihood function attains its maximum when
equal weight is placed on each observation.
Let θ0 = T (F0) be a J-dimensional parameter vector for
some function T . Analogous to the parametric likelihood case,
inferences about θ0 can be made using the empirical likelihood
ratio L(F)/L(F̂), where F̂ is the empirical distribution function.
Next, suppose we have r estimating functions g(Y ; θ) =
(g1(Y ; θ), . . . , gr(Y ; θ)) such that EF (g(Y ; θ)) = 0. The main
purpose of such functions is to identify the parameters of the
problem. The profile empirical likelihood ratio function can then
be written as
R(θ) = max

n
i=1
npi
pi ≥ 0, n
i=1
pi = 1,
n
i=1
pig(yi; θ) = 0

.
1 The Atkinson class of inequality measures, and the Gini index are some of the
other well established measures of inequality.
Undermild regularity conditions, it canbe shown that−2 logR(θ0)
d
−→ χ2(J).
2 Details on the computation of the profile likelihood ratio
function can be found in Owen (2001, Chapter 3.14).3
Our main focus in this paper is to compare inequality between
two distinct populations.4 To distinguish between the two
populations, let superscripts A and B hereby indicate association
with population A and B, respectively. If we let D0 = (D1,0, . . . ,
DJ,0) = (IB1,0 − I
A
1,0, . . . , I
B
J,0 − I
A
J,0), we can test the null hypothesis
thatD0 = D. Usually, applied researcherswould bemost interested
in testing the null hypothesis that IA0 = I
B
0 , which is equivalent to
testing D0 = 0. To apply the empirical likelihood-based inference
method to the generalized entropy class of inequality measures,
we need to encode the parameters of our problem into suitable
estimating functions.
Given that we are interested in comparing two populations, the
profile empirical likelihood ratio function is
R(θA, θB) = max
 n
A
i=1
nApAi
nB
i=1
nBpBi
pAi ≥ 0, pBi ≥ 0,
nA
i=1
pAi = 1,
nB
i=1
pBi = 1,
nA
i=1
pAi g(y
A
i ; θ
A) = 0,
nB
i=1
pBi g(y
B
i ; θ
B) = 0
 ,
where θA = (µA, IA), θB = (µB, IA,D), and the estimating func-
tions are
g(Y A; θA) =

Y A1 − µ
A
1
...
Y AJ − µ
A
J
h1(Y A1 , µ
A
1, α1) − I
A
1
...
hJ(Y AJ , µ
A
J , αJ) − I
A
J

,
and
g(Y B; θB) =

Y B1 − µ
B
1
...
Y BJ − µ
B
J
h1(Y B1 , µ
B
1, α1) − I
A
1 − D1
...
hJ(Y BJ , µ
B
J , αJ) − I
A
J − DJ

.
Sincewe are only interested in conducting hypotheses onD, the
remaining parameters in the µA, µB and IA vectors are regarded
as ‘‘nuisance’’ parameters. Following Owen (1990), we can ‘‘profile
out’’ such parameters by maximizing over them. So the empirical
likelihood ratio function for D is
R(D) = max
µA,µB,IA
R(µA, µB, IA,D).
To compute R(D) for any vector D, we can follow Owen (1990)
and use a nested algorithm which involves an ‘‘inner’’ and ‘‘outer’’
2 A bootstrap calibration is also possible (see Owen, 2001, Chapter 3.3).
3 Computational routines for several statistical packages are available on Owen’s
website: http://www-stat.stanford.edu/~owen/empirical/.
4 There have been numerous studies done on empirical likelihood for the two
population case (see, e.g., Wu and Yan, 2012).
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stage. The former involves solving R(µA, µB, IA,D) given candi-
date values for µA, µB and IA while the latter involves maximiz-
ing R(µA, µB, IA,D) over the choices of µA, µB and IA. The initial
candidate values for such parameters could simply be the sample
estimates. Bymaximizing over these parameter vectors, we reduce
the empirical likelihood ratio function into a function of only D
which is J-dimensional. Therefore, we have −2 logR(D0)
d
−→ χ2(J).
4. Simulation evidence
To assess the size and power of our empirical likelihood-best
test, we now present the results of someMonte Carlo experiments.
All our hypothesis tests concern a single random variable (i.e.,
Y Aj = Y
A
k and Y
B
j = Y
B
k for all j, k), and a single scalar measure
of inequality with α = 0.
To calibrate the size of our proposed method, we consider
two parametric distributions: the gamma distribution and the
Singh–Maddala distribution. The cumulative distribution function
for the gamma distribution is given by F(y) = γ (a2, y/a1)/0(a2),
where a1 is a scale parameter, a2 is a shape parameter, γ (·) is
the gamma function, and 0(·) is the incomplete gamma function.
The cumulative distribution function for the Singh–Maddala dis-
tribution is F(y) = 1 − (1 + b1yb2)−b3 , where b1 is a scale pa-
rameter, and b2 and b3 are shape parameters. Following McDon-
ald (1984), we set a2 = 2.1557 for the gamma distribution, and
b2 = 1.697 and b3 = 8.368 for the Singh–Maddala distribution
which closely mimic the 1980 US income distribution. The scale
parameters for both distributions are set to unity.5 Given these
specifications, the true inequality measures under the gamma
and Singh–Maddala distributions are 0.2495227 and 0.2488523,
respectively.
Samples for both populations are generated from the same
distribution. We test the null hypothesis that D0 = 0, which is
true. The nominal size of the test is set to 5%. Rejection frequencies
for 100,000 independent trials, for sample sizes varying from
(nA, nB) = (100, 100) to (nA, nB) = (500, 500), are reported in
Table 1. As a benchmark, we also report the rejection frequencies
for the delta method.6 Although the empirical likelihood-based
method seems to over reject in small samples, it is evident that the
errors in rejection probability (difference between the simulated
and nominal rejection rates) subside as the sample sizes are
increased. Even when we have just 300 observations on each
population, these errors are less than one-half of one percentage
point for both distributions.
To assess the power of our testing methodology, we conduct
two Monte Carlo experiments. For the first experiment, we
consider generating both samples from the gamma distribution.
The second experiment involves generating both samples from the
Singh–Maddala distribution. The shape parameters, of population
A, for the gamma and Singh–Maddala distribution remain set to
their previous values from the size simulation.We vary our choices
for the shape parameters of population B so that D0, the difference
in inequality measures between population B and population A, is
pre-specified to be −0.10, −0.05, 0.05, and 0.10.
As in the size simulations, we set the nominal size to 5%
and test the null hypothesis that D0 = 0 (which is false in all
5 Zheng (2001) used the Singh–Maddala distribution with the same parameter
specifications to analyze the asymptotic properties of decomposable poverty
measure estimates with relative poverty lines. Thompson (2013) used both
distributions with the same parameters to assess the size and power of his
testing procedure for comparing poverty measures between two subgroups of a
population.
6 The delta method can be used to obtain variances of inequality measure
estimates belonging to the generalized entropy class (see, e.g., Thompson, 2010).
Table 1
Rejection frequencies for size simulation.
Distribution nA, nB
EL
100, 100 200, 200 300, 300 400, 400 500, 500
Gamma 5.769 5.403 5.250 5.171 5.067
Singh–Maddala 6.215 5.615 5.291 5.281 5.118
Delta method
Gamma 4.751 4.897 4.938 4.954 4.896
Singh–Maddala 4.705 4.982 4.919 4.986 4.908
Table 2
Rejection frequencies for power simulation with gamma distributions.
D0 aB2 n
A, nB
EL Delta method
100, 100 500, 500 100, 100 500, 500
−0.10 3.501874 71.115 99.992 70.562 99.991
−0.05 2.660860 19.841 70.527 19.708 70.056
0.05 1.818233 14.964 53.615 14.865 54.100
0.10 1.576528 38.405 96.440 38.312 96.530
Notes: aB2 is the shape parameter for population B.
Table 3
Rejection frequencies for power simulation with Singh–Maddala distributions.
D0 bB2 b
B
3 n
A, nB
EL Delta method
100, 100 500, 500 100, 100 500, 500
−0.10 2.28 6.32 62.853 99.951 64.610 99.957
−0.05 2.01 4.45 17.243 64.067 17.913 64.098
0.05 2.09 1.38 11.143 39.256 9.118 33.982
0.10 2.08 1.17 25.120 83.727 20.146 77.966
Notes: bB2 and b
B
3 are the shape parameters for population B.
cases here). We consider sample sizes of (nA, nB) = (100, 100)
and (nA, nB) = (500, 500), and conduct 100,000 independent
trials. To correct for size distortions, the critical value of the test
statistic is set equal to its 95,000th largest value from the size
simulation. Rejection frequencies along with our choices of shape
parameters (for population B) for the first and second experiment
are reported in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively. We also report
the (size-corrected) rejection frequencies for the delta method.
From Table 2, it is apparent that the two testing methodologies
perform almost identically for the first experiment (though the
empirical likelihood-based method holds a slim advantage with
100 observations on each population). But when the samples are
both drawn from the Singh–Maddala distribution as in Table 3, the
empirical likelihood-based method clearly outperforms the delta
method when D0 = 0.05, 0.10. In fact, with 500 observations,
our method has rejection frequencies that are more than five
percentage points higher than those of the delta method. Overall,
we can conclude that the empirical likelihood-based approach
certainly matches the performance of the delta method, and in
some cases outperforms it.
5. Empirical application
In this section, we illustrate our proposed methodology using
a ‘‘real-world’’ application where we compare income inequality,
using after-tax income data, between two populations in Canada:
non-immigrants and immigrants.
We obtain our data from the Survey of Labour and Income
Dynamics (SLID) for 2009. To reduce the level of heterogeneity
T. Mehdi, T. Stengos / Economics Letters 123 (2014) 54–57 57
Table 4
Sample estimates for empirical application.
Population µ I1 I2 I3
Non-immigrants 25,019 0.547714 0.417437 0.378834
Immigrants 17,132 0.675557 0.501120 0.449005
within samples, we restrict our analysis to single (never married)
individuals who reside in urban areas with a population of 500,000
or greater. For the purposes of this illustration, we consider only
those immigrants who have been in Canada for 19 years or less.
Our sample consists of 3093 non-immigrants and 393 immigrants
(i.e., nA = 3093, and nB = 393).
We consider three distinct scalar measures of inequality by
setting α1 = 0, α2 = 0.5, and α3 = 1. The sample estimates
of the population means and inequality measures are reported
in Table 4. The nominal size of the test is set to 5%. Given three
measures of inequality, the appropriate degrees of freedom for the
null distribution is three. In testing D0 = 0, our test statistic is
determined to be −2 logR(0) = 9.851083 which exceeds the
95th percentile of the χ2(3) distribution (i.e., 7.814728). Thus, our
null hypothesis is rejected leading us to conclude that income
inequality between non-immigrants and immigrants in Canada
may not be equal.
References
Atkinson, A.B., 1970. On the measurement of inequality. J. Econom. Theory 12,
244–263.
Biewen, M., 2002. Bootstrap inference for inequality, mobility and poverty
measurement. J. Econometrics 108, 317–342.
Cowell, F.A., 1989. Sampling variance and decomposable inequality measures. J.
Econometrics 42, 27–41.
Cowell, F.A., 2000. Measurement of inequality. In: Atkinson, A.B., Bourguignon, F.
(Eds.), Handbook of Income Distribution, Vol. I. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Cowell, F.A., 2011. Measuring Inequality, third ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Davidson, R., Flachaire, E., 2007. Asymptotic and bootstrap inference for inequality
and poverty measures. J. Econometrics 141, 141–166.
Kakwani, N., 1993. Statistical inference in the measurement of poverty. Rev. Econ.
Stat. 75, 632–639.
McDonald, J., 1984. Some generalized functions for the size distribution of income.
Econometrica 52, 647–663.
Owen, A.B., 1988. Empirical likelihood ratio confidence intervals for a single
functional. Biometrika 75, 237–249.
Owen, A.B., 1990. Empirical likelihood ratio confidence regions. Ann. Statist. 18,
90–120.
Owen, A.B., 2001. Empirical Likelihood. Chapman and Hall/CRC, Boca Raton.
Thompson, B.S., 2010. Statistical inference for vector measures of inequality and
poverty. J. Econ. Inequal. 8, 451–462.
Thompson, B.S., 2013. Empirical likelihood-based inference for poverty measures
with relative poverty lines. Econometric Rev. 32, 513–523.
Wu, C., Yan, Y., 2012. Empirical likelihood inference for two-sample problems. Stat.
Interface 5, 345–354.
Zheng, B., 2001. Statistical inference for poverty measures with relative poverty
lines. J. Econometrics 101, 337–356.
Paper 1C
COMMUNICATIONS IN STATISTICS—THEORY ANDMETHODS
, VOL. , NO. , –
http://dx.doi.org/./..
Poverty comparisons with common relative poverty lines
Tahsin Mehdi
Department of Economics, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received  September 
Accepted  March 
KEYWORDS
Bootstrap inference; Income
distribution; Relative poverty.
MATHEMATICS SUBJECT
CLASSIFICATION
B; F
ABSTRACT
Relative poverty lines are increasingly being used in poverty compari-
son studies. Existingmethods assume that the distributions being com-
pared are distinct with independent relative poverty lines. However, this
practice may be problematic when comparing two subgroups of a pop-
ulation. We follow up on a recent proposal for the usage of common
relative poverty lines in such cases, and develop a test for comparing
poverty between subgroups of a single population, using inequality
restrictions. Monte Carlo experiments are conducted in order to exam-
ine the size and power of our proposed test. We illustrate our procedure
using some U.S. household income data.
1. Introduction
Inception of poverty measurement into economic literature was largely propagated by the
work of Sen (1976) who brought the topic to the forefront. As a result, there has been a
paradigm shift in the way poverty is viewed and measured. Over the past two decades,
great advancements in inference for poverty measures have been made due to works such as
Kakwani (1993), Bishop et al. (1995), Bishop et al. (1997), Davidson andDuclos (2000), Zheng
(2001), and Biewen (2002).
Poverty measurement typically entails setting or defining a poverty line (i.e., a threshold
level of income or some other measure of individual welfare that divides the “poor” and “non
poor”). A poverty line can be specified as one that is absolute or relative. The former is usu-
ally determined by analysts who base their decision on their own interpretation of economic
factors. Such poverty lines need to be revised frequently to reflect changes in economic condi-
tions. To alleviate this issue, an alternative is to specify the poverty line as a fraction of either
themean or some quantile of the underlying income distribution. These are known as relative
poverty lines and they have gained momentum in recent years.1
In this article, we focus exclusively on decomposable (additively separable) poverty mea-
sures that utilize relative poverty lines.2 Asymptotic properties of such measures remained
rather elusive, until the work of Zheng (2001). His work is closely related to that of Preston
(1995)who also considered relative poverty lines but only for the headcount ratio (i.e., the pro-
portion of the population with income levels below the poverty line). Zheng’s main focus was
CONTACT Tahsin Mehdi tmehdi@uwaterloo.ca Department of Economics, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario,
Canada NL G.
 For example, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) often reports poverty rates for itsmember
countries by setting poverty lines to %, %, and % of the national median income level.
 Such poverty measure estimates themselves require an estimate of the underlying poverty line and therefore the sampling
variance of the poverty line must be taken into consideration.
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on comparing poverty between two distinct populations each with its own relative poverty
line. He developed a procedure for testing the null hypothesis that PB ≥ PA, where PG is a
vector of poverty measures for population G, for G = A, B.
Recently, Thompson (2013) proposed a novel, empirical likelihood (EL)-based method of
inference, for comparing poverty between two subgroups of a population that share a common
relative poverty line. His particular focus was on testing the null hypothesis that PB = PA,
under the assumption that the poverty line is some fraction of the “pooled” median income
level. This may be sensible when comparing poverty between, say, males and females from a
certain population.
Often, applied researchers may bemore interested in determining if one subgroup is better
(or worse) off. So we depart from Thompson’s (2013) null of equality and devise a method
for testing null hypotheses of the form PB ≥ PA (under the assumption of common relative
poverty lines). We focus on quantile-based poverty lines but our test can be adapted to the
case of mean-based poverty lines.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief
overview of decomposable poverty measures. In Section 3, we lay out the asymptotic frame-
work and develop our testing procedure. In Section 4, we conduct a series of Monte Carlo
experiments in order to assess the size and power of our test. In Section 5, we provide a brief
illustration of our procedure using some U.S. household income data. Section 6 concludes.
2. Decomposable poverty measures
As stated earlier, we focus exclusively on decomposable poverty measures, which are a class
of poverty measures that are additively separable.
LetY be a continuous randomvariable whose value is determined by income or some other
measure of individual welfare. Let F be its distribution function. For a given poverty line z,
an individual with income y is classified as being poor if y ≤ z, and non poor if y > z.
A decomposable povertymeasure is onewhich can bewritten as P = EF [p(y; z)], whereEF
denotes the expectation under distribution F , and p(y; z) is an individual deprivation func-
tion such that p(y; z) ≥ 0 for y ≤ z, and p(y; z) = 0 for y > z.3 Several deprivation functions
have been proposed in the literature (see, e.g., Zheng, 2001, Table 1) and itmay seem as though
there is no clear guidance as to which one should be chosen. However, one can select it based
on axiomatic grounds (see Zheng, 1997, for a discussion on the desirability of axioms and
poverty measures).
The aim of this article is to develop a framework which will allow us to make poverty
comparisons between two subgroups of a population that share a common relative poverty
line. Suppose a finite population of size N consists of NA individuals who belong to a sub-
group, denoted A, and NB individuals who belong to another subgroup, denoted B. Let
FA and FB be the distribution functions that generate the underlying variable of interest
(e.g., income) in each subgroup. The population level distribution function is simply F(·) =
wAFA(·) + wBFB(·), where wA = NA/N and wB = NB/N. We assume a common quantile-
based poverty line z = cξq for some fraction c ∈ [0, 1], where ξq is a population quantile of
order q (i.e., F(ξq) = q).4 Then the poverty measures for subgroups A and B, respectively, are
just EA[p(y; z)] and EB[p(y; z)], where EG denotes the expectation under distribution FG.
 The restrictions on the individual deprivation function follow from the “focus axiom” (see Foster, ).
 If one is interested in a common mean-based poverty line, then z = cμ where μ = wAEA(y) + wBEB(y). In this case, the
asymptotic expression () would need to be changed accordingly.
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Since there may be conflicting opinions on the choice of c, one may want to make
poverty comparisons more “robust” by considering J different poverty lines with the jth
poverty line being z j = c jξq for j = 1, . . . , J. Then the vector poverty measures for sub-
groups A and B, respectively, are PA = (PA1 , . . . , PAJ ) = (EA[p(y; z1)], . . . ,EA[p(y; zJ )]) and
PB = (PB1 , . . . , PBJ ) = (EB[p(y; z1)], . . . ,EB[p(y; zJ )]).
3. Estimation and inference
In this section, we establish the asymptotic properties required for comparing poverty
between distributions with common quantile-based poverty lines. Our work will be greatly
facilitated by Zheng (2001) who laid much of the groundwork but under the assumption that
each distribution has its own relative poverty line.
Let {yAi }nAi=1 and {yBi }nBi=1 be random iid draws from FA and FB, respectively, and let n =
nA + nB be the pooled sample size. Assume that n → ∞ implies nG → ∞, and nG/NG is
sufficiently small so that no finite population adjustment is necessary. Further, assume that
the sampling proportions coincide with the population (i.e., nG/n = wG) The jth poverty
measure for subgroup G can be consistently estimated by P̂Gj = n−1G
∑nG
i=1 p(y
G
i ; ẑ j), where
ẑ j = c jy(r), y(r) is the rth order statistic of the pooled sample y = (yA, yB)′ with r =
[
nq
]
, and[
nq
]
is the integer part of nq.
Let the vector of differences in poverty measures between subgroups B and A be given
by D = (D1, . . . ,DJ ) = (PB1 − PA1 , . . . , PBJ − PAJ ). Using similar arguments as Zheng (2001,
Section 4.2), an asymptotic expression for the jth difference is
Dj = 1nB
nB∑
i=1
p
(
yBi ; z j
) − 1
nA
nA∑
i=1
p
(
yAi ; z j
) + c js j(y(r) − ξq) + op (n−1/2) (1)
where s j = aBj − aAj + p(z j; z j)[ fB(z j) − fA(z j)], aGj = ∂PGj /∂z j, and fG is the underlying
density function of distribution FG.
Using the Bahadur representation (see, e.g., Zheng, 2001, pp. 351), we can express the dif-
ference between the sample quantile and population quantile as
y(r) − ξq =
q − F̂(ξq)
f (ξq)
+ op
(
n−1/2
)
(2)
where F̂(ξq) = n−1
∑n
i=1 I(yi ≤ ξq), I(·) is an indicator function which evaluates to 1 if its
argument (·) is true and 0 otherwise, and f (·) is the underlying population density function.
Thus, (1) becomes
Dj = 1nB
nB∑
i=1
p
(
yBi ; z j
) − 1
nA
nA∑
i=1
p
(
yAi ; z j
) − c js j
f (ξq)
F̂(ξq) +
c js jq
f (ξq)
+ op
(
n−1/2
)
(3)
Under the conditions that FA and FB are differentiable and have finite first two moments,D
can be consistently estimated by D̂ = (D̂1, . . . , D̂J ) = (P̂B1 − P̂A1 , . . . , P̂BJ − P̂AJ ), so it follows
that
√
n(D̂ − D) will converge in distribution to a normal random vector with mean vector
zero and covariance matrix  which has typical element
Cov(D̂ j, D̂k) = {EA[p(y; z j)p(y; zk)] − PAj PAk }/wA + {EB[p(y; z j)p(y; zk)] − PBj PBk }/wB
− cksk{PBj [1 − FB(ξq)] − PAj [1 − FA(ξq)]}/ f (ξq)
− c js j{PBk [1 − FB(ξq)] − PAk [1 − FA(ξq)]}/ f (ξq)
+ c jcks jsk{wAFA(ξq)[1 − FA(ξq)] + wBFB(ξq)[1 − FB(ξq)]}/ f 2(ξq), ∀ j, k
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In practice  can be consistently estimated by ̂ which has typical element
ˆCov(D̂ j, D̂k) =
[
1
nA
nA∑
i=1
p(yAi ; ẑ j)p(yAi ; ẑk) − P̂Aj P̂Ak
]
n
nA
+
[
1
nB
nB∑
i=1
p(yBi ; ẑ j)p(yBi ; ẑk) − P̂Bj P̂Bk
]
n
nB
−ckŝk{P̂Bj [1 − F̂B(y(r))] − P̂Aj [1 − F̂A(y(r))]}/ f̂ (y(r))
−c jŝ j{P̂Bk [1 − F̂B(y(r))] − P̂Ak [1 − F̂A(y(r))]}/ f̂ (y(r))
+ c jckŝ j ŝk{nAF̂A(y(r))[1 − F̂A(y(r))]
+ nBF̂B(y(r))[1 − F̂B(y(r))]}/[n f̂ 2(y(r))], ∀ j, k,
where F̂G(y(r)) = n−1G
∑nG
i=1I(y
G
i ≤ y(r)), ŝ j = âBj − âAj + p(ẑ j; ẑ j)[ f̂B(ẑ j) − f̂A(ẑ j)], âGj =
∂P̂Gj /∂ ẑ j, and f̂G is the estimated underlying density function of FG. A well-known method
for estimating densities is kernel estimation.5 The estimate of the underlying population den-
sity function is f̂ (·) = nAn−1 f̂A(·) + nBn−1 f̂B(·). Buskirk (1998) showed that weighted ker-
nel density estimators (as is the case here) will indeed be consistent.
Recall from Section 1 that our focus is on testing the null hypothesis that PB ≥ PA, which
means subgroup B has (weakly) higher poverty than subgroup A for all poverty lines consid-
ered. We may equivalently state the null hypothesis as
H0 : D ≥ 0
The alternate hypothesis is simply the negation of H0.
For our purposes, the relevantmethods can be found inKodde and Palm (1986) andWolak
(1989) who developed the framework for testing multivariate inequality restrictions.6 First,
we compute the Wald-type test statistic
W = min
D≥0
n(D̂ − D)′̂−1(D̂ − D) (4)
where the right-hand side is a quadratic programming problem. Then we obtain a p-value in
order to decide whether the null should be rejected or not. Under the null,W will converge
in distribution to a mixture of χ 2 distributions.
Since obtaining the critical values can be rather cumbersome, we follow Stengos and
Thompson (2012) and advocate the use of the bootstrap. The procedure can be explained
as follows. Given samples yA and yB of sizes nA and nB, respectively, we pool the samples and
obtain y = (yA, yB)′. Then the bootstrap samples yA∗ and yB∗ are generated by resampling nA
and nB observations (with replacement) from y. Next, using the bootstrap samples, we com-
pute the bootstrap test statisticW ∗ in a similar manner toW . After repeating this process a
large number of times, the bootstrap p-value is the proportion of times thatW ∗ exceedsW .
A value less than the nominal size of the test should lead to the rejection of H0.
 The consistency of such estimators has been rigorously established in the literature (see, e.g., Li and Racine, ).
 Zheng () suggested using the approach for testing a similar type of hypothesis (but under the assumption of distinct
relative poverty lines). Stengos and Thompson () also use it in testing for bivariate stochastic dominance.
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Table . Rejection frequencies for size simulation.
n
Distribution    ,
Gamma . . . .
Singh–Maddala . . . .
Log-normal . . . .
Unit Exponential . . . .
Uniform . . . .
Note: The nominal size of the test is %. The poverty lines are set to 40%, 50%, and 60% of the median.
4. Simulation evidence
We now present the results from a series of Monte Carlo experiments which were used to
assess the size and power of our test. The hypothesis tests here were conducted with a nominal
size set to 5%. Each of our experiments were carried out using 10,000 independent trials, and
sample sizes of nA = nB = n/2. The deprivation function is set to p(y; z) = I(y ≤ z) (i.e., the
headcount ratio), for which aGj = 0 (see, e.g., Zheng, 2001, Table 1).
In assessing the size of our test, five different parametric distributions are considered:
gamma, Singh–Maddala, log-normal, unit exponential, and uniform. The latter four distribu-
tions were used in Zheng (2001). The former two were used in Thompson (2013). The cumu-
lative distribution function of the gamma distribution is given by F(y) = γ (a2, y/a1)/(a2),
where a1 is a scale parameter, a2 is a shape parameter, γ (·) is the gamma function, and (·) is
the incomplete gamma function. The cumulative distribution function of the Singh–Maddala
distribution is given by F(y) = 1 − (1 + b1yb2 )−b3 , where b1 is a scale parameter, and b2 and
b3 are shape parameters. FollowingMcDonald (1984), we set a2 = 2.1557 for the gamma dis-
tribution, and b2 = 1.697 and b3 = 8.368 for the Singh–Maddala distribution, which were
used to simulate 1980 U.S. income distribution. The scale parameters for both distributions
are set to unity. For the log-normal distribution, the mean and standard deviation are set to
2.9372 and 0.7797, respectively, which were also used by McDonald (1984) to simulate 1980
U.S. income distribution. For the uniform distribution, we follow Zheng (2001) and specify
the support as the unit interval [0, 1]. We consider three different poverty lines set to 40%,
50%, and 60% of the median (i.e., q = 0.5).7
To assess the size of the test, observations for subgroups A and B are generated from the
same distribution. We test the null hypothesis that D ≥ 0 which is (weakly) true in this case.
We consider pooled sample sizes varying from n = 100 to n = 1, 000 and utilize 199 boot-
strap replications. Rejection frequencies reported in Table 1 indicate good size properties.
Overall, we can conclude that n = 1, 000 should be sufficient for our proposed test to be reli-
able. This is not a very demanding requirement at all as typical household survey datasets
tend to have thousands of observations.
In assessing the power of our test, we focus exclusively on the gamma distribution. The
shape and scale parameters for subgroup A remain set to their original levels from the size
simulation. For subgroup B, we vary the parameters following Thompson (2013), so as to
induce D < 0. Rejection frequencies based on 199 bootstrap replications, along with shape
and scale parameters for subgroup B, are reported in Table 2. Our test exhibits good power
properties. Clearly, when sample sizes are small and D is close to 0, power is quite low but
with increased sample sizes it approaches full power quite quickly.
 As discussed earlier, quantile-based poverty lines require density estimation in calculating the covariance structure. We use
kernel estimation with a Gaussian kernel and a “rule-of-thumb”bandwidth (see, e.g., Li and Racine, , Ch. ).
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Table . Rejection frequencies for power simulation.
n
aB1 a
B
2 D1 D2 D3    ,
. . − . − . − . . . . .
. . − . − . − . . . . .
Note: The nominal size of the test is %. Dj is the jth difference in poverty measures between subgroups B and A with poverty
lines set to 40%( j = 1), 50%( j = 2), and 60%( j = 3) of the median. Both distributions are generated from the gamma
distribution. The scale parameter of distribution A is set to unity and its shape parameter is set to ..
In the final experiment, we examine power again but using Zheng (2001) and Thomp-
son (2013) as benchmarks. We consider a single poverty line set to one-half the median. In
order to ensure “fairness” to Thompson’s (2013) EL-based test which has the null of equal-
ity of poverty, we briefly depart from our null involving inequality, and test D = 0. Our test
and that of Zheng (2001) can easily accommodate this type of hypothesis. In fact, for a sin-
gle poverty line, both tests can be done using t statistics which will have limiting standard
normal distributions under the null. Thompson’s (2013) EL test statistic will have a lim-
iting χ 21 distribution. The shape and scale parameters for subgroup A remain set to their
original levels while those for subgroup B are varied using Thompson’s (2013) values which
induce D = (−0.10, −0.05, 0.05, 0.10) while maintaining the same median for both distri-
butions (this ensures fairness to Zheng’s (2001) test). Rejection frequencies (size-corrected)
for n = 100 and n = 1, 000 along with the shape and scale parameter values for subgroup B
are reported in Table 3. To correct for size distortions, we first conducted the trials by gen-
erating both sets of observations using the same shape and scale parameters from the size
simulation. For our test and that of Zheng (2001), the lower-tail and upper-tail critical values
were then set equal to the 250th and 9,750th largest test statistics, respectively. For Thomp-
son’s (2013) test, the critical value was set equal to the 9,500th largest test statistic. The results
suggest that our test and that of Thompson (2013) are on par which is not at all that surprising
given that both use a common relative poverty line. Zheng’s (2001) test appears to be more
powerful but one must remember that his test is based on the assumption of distinct relative
poverty lines which may be associated with relatively lower sampling variances.
5. Illustration
In this section, we illustrate our approach using some household income data obtained from
the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS) for 2012. Specifically, we com-
pare poverty between males and females.
Table . Rejection frequencies for power simulation with null of equality.
W Zheng EL
D aB1 a
B
2 n = 100 n = 1, 000 n = 100 n = 1, 000 n = 100 n = 1, 000
−. . . . . . . . .
−. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
Note: The null here is D = 0with nominal size %. The poverty line is set to one-half the median. Both distributions are
generated from the gamma distribution. The scale parameter of distribution A is set to unity and its shape parameter is set to
..
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Table . Descriptive statistics and estimated poverty measures for empirical illustration.
Subgroup Mean Median Std. Dev. P1 P2 P3 P
∗
1 P
∗
2 P
∗
3
Male $, $, $, . . . . . .
Female $, $, $, . . . . . .
Note: Pj denotes the estimated poverty measure with a poverty line set to 40%( j = 1), 50%( j = 2), and 60%( j = 3) of the
median. P∗j denotes the jth poverty measure based on distinct poverty lines. The overall sample median is $,.
For the purposes of this illustration,we ignore the complex sampling structure of the survey
and assume the observations are drawn through simple random sampling. The survey also
includes observations from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico which we exclude from our
study. Thus, we only consider the 50 states of the United States. Furthermore, to reduce the
level of heterogeneity within the sample, we consider only one person households. There are
a total of 333,769 observations with 139,284 males and 194,485 females.
The U.S. government has essentially defined poverty in absolute terms for over half a cen-
tury. As discussed in Section 1, absolute poverty lines are ones which are fixed and thus do
not depend on the underlying income distribution. Currently, there are two basic poverty
measures the United States uses. The first of which is based on poverty “thresholds” set by
the U.S. Census Bureau. These thresholds are adjusted for factors like family size, number
of children under 18 years of age, etc., and are most commonly used for statistical purposes.
The second way the United States measures poverty is based on poverty “guidelines” issued
by U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. These so-called guidelines are mainly
used for administrative purposes (i.e., determining financial eligibility for federal assistance
programs).8
Herewe consider relative poverty and set poverty lines to 40%, 50%, and 60%of themedian
income level, which the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
use to report poverty rates for its member countries. Some descriptive statistics along with
estimated headcount ratios, based on common poverty lines as well as distinct poverty lines,
are reported in Table 4. Despite less variability and a lower median income level for females,
the conventional estimates based on distinct poverty lines are higher for males on all counts.
But those based on common poverty lines suggest higher poverty for females.
Next, we employ our test as well as that of Zheng (2001) in testing some hypotheses based
on the headcount ratio.We utilize 999 bootstrap replications and use theGaussian kernel with
bandwidths chosen via “rule-of-thumb” in estimating densities. The nominal size of the test
is set to 5%.
Consider Zheng’s (2001) test which, in this instance, sets the poverty lines for males and
females based on their respective median income levels. We first test the null hypothesis that
females have (weakly) higher poverty than males. We obtain a bootstrap p-value of exactly 0
which leads us to reject the null. Next, we test the null hypothesis that males have (weakly)
higher poverty than females. In doing so, we obtain a bootstrap p-value of 0.6797 so we
are unable to reject our second null hypothesis. The tests here indicate that males may have
(weakly) higher poverty than females. If income among females is indeed more evenly dis-
tributed as the standard deviations suggest, and they also have a lower median income level,
we argue that this conclusion is rather incongruous.
Now we consider our approach which, in this instance, is predicated on the poverty lines
being determined by the median of the overall income distribution of males and females.
In testing (weakly) higher poverty for females than males, we obtain a bootstrap p-value of
More details can be found on the Institute for Research on Poverty website: http://www.irp.wisc.edu
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0.6537 while in testing (weakly) higher poverty for males than females, we obtain exactly 0.
Thus, we are able to reject the null of (weakly) higher poverty for males than females, but not
the converse. So contrary to Zheng’s (2001) test, we reach a conclusionwhich seems to suggest
(weakly) higher poverty for females than males. The likely explanation for the contradictory
conclusions is that since the estimated median and standard deviation for females are lower
than males, there is more evidence of higher poverty for females based on our framework.
This brief illustration serves as a caution to applied researchers who continue the conven-
tional practice of assuming distinct poverty lines.
6. Conclusion
In this article, we followed up on Thompson’s (2013) proposal for the usage of common rela-
tive poverty lines, and developed the asymptotic framework for making poverty comparisons
between subgroups of a population. While Thompson (2013) was concerned with testing
equality of poverty between subgroups, we devised a method for testing inequality restric-
tions (i.e., whether one subgroup has (weakly) higher poverty than the other).
Simulation evidence presented here validates our approach. A series ofMonte Carlo exper-
iments suggest our test has good size and power properties. Finally, an empirical investiga-
tion was conducted using some U.S. household income data, for illustrative purposes, which
demonstrated why using common relative poverty lines may be more sensible in some cases.
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Abstract
Wemeasure global performance when it comes to child development outcomes based
on Save the Children UK’s Child Development Index, a composite measure com-
prising health, education, and nutrition. We rely on consistent tests of stochastic
dominance efficiency to derive the most optimistic scenario for measured child devel-
opment where more countries achieve better measured outcomes based on the least
variable combination of components of the index. Using the same approach, we also
derive the most pessimistic scenario where more countries achieve worse measured
outcomes. This approach presents an opportunity to study the sensitivity of the Child
Development Index and allows us to better understand the aspects of child develop-
ment by offering a glimpse into the index components most responsible for driving
or hindering improvements in measured child development across countries. To gain
a sense of the evolution of the dimensions, we consider four time periods: 1995 -
1999, 2000 - 2004, 2005 - 2010, and 2011 - 2016. We find that in the most opti-
mistic scenario for measured child development, increasing the weight attached to
the education dimension over time allows more countries to achieve better measured
outcomes. On the other hand, shifting majority of the weight towards health results in
the most pessimistic scenario. These results indicate that improvements in children’s
education outcomes have outpaced health and nutrition. That is, relative to health and
nutrition, more countries find it easier to achieve better education outcomes.
Keywords Multidimensional welfare · Stochastic dominance · Child development
1 Introduction
The year 2015 marked the end of United Nation’s (UN) Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs), and ushered in the era of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), an
 Tahsin Mehdi
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overarching framework for the world to “end poverty, protect the planet and ensure
prosperity for all”. Measuring and improving the well-being of children, in particu-
lar, has always been at the forefront of public discourse. Achieving universal primary
education and reducing child mortality were two of the MDGs (see, e.g., United
Nations 2015a). SDGs include better health, education, and nutrition outcomes for all
ages (see, United Nations 2015b). According to (World Health Organization 2007),
“economists now argue on the basis of the available evidence that investment in early
childhood is the most powerful investment a country can make, with returns over the
lifecourse many times the size of the original investment”.
Neuman and Devercelli (2013) states that worldwide inequalities in child develop-
ment are stark and they begin prior to birth and expand during a child’s early years.
There is cross-country evidence suggesting that by the time children enroll in primary
school, significant gaps exist in their development. Over 200 million children under
the age of 5 living in low and middle-income countries fail to reach their developmen-
tal potential as a result of poverty, nutritional deficiencies, and inadequate learning
opportunities (see, Grantham-McGregor et al. 2007). The earliest years of a child’s
life usually presents the best window of opportunity for better outcomes later in life.
Child development inequalities exist not just across countries but within countries
also as evidenced by figures that show significant disparities in pre-primary enroll-
ment between the poorest and wealthiest households (see, Neuman and Devercelli
2013).
It is now widely recognized that univariate indicators such as income per capita are
inadequate for assessing quality of life. This sentiment is echoed by numerous works
such as Maasoumi (1999) and List (2004), or Fleurbaey (2012). Recent decades have
seen a dramatic increase in the development of multidimensional welfare indica-
tors (e.g., UN’s Human Development Index and Multidimensional Poverty Index, or
OECD’s Better Life Index). When it comes to assessing the well-being of children,
it’s no different (see, e.g., Roelen and Gassmann 2008; Trani et al. 2013; Chzhen and
Ferrone 2017; Chzhen et al. 2017). Main and Bradshaw (2016) and Roelen (2017)
point out that household-based monetary metrics are insufficient for capturing what
it means for children to be “poor”.
Building on the UN’s well-known Human Development Index (HDI), Save the
Children UK developed the Child Development Index (CDI) in 2008 (see, Save
the Children UK 2008), a composite index that aggregates health, education, and
nutrition into a summary measure.1 Due to a lack of reliable annual data, Save the
Children UK (2012) combined data from 1995 to 1999, 2000 to 2004, and 2005 to
2010 to produce three sets of CDIs for several countries. In this paper, we consider
the same time periods but also combine data for 2011 to 2016 to produce a more
recent set of CDIs. The health dimension of the CDI is captured by mortality rate for
children under 5 (per 1,000 live births which Save the Children UK bounds to 340),
the education dimension is measured by the net primary-school non-enrollment, and
lastly nutrition is captured by the percentage of underweight children under 5. The
CDI is simply the arithmetic mean of the three components, and thus is bounded by
1Instead of nutrition, the HDI uses standard of living as its third component.
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the unit interval (or between 0 and 100 depending on whether the dimensional indi-
cators are expressed in fractions or not). In other words, each dimension is assigned
a weight of 1/3. A relatively lower CDI corresponds to better measured child devel-
opment outcomes. For this paper, it is easier to use the obverse of the CDI indicators.
That is, we consider the survival rate of children under 5 (using Save the Children
UK’s 340 live births as an upper bound), net primary-school enrollment rate, and per-
centage of healthy weight children under 5. In this regard, a relatively higher CDI
will correspond to better measured child development.2
The ability of composite indices to synthesize complex social phenomena into
single summary measures is indeed appealing but how the underlying components
are aggregated often raise questions of efficacy. The CDI, much like the HDI, is
an equally-weighted composite index (i.e., each of its dimensions are given equal
weight prior to aggregation). Such a weighting scheme is just one among an infinite
number of weighting strategies that can be envisioned so it becomes a major source of
debate among researchers and policy makers. However, the equal-weighting scheme
is not without its virtues as pointed out by Hagerty and Land (2007) who developed a
mathematical model for examining weighting schemes for quality of life indicators.
One of their many findings was that when the distribution of preferences with regards
to weighting are unknown for a given population (which is often the case in practice),
constructing an index with equal weights constitutes the “minimax” solution. That is,
the equal-weighting strategy actually minimizes the maximum possible disagreement
in the population (see Proposition 6, Hagerty and Land 2007).
In this article, our aim is not to discuss the superiority or inferiority of weight-
ing schemes but rather it is to shed light on the CDI components most responsible
for driving composite improvements over time and those hindering improvements
across countries. For this, we rely on consistent tests of stochastic dominance effi-
ciency (SDE) proposed by Scaillet and Topaloglou (2010), to derive the best-case
and worst-case scenarios for measured child development. The former refers to a sit-
uation where more countries achieve better measured child development outcomes,
while the latter refers to a situation where more countries achieve worse measured
outcomes.
SDE is a data-driven aggregation procedure and can be viewed as a direct exten-
sion of stochastic dominance which is a nonparametric statistical method of ranking
distributions in a robust manner taking all moments of a distribution into account.
Stochastic dominance has gained significant interest across multiple disciplines.
Stochastic dominance does not require the specification of an explicit social welfare
functional form or probability distribution. First-order stochastic dominance satis-
fies all types of non-decreasing utility functions. It simply requires economic agents
to be rational in the sense that more of a social “good” increases utility level while
2We refer to “measured” child development to emphasize that the CDI (and any other composite index for
that matter) is a subjective measure of well-being. Discussions surrounding a truly optimal indicator of
well-being would delve not only into the empirical realm but political and philosophical realms as well. In
the absence of such an indicator, composite indicators such as the CDI serve as good analytical tools with
which to assess well-being.
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more of a social “bad” decreases utility level (monotonicity axiom). Until (Scaillet
and Topaloglou 2010), only pairwise testing of dominance was possible (e.g., David-
son and Duclos 2000; Barrett and Donald 2003). Scaillet and Topaloglou (2010)
extended stochastic dominance by allowing for full diversification. That is, they
devised a method for testing a benchmark set of linearly weighted combination of
variables against all other possible linear weighting combinations.
Stochastic dominance exploits all moments of the underlying distributions.
Though SDE is rooted in the domain of finance, a strand of literature has recently
emerged which apply the method to multidimensional well-being measures (e.g.,
Agliardi et al. 2012, 2014, 2015; Pinar et al. 2013, 2015, 2017a, b). In the context
of multidimensional well-being, an “efficient” weighting vector is one which gives
rise to the best-case scenario where more units (e.g., countries) realize better mea-
sured outcomes based on the least variable combination of components. The weights
arising from this type of analysis identify the components that are the greatest con-
tributors to improvements or hindrances in overall measured outcomes over time,
which may be of great interest to policy makers and researchers.
SDE has been used to assess the HDI in Pinar et al. (2013, 2015, 2017a). The
approach was also utilized by Pinar (2015) in examining the World Bank’s World
Governance Indicators.3 While Pinar et al. (2013, 2017a) examined human develop-
ment worldwide, Pinar et al. (2015) restricted the analysis to the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) region. Agliardi et al. (2015) used the approach in develop-
ing an environmental degradation index. Agliardi et al. (2012, 2014) and Pinar et al.
(2017b) are examples of how SDE can be applied in the domain of finance.
Following such recent works, we rely on consistent tests of SDE to derive the most
optimistic and most pessimistic scenarios for measured child development across
countries. Our results suggest that more countries realize higher levels of measured
child development when education receives more weight over time. On the other
hand, shifting most of the weight towards health results in the worst-case scenario
where more countries achieve worse measured outcomes. This reveals that more
countries may have invested in their education system relative to health and nutri-
tion over time, and thus weighting education more heavily allows more countries to
achieve better measured child development. This also means that improvements in
education systems may have outpaced health and nutrition. In terms of cross-country
comparisons, re-weighting the indicators has little impact on countries that are well
invested in all three dimensions while those invested in one or two dimensions
experience substantial deviations in rankings.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. We commence with Section 2
which introduces the concept of SDE in the context of measuring child development
outcomes. In Section 3, we describe the data. We employ SDE and offer a discussion
of our empirical results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with reflections on the
broad findings and implications.
3Pinar et al. (2013) found that weighting education relatively more results in the most optimistic scenario
for measured human development. This study was later followed up by Pinar et al. (2017a) who found that
under the updated methodology of the UN, the health dimension gets weighted increasingly more over
time in the most optimistic scenario.
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2 Stochastic Dominance Efficient Child Development Index
ConsiderY, anN×3 matrix of achievements taking values inR3, where the elements
in the matrix consist of realization of achievements in the 3 CDI indicators for N
countries. Let F(Y) be the continuous cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
Y = (Y1, Y2, Y3)′ at point y = (y1, y2, y3)′.
Consider some weighting vector λ ∈ L where L := {λ ∈ R3+ | e′λ = 1}, and
e is a vector of ones of length 3 that imply the (non-negative) weights sum to unity.
We denote the CDF of the composite index λ′Y at some measured child development
level z as
G(z, λ; F) =
∫
R3
I (λ′u ≤ z)dF (u), (1)
where I (·) is the indicator function that equals 1 if its argument (·) is true, and 0
otherwise.
Denote the benchmark weighting vector by τ = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), the vector of
equal weights which Save the Children UK used to report its composite index of
child development. With relatively little guidance regarding specifications of prefer-
ences and distributional assumptions regarding the components of child development,
stochastic dominance offers a generalized approach that allows us to relax several
assumptions typically synonymous with economic theory.
Distribution of the composite index constructed from λ stochastically dominates
the one constructed from τ at first-order if G(z, λ; F) ≤ G(z, τ ; F) for all z ∈ R.
In other words, the proportion of countries under weighting vector, λ, with measured
child development below some given level z is less than (or at most equal to) the
proportion of countries under weighting vector, τ , as shown in Fig. 1.
In this article, our focus is strictly on first-order stochastic dominance which is the
strongest form, but in general, let
Jj (z, λ; F) = 1
(j − 1)!
∫
R3
(z − λ′u)j−1I (λ′u ≤ z)dF (u). (2)
Distribution of the composite index constructed from λ dominates that of the com-
posite index constructed from τ at order j if Jj (z, λ; F) ≤ Jj (z, τ ; F) for all z ∈ R.
It is straightforward to check that for j = 1, J1(z, ·; F) = G(z, ·; F). Also note that
higher order dominance is implied by lower order dominance.
Testing for SDE of τ against all other linear weighting combinations at order j
can be formally stated as,
H
j
0 : Jj (z, τ ; F) ≤ Jj (z, λ; F) for all z ∈ R and for all λ ∈ L,
H
j
1 : Jj (z, τ ; F) > Jj (z, λ; F) for some z ∈ R or for some λ ∈ L.
In practice, F will be unknown so expression Eq. 2 will need to be replaced by its
empirical counterpart,
Jj (z, λ; F̂ ) = 1
N(j − 1)!
N∑
i=1
(z − λ′Yi )j−1I (λ′Yi ≤ z). (3)
T. Mehdi
Fig. 1 First order stochastic dominance of λ weighted index over τ weighted index
Under the null hypothesis, τ is efficient at order j , in that no composite index can be
constructed from λ that dominates (at order j ) the index based on τ .
To test for first-order (j = 1) SDE of τ which is tantamount to testing whether
τ offers the best-case scenario for measured child development, we use the one-
sided weighted Kolmogorov-Smirnov type test statistic proposed by Scaillet and
Topaloglou (2010),
Ŝ = √N 1
N
sup
z,λ
[G(z, τ ; F̂ ) − G(z, λ; F̂ )]. (4)
Naturally, one may be interested in whether τ actually gives rise to the worst-
case scenario for measured child development. The test statistic in that case simply
involves reversing (4).
The test statistic has a non-standard limiting distribution and thus, p-values need
to be obtained using bootstrap methods. We use the block bootstrap procedure which
is shown to be quite reliable even in small samples (see, e.g., Pinar et al. 2013; Scail-
let and Topaloglou 2010). The computation of the test statistic which involves mixed
integer linear programming, is enumerated in detail in Pinar et al. (2013) and alter-
natively, Scaillet and Topaloglou (2010). We use R’s Rcplex package (Bravo and
Theussl 2016; R Core Team 2018) which is an implementation of IBM’s CPLEX
optimizer.
If the null is rejected in the most optimistic scenario, then the benchmark weight-
ing vector, τ , does not generate the most optimistic scenario for measured child
development across countries. There exists some other weighting vector, λ, that leads
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to more countries achieving better measured outcomes. Such weights can be obtained
by solving,
max
λ
[G(z, τ ; F̂ ) − G(z, λ; F̂ )] for a given z. (5)
The above problem is solved for each observed Child Development Index level, z,
under the equal-weighting scheme. The weights arising from Eq. 5 give us an indica-
tion as to the implicit preferences of countries. That is, they tell us which components
are the greatest contributors to improvements in measured child development.
Analogously, the weights for the worst-case scenario can be obtained by revers-
ing the maximization problem (5). Such weights provide insight on the indicators
preventing improvement in measured outcomes.
3 Data
Our data spans from 1995 to 2016 and is primarily drawn from the UN’s MDG indi-
cators. There exists a fairly consistent series of data for mortality rates for children
under 5, but data on net primary-school non-enrollment and underweight children
under 5 is quite sparse. For this reason, we follow Save the Children UK and com-
bine our data with World Bank data to fill in data gaps where possible. We take the
average of each indicator across the same time frames as Save the Children UK: 1995
- 1999, 2000 - 2004, 2005 - 2010, and additionally 2011 - 2016. This results in a
sample of 80, 76, 95, and 70 countries, respectively.4
As mentioned in Section 1, to place this in the SDE framework, we subtract the
dimensional rates from 100% to transform the indicators into survival rates for chil-
dren 5 (per 1,000 live births which we bound to 340 following Save the Children
UK), net primary-school enrollment rates, and percentage of healthy weight chil-
dren under 5. This ensures that a higher CDI corresponds with better measured child
development outcomes.
4 Results
We now present our findings and offer a discussion. The means and standard devia-
tions of the CDI components are reported in Table 1. Generally, it is evident that the
means for education and nutrition are higher than the health dimension for all time
periods. The null hypothesis of first-order dominance of the equally weighted CDI
(i.e., that equal-weighting offers the most optimistic scenario), is rejected. It is also
rejected for the worst-case scenario (i.e., the equally weighted CDI does not give rise
to the most pessimistic scenario either). There exist several other weighting schemes
4Save the Children UK 2008 and 2012 were able to publish CDIs for 141 countries consistently across
three time periods due to the fact that they were able to supplement their data with additional sources at
the time. However, well-being indicators such as mortality, school enrollment, and malnutrition often get
revised so we draw from the most recent database.
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Table 1 Means and standard deviations of the Child Development Index components
Mean Standard deviation
Health1 Education2 Nutrition3 Health1 Education2 Nutrition3
1995 - 1999 76.0 78.6 84.0 19.3 19.9 12.2
2000 - 2004 77.5 81.6 82.9 15.8 18.0 12.3
2005 - 2010 83.2 86.6 86.8 13.1 14.0 10.9
2011 - 2016 84.7 88.4 86.5 10.6 11.9 10.2
1Survival rate for children under 5
2Net primary-school enrollment rate
3Percentage of healthy weight children under 5
(indices) that dominate equal-weighting. Our tests were based on 999 block bootstrap
replications.
The average of the dominating weights for the most optimistic (best-case) and
most pessimistic (worst-case) scenarios are presented in Table 2 while the coun-
try rankings are provided in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6. It is immediately clear that the
best-case scenario where more countries realize better measured child development,
occurs when education receives more weight over time. That is, education is the main
driving force towards higher measured child development as its weight more than
doubles from 0.361 in 1995 - 1999 to 0.739 in 2011 - 2016 under the most optimistic
Table 2 Mean stochastic dominance efficient weights for best-case and worst-case scenarios for the Child
Development Index
N Dominating indices Health1 Education2 Nutrition3
Best-case scenario
1995 - 1999 80 78 0.047 0.361 0.592
2000 - 2004 76 75 0.070 0.542 0.388
2005 - 2010 95 92 0.039 0.680 0.281
2011 - 2016 70 66 0.074 0.739 0.187
Worst-case scenario
1995 - 1999 80 72 0.681 0.222 0.097
2000 - 2004 76 73 0.795 0.086 0.119
2005 - 2010 95 95 0.692 0.151 0.157
2011 - 2016 70 70 0.633 0.136 0.231
1Measured by survival rate for children under 5
2Measured by net primary-school enrollment rate
3Measured by percentage of healthy weight children under 5
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Table 3 Child Development Index rankings under different weighting schemes, 1995 - 1999
Deviation from
Rank equal-weight Index
Best- Equal- Worst- Best- Worst- Best- Equal- Worst-
case weight case case case case weight case
Kuwait 1 1 2 0 –1 98.51 97.78 96.86
Australia 2 2 1 0 1 97.91 97.50 97.44
Argentina 3 3 7 0 –4 96.84 96.20 95.08
Tunisia 4 10 21 6 –11 96.43 94.29 91.67
Jordan 5 8 14 3 –6 96.43 94.94 93.04
Qatar 6 5 4 –1 1 95.95 96.09 96.10
Republic of Macedonia 7 9 10 2 –1 95.75 94.75 94.02
Croatia 8 7 6 –1 1 95.70 95.34 95.71
Brazil 9 15 24 6 –9 95.66 93.44 90.65
United States 10 4 3 –6 1 95.62 96.20 96.84
Bahrain 11 6 5 –5 1 95.10 95.78 96.04
Jamaica 12 14 15 2 –1 94.75 93.80 92.92
Lebanon 13 12 13 –1 –1 94.72 93.87 93.20
Costa Rica 14 11 9 –3 2 94.01 94.03 94.52
Uruguay 15 13 11 –2 2 93.87 93.81 93.95
Romania 16 18 23 2 –5 93.82 92.43 91.30
Peru 17 26 31 9 –5 93.50 90.92 87.88
Mexico 18 16 18 –2 –2 93.46 93.06 92.20
Bolivia 19 38 48 19 –10 93.31 87.31 79.99
West Bank & Gaza 20 23 25 3 –2 93.21 91.65 90.40
Panama 21 17 17 –4 0 93.15 92.68 92.22
Albania 22 20 19 –2 1 92.89 92.36 91.71
South Africa 23 32 41 9 –9 92.25 89.19 85.13
Colombia 24 22 22 –2 0 92.20 91.76 91.53
Venezuela 25 24 20 –1 4 92.15 91.62 91.71
Georgia 26 28 30 2 –2 92.13 89.79 87.98
Turkey 27 29 33 2 –4 91.70 89.77 87.43
Syrian Arab Republic 28 19 16 –9 3 91.64 92.40 92.72
Egypt 29 31 38 2 –7 91.28 89.32 86.59
Guyana 30 30 34 0 –4 91.26 89.70 87.42
Ecuador 31 27 27 –4 0 90.64 90.64 89.97
Dominican Republic 32 36 37 4 –1 90.45 88.29 86.62
Mauritius 33 21 12 –12 9 90.43 92.08 93.39
Kyrgyzstan 34 35 39 1 –4 90.34 88.49 86.03
Azerbaijan 35 40 49 5 –9 89.83 85.02 79.31
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Table 3 (continued)
Deviation from
Rank equal-weight Index
Best- Equal- Worst- Best- Worst- Best- Equal- Worst-
case weight case case case case weight case
China 36 34 32 –2 2 89.56 88.52 87.59
Iran 37 33 28 –4 5 89.02 88.85 88.50
Malaysia 38 25 8 –13 17 87.93 91.48 94.81
Mongolia 39 42 46 3 –4 87.51 84.20 80.43
Algeria 40 39 35 –1 4 87.46 87.31 87.38
Zimbabwe 41 47 51 6 –4 85.78 80.81 75.21
Oman 42 37 26 –5 11 85.77 87.49 90.27
El Salvador 43 41 40 –2 1 84.93 84.77 85.74
Nicaragua 44 45 43 1 2 84.37 83.71 84.03
Morocco 45 49 47 4 2 82.45 80.46 80.08
Botswana 46 48 50 2 –2 82.26 80.60 79.11
Indonesia 47 46 42 –1 4 81.54 83.42 84.08
Malawi 48 54 68 6 –14 81.29 71.27 57.14
Philippines 49 44 36 –5 8 79.84 83.74 86.87
Guatemala 50 50 45 0 5 79.20 80.34 81.72
Vietnam 51 43 29 –8 14 78.73 84.19 88.39
Togo 52 52 58 0 –6 78.50 73.30 67.10
Rwanda 53 63 72 10 –9 77.17 65.14 50.20
Zambia 54 61 70 7 –9 76.28 66.77 55.78
Kenya 55 56 57 1 –1 74.70 70.75 67.50
Comoros 56 53 52 –3 1 74.55 72.06 69.90
Bhutan 57 55 53 –2 2 74.31 71.23 69.88
Maldives 58 51 44 –7 7 74.29 79.77 83.50
Mauritania 59 58 59 –1 –1 73.31 69.23 66.30
Ghana 60 57 56 –3 1 72.79 69.85 67.67
Gambia 61 60 61 –1 –1 72.18 67.94 63.65
Cote d’Ivoire 62 64 66 2 –2 71.73 64.95 58.65
Senegal 63 65 65 2 0 69.65 63.90 59.02
Nigeria 64 71 73 7 –2 67.67 58.77 48.75
Cambodia 65 59 55 –6 4 67.56 68.76 68.08
Benin 66 66 67 0 –1 67.50 62.50 57.62
Tanzania 67 70 69 3 1 64.02 59.48 55.93
Mozambique 68 73 74 5 –1 63.66 55.15 46.95
Guinea 69 74 75 5 –1 63.43 54.40 46.43
Madagascar 70 67 62 –3 5 63.16 62.30 61.79
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Table 3 (continued)
Deviation from
Rank equal-weight Index
Best- Equal- Worst- Best- Worst- Best- Equal- Worst-
case weight case case case case weight case
Djibouti 71 69 63 –2 6 62.49 59.69 60.80
Nepal 72 62 54 –10 8 62.32 65.95 69.41
Congo Dem. Republic 73 72 71 –1 1 61.89 56.35 51.01
Yemen 74 68 60 –6 8 59.01 61.84 65.39
Angola 75 77 78 2 –1 58.29 50.42 41.63
Chad 76 76 76 0 0 56.98 50.68 44.69
Mali 77 79 79 2 0 55.39 46.85 37.67
Burkina Faso 78 78 77 0 1 53.55 47.73 43.19
Eritrea 79 75 64 –4 11 50.16 53.45 59.75
Niger 80 80 80 0 0 41.98 34.56 27.70
Mean – – – – – 81.66 79.52 77.34
view of measured child development. This indicates that more countries find it eas-
ier to realize better measured child development if more weight is shifted towards
education over time, a finding consistent with Pinar et al. (2013) who also found
education to be the dominant dimension for the HDI. The dominance of education
is underscored by Table 1 which shows that the mean net primary-school enrollment
rate increased by almost 10 percentage points from 1995 to 2016, while its standard
deviation decreased by almost 10 percentage points in that same period. As seen in
Tables 3–6, the best-case scenario always results in a higher mean composite index.
This is to be expected as one of the properties of first-order stochastic dominance
is that the dominating distribution is guaranteed to have the higher mean (i.e., since
more countries achieve a better measured outcome, it stands to reason that the overall
mean will also rise).
On the other hand, the worst-case scenario occurs when most of the weight gets
shifted towards health regardless of the time period. Under the worst-case scenario,
the weight attached to the nutrition dimension increases gradually over time. This
echoes our finding that improvements in survival rate outcomes for children under 5
and percentage of healthy weight children under 5 may be lagging behind compared
to net primary-school enrollment rate outcomes. In other words, more countries find
it harder to achieve better measured child development outcomes when nutrition gets
weighted heavily.
The country rankings for the 1995 - 1999 period are presented in Table 3. For this
period, the top 2 countries (Kuwait, and Australia) do not experience any major devi-
ations in their ranking regardless of the weighting schemes. This suggests that such
countries have balanced achievements across the child development indicators and
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Table 4 Child Development Index rankings under different weighting schemes, 2000 - 2004
Deviation from
Rank equal-weight Index
Best- Equal- Worst- Best- Worst- Best- Equal- Worst-
case weight case case case case weight case
Kuwait 1 1 3 0 –2 98.56 97.84 96.80
Jordan 2 4 11 2 –7 97.49 95.88 93.35
Peru 3 8 22 5 –14 97.19 94.84 91.30
Tunisia 4 7 14 3 –7 96.80 95.35 92.96
Cuba 5 2 1 –3 1 96.47 96.85 97.47
Ecuador 6 12 19 6 –7 96.45 94.51 91.74
Lebanon 7 5 5 –2 0 96.35 95.85 95.10
Turkey 8 17 23 9 –6 96.09 94.09 90.62
United States 9 3 2 –6 1 95.96 96.50 97.27
Trinidad & Tobago 10 10 15 0 –5 95.88 94.65 92.61
Brazil 11 14 16 3 –2 95.45 94.41 92.48
Panama 12 11 13 –1 –2 95.37 94.56 93.28
Romania 13 9 12 –4 –3 95.37 94.69 93.34
Syrian Arab Republic 14 15 7 1 8 95.08 94.34 93.79
Republic of Macedonia 15 6 4 –9 2 95.06 95.58 95.74
Colombia 16 13 10 –3 3 94.97 94.42 93.47
Egypt 17 20 25 3 –5 94.47 92.47 89.70
Jamaica 18 18 8 0 10 94.00 94.05 93.62
Venezuela 19 16 6 –3 10 93.95 94.15 94.14
Iran 20 19 20 –1 –1 93.72 93.05 91.60
Sao Tome & Principe 21 33 41 12 –8 93.10 87.84 79.52
Guyana 22 24 33 2 –9 93.06 90.61 87.42
Bolivia 23 31 38 8 –7 92.58 88.98 82.56
Algeria 24 22 27 –2 –5 91.97 91.07 89.59
Mongolia 25 32 37 7 –5 91.20 88.96 85.02
Armenia 26 21 17 –5 4 91.12 91.96 92.15
South Africa 27 35 40 8 –5 90.96 86.65 79.80
Iraq 28 30 31 2 –1 90.46 89.48 87.96
Nicaragua 29 26 24 –3 2 90.39 90.39 89.70
Honduras 30 28 26 –2 2 90.31 89.86 89.67
Sri Lanka 31 25 9 –6 16 90.01 90.41 93.62
Dominican Republic 32 27 28 –5 –1 89.83 90.07 89.23
El Salvador 33 23 21 –10 2 89.82 90.71 91.42
Albania 34 29 18 –5 11 88.99 89.60 91.82
Maldives 35 34 30 –1 4 88.48 87.55 88.76
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Table 4 (continued)
Deviation from
Rank equal-weight Index
Best- Equal- Worst- Best- Worst- Best- Equal- Worst-
case weight case case case case weight case
Indonesia 36 36 36 0 0 88.35 86.61 85.86
Malawi 37 45 64 8 –19 88.25 77.93 61.98
Azerbaijan 38 41 39 3 2 86.82 85.46 82.51
Vietnam 39 37 29 –2 8 86.54 86.58 88.85
Philippines 40 38 32 –2 6 85.93 86.13 87.77
Guatemala 41 40 35 –1 5 85.83 85.53 85.89
Morocco 42 39 34 –3 5 85.29 86.03 86.33
Namibia 43 43 42 0 1 85.12 82.39 78.81
Botswana 44 42 44 –2 –2 84.71 82.57 78.04
Rwanda 45 50 65 5 –15 82.47 74.40 61.19
Myanmar 46 44 43 –2 1 81.44 79.42 78.20
Lesotho 47 46 55 –1 –9 80.70 76.47 68.59
Benin 48 51 63 3 –12 80.37 74.29 64.30
Cambodia 49 47 46 –2 1 80.04 76.30 73.79
Swaziland 50 48 60 –2 –12 79.35 75.59 66.89
Gambia 51 49 52 –2 –3 77.58 75.32 70.09
Equatorial Guinea 52 55 62 3 –7 77.36 73.31 64.55
Comoros 53 52 50 –1 2 75.44 73.95 71.51
Tanzania 54 54 54 0 0 75.04 73.32 68.75
Zambia 55 58 66 3 –8 74.78 69.30 59.59
Kenya 56 53 51 –3 2 74.39 73.57 70.47
Nepal 57 56 45 –1 11 72.05 72.54 76.34
Lao 58 60 57 2 3 70.51 69.11 68.10
Ghana 59 57 47 –2 10 70.31 71.82 72.23
Senegal 60 59 61 –1 –2 69.90 69.12 65.85
Nigeria 61 66 72 5 -6 67.82 62.57 52.66
Madagascar 62 61 53 –1 8 67.02 67.80 69.88
Mozambique 63 65 69 2 –4 66.88 64.43 58.10
Mauritania 64 63 59 –1 4 66.76 67.08 67.06
Yemen 65 62 49 –3 13 65.92 67.52 72.01
Pakistan 66 64 58 –2 6 63.51 65.38 67.54
Guinea 67 68 70 1 –2 60.89 59.86 56.12
Guinea-Bissau 68 69 71 1 –2 60.56 59.03 52.96
Mali 69 73 75 4 –2 60.29 55.50 45.46
Chad 70 72 74 2 –2 59.37 56.18 48.98
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Table 4 (continued)
Deviation from
Rank equal-weight Index
Best- Equal- Worst- Best- Worst- Best- Equal- Worst-
case weight case case case case weight case
Burundi 71 71 68 0 3 54.55 56.62 58.85
Eritrea 72 67 48 –5 19 54.13 61.60 72.06
Ethiopia 73 74 67 1 7 51.69 55.02 59.45
Djibouti 74 70 56 –4 14 49.94 58.61 68.48
Burkina Faso 75 75 73 0 2 49.33 50.36 49.06
Niger 76 76 76 0 0 43.84 43.71 41.00
Mean – – – – – 81.82 80.67 78.48
re-weighting the composite index has little to no effect on their measured outcomes.
On the other hand, Bolivia improved its ranking by 19 positions under the best-case
scenario going from 38th to 19th (out of 80 countries). In the 1995 - 1999 period, the
SDE method assigned most of the weight towards nutrition which allowed Bolivia to
move up. This is because Bolivia’s score in the nutrition dimension is relatively high.
However, under the worst-case scenario, Bolivia ranked 48th, dropping 10 spots from
its original equal-weight ranking. Its composite index was 93.31 under the best-case
scenario while it decreased to 79.99 under the worst-case scenario, a fairly signifi-
cant composite index variation. This is indicative that countries such as Bolivia may
excel is one dimension but may be lagging in others.
Table 4 reports the rankings for the 2000 - 2004 period when education became
the dominant dimension (receiving more than half the weight under the best-case
scenario). This suggests that more countries started finding it easier to improve
childrens’ education outcomes as opposed to outcomes in health or nutrition, thus
showing an implicit preference for improving education systems perhaps by invest-
ing relatively more in education. Under the best-case scenario, Sao Tome & Principe
(+12) and El Salvador (-10) experience the largest rank deviations from their bench-
mark (equal-weight) as a result of education being weighted heavily. Countries that
improved their ranking were generally the ones that excelled in net primary-school
enrollment rates while those that dropped in rankings tended to be the ones that were
at a relative disadvantage when it came to education. Under the worst-case scenario,
Malawi (-19) and Eritrea (+19) exhibited the largest deviations from their bench-
mark ranking. Recall that the vast majority of the weight is shifted to health in the
worst-case scenario (see Table 2). Although relatively more countries (compared to
the benchmark case) achieve worse measured outcomes in this scenario, those that
did achieve good survival rate outcomes for children under 5, moved up. Once again,
SDE demonstrates how significantly composite indices can vary by re-weighting.
Malawi achieved 88.25 under the most optimistic scenario but just 61.98 under the
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Table 5 Child Development Index rankings under different weighting schemes, 2005 - 2010
Deviation from
Rank equal-weight Index
Best- Equal- Worst- Best- Worst- Best- Equal- Worst-
case weight case case case case weight case
Germany 1 1 1 0 0 99.31 99.04 98.85
Japan 2 2 2 0 0 99.01 98.53 98.76
Argentina 3 5 10 2 –5 98.56 97.39 96.30
Kuwait 4 4 6 0 –2 98.36 97.69 97.14
Jordan 5 9 16 4 –7 98.36 96.78 95.01
Tunisia 6 10 13 4 –3 98.17 96.61 95.25
Belize 7 12 14 5 –2 97.99 96.22 95.09
Uruguay 8 8 8 0 0 97.85 96.80 96.42
Turkey 9 13 27 4 –14 97.75 96.09 93.95
Kazakhstan 10 19 30 9 –11 97.39 95.38 93.58
Peru 11 17 24 6 –7 97.37 95.64 94.28
Australia 12 3 3 –9 0 97.09 98.05 98.27
Egypt 13 24 33 11 –9 96.44 94.61 93.30
Mongolia 14 32 43 18 –11 96.35 93.49 90.58
Syrian Arab Republic 15 23 20 8 3 96.35 94.68 94.84
United States 16 7 4 –9 3 96.00 96.93 97.37
Georgia 17 14 19 –3 –5 95.99 95.83 94.89
Chile 18 6 5 –12 1 95.98 97.10 97.26
Brazil 19 16 18 –3 –2 95.68 95.65 94.93
Algeria 20 26 35 6 –9 95.64 94.34 92.60
Mexico 21 18 15 –3 3 95.54 95.47 95.04
Panama 22 20 22 –2 –2 95.51 95.07 94.37
Republic of Macedonia 23 11 9 –12 2 95.38 96.27 96.39
Kyrgyzstan 24 31 41 7 –10 95.18 93.66 91.50
Sao Tome & Principe 25 47 54 22 –7 95.07 89.56 85.17
Oman 26 22 12 –4 10 95.07 94.78 95.66
Venezuela 27 21 17 –6 4 94.33 94.95 94.98
Colombia 28 25 23 –3 2 94.27 94.50 94.29
Malaysia 29 30 11 1 19 94.24 93.89 95.85
Thailand 30 27 21 –3 6 94.16 94.29 94.82
Tajikistan 31 48 52 17 –4 94.08 89.22 85.76
El Salvador 32 29 26 –3 3 94.02 93.90 93.96
Guatemala 33 43 45 10 –2 94.01 91.03 89.85
Honduras 34 37 37 3 0 93.80 92.72 92.25
Nicaragua 35 34 38 –1 –4 93.38 92.98 92.21
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Table 5 (continued)
Deviation from
Rank equal-weight Index
Best- Equal- Worst- Best- Worst- Best- Equal- Worst-
case weight case case case case weight case
Belarus 36 15 7 –21 8 93.26 95.74 96.84
South Africa 37 50 57 13 –7 93.09 88.51 83.73
Bolivia 38 44 49 6 –5 92.69 90.90 87.86
Malawi 39 59 67 20 –8 92.62 84.39 76.85
Moldova 40 28 25 –12 3 92.60 93.93 94.11
Maldives 41 41 34 0 7 92.24 91.11 93.11
Iraq 42 42 46 0 –4 91.98 91.09 89.75
Indonesia 43 51 47 8 4 91.80 88.46 88.73
Armenia 44 33 31 –11 2 91.74 93.11 93.56
Paraguay 45 36 36 –9 0 91.53 92.75 92.51
Albania 46 35 28 –11 7 91.33 92.79 93.77
Vietnam 47 49 44 2 5 90.93 88.86 90.39
Saudi Arabia 48 38 29 –10 9 90.68 92.70 93.73
Tanzania 49 55 61 6 –6 90.59 85.32 81.34
Zambia 50 64 74 14 –10 90.20 81.84 73.71
Sri Lanka 51 46 32 –5 14 90.18 89.89 93.37
Cambodia 52 58 55 6 3 90.14 84.70 84.56
Suriname 53 39 40 –14 –1 90.11 91.34 91.71
Dominican Republic 54 40 42 –14 –2 89.93 91.23 90.74
Togo 55 65 70 10 –5 87.95 80.99 75.37
Uganda 56 63 66 7 –3 87.40 82.07 77.08
Rwanda 57 61 63 4 –2 87.13 83.18 79.20
West Bank & Gaza 58 45 39 –13 6 86.93 90.75 91.88
India 59 71 62 12 9 86.50 78.65 79.37
Azerbaijan 60 52 51 –8 1 86.41 87.56 87.18
Guyana 61 53 50 –8 3 85.85 87.02 87.34
Philippines 62 54 48 –8 6 85.84 85.87 88.08
Namibia 63 60 58 –3 2 85.72 83.69 82.38
Bangladesh 64 67 60 3 7 85.24 79.83 81.45
Benin 65 69 75 4 –6 85.22 78.99 73.47
Myanmar 66 62 59 –4 3 85.20 82.67 82.27
Botswana 67 57 56 –10 1 84.96 85.10 84.00
Swaziland 68 66 76 –2 –10 84.10 80.37 72.84
Bhutan 69 56 53 –13 3 83.91 85.21 85.25
Angola 70 82 95 12 –13 83.78 71.06 55.91
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Table 5 (continued)
Deviation from
Rank equal-weight Index
Best- Equal- Worst- Best- Worst- Best- Equal- Worst-
case weight case case case case weight case
Mozambique 71 74 80 3 –6 82.88 77.19 70.89
Cameroon 72 72 78 0 –6 82.80 77.69 71.48
Kenya 73 68 68 –5 0 80.81 79.00 76.29
Lao 74 78 73 4 5 79.82 75.78 74.82
Lesotho 75 77 82 2 –5 79.28 76.35 70.50
Senegal 76 70 64 –6 6 77.87 78.81 77.39
Gambia 77 75 71 –2 4 76.90 77.14 75.27
Burundi 78 80 81 2 –1 76.80 72.57 70.57
Ghana 79 73 69 –6 4 76.18 77.65 76.16
Mauritania 80 79 79 –1 0 74.22 73.89 71.44
Guinea-Bissau 81 85 89 4 –4 73.58 70.12 63.06
Congo 82 76 65 –6 11 72.36 77.07 77.35
Timor-Leste 83 83 72 0 11 71.30 70.26 75.09
Guinea 84 84 87 0 –3 71.26 70.21 66.62
Mali 85 88 92 3 –4 69.28 66.20 60.16
Nigeria 86 89 90 3 –1 68.75 66.18 61.49
Equatorial Guinea 87 81 85 –6 –4 67.37 72.33 69.21
Cote d’Ivoire 88 86 88 –2 –2 66.24 67.93 66.35
Ethiopia 89 87 83 –2 4 64.54 67.41 70.48
Central African Republic 90 92 93 2 –1 64.34 62.54 57.15
Burkina Faso 91 94 91 3 3 60.09 62.01 60.96
Djibouti 92 91 84 –1 7 53.38 63.78 70.36
Liberia 93 90 86 –3 4 52.63 64.30 68.16
Niger 94 95 94 1 1 52.04 55.09 55.99
Eritrea 95 93 77 –2 16 50.62 62.45 72.83
Mean – – – – – 86.51 85.52 84.26
most pessimistic scenario. This suggests that for countries such as Malawi, there
exists quite a lot of disparity between their achievements in the different dimensions
(they may excel in some but not others).
The rankings for the 2005 - 2010 period are provided in Table 5. Because of their
balanced achievements across health, education, and nutrition outcomes for chil-
dren, Germany and Japan consistently rank as the first and second best, respectively,
regardless of the weighting scenario. Sao Tome & Principe (+22), Malawai (+20) and
Belarus (-21) exhibited the largest deviations in rankings under the most optimistic
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Table 6 Child Development Index rankings under different weighting schemes, 2011 - 2016
Deviation from
Rank equal-weight Index
Best- Equal- Worst- Best- Worst- Best- Equal- Worst-
case weight case case case case weight case
Tunisia 1 1 5 0 –4 99.10 97.63 96.50
Iran 2 3 8 1 –5 98.46 96.74 95.72
Algeria 3 7 17 4 –10 98.21 96.16 94.37
Belize 4 10 10 6 0 98.12 96.09 95.30
Mexico 5 2 7 –3 –5 97.44 96.80 96.20
Kyrgyzstan 6 13 19 7 –6 97.29 95.67 94.10
Morocco 7 15 23 8 –8 97.23 95.20 93.14
Jordan 8 6 9 –2 –3 97.06 96.22 95.35
Mongolia 9 14 24 5 –10 97.01 95.35 93.13
Uruguay 10 5 6 –5 –1 96.48 96.27 96.36
Ecuador 11 17 20 6 –3 96.48 94.77 93.87
Egypt 12 20 21 8 –1 96.21 94.58 93.86
Vietnam 13 24 26 11 –2 96.16 93.12 92.47
Oman 14 18 11 4 7 95.92 94.73 95.25
Turkey 15 11 13 –4 –2 95.87 95.86 95.14
Tajikistan 16 30 35 14 –5 94.61 89.91 87.41
Peru 17 16 14 –1 2 94.49 95.01 95.03
Chile 18 4 1 –14 3 94.25 96.54 97.31
El Salvador 19 19 15 0 4 94.23 94.71 94.98
United States 20 9 3 –11 6 94.03 96.12 97.17
Kuwait 21 12 4 –9 8 93.67 95.73 96.60
Republic of Macedonia 22 8 2 –14 6 93.61 96.13 97.19
Honduras 23 23 22 0 1 93.59 93.31 93.23
Sao Tome & Principe 24 29 34 5 –5 93.39 90.17 87.44
Cambodia 25 35 36 10 –1 93.39 87.49 86.79
Togo 26 43 49 17 –6 93.21 85.19 79.63
Indonesia 27 32 31 5 1 92.70 89.06 89.19
India 28 44 41 16 3 92.38 84.38 82.79
Moldova 29 21 12 –8 9 92.27 94.55 95.22
Nepal 30 42 39 12 3 91.99 85.49 85.27
Sierra Leone 31 61 69 30 –8 91.90 77.25 64.80
Thailand 32 25 18 –7 7 91.75 92.79 94.21
Zimbabwe 33 41 48 8 –7 91.72 85.51 79.82
West Bank & Gaza 34 22 16 –12 6 91.62 94.03 94.37
Dominican Republic 35 26 27 –9 –1 91.23 92.49 92.31
Cameroon 36 47 57 11 –10 90.98 83.57 77.60
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Table 6 (continued)
Deviation from
Rank equal-weight Index
Best- Equal- Worst- Best- Worst- Best- Equal- Worst-
case weight case case case case weight case
Zambia 37 45 53 8 –8 90.86 84.16 78.82
Guatemala 38 31 30 –7 1 90.71 89.84 89.97
Benin 39 48 55 9 –7 90.63 83.47 78.59
Lao 40 51 51 11 0 90.60 82.63 79.58
Sri Lanka 41 33 28 –8 5 90.52 88.29 91.28
Congo 42 34 37 –8 –3 90.45 88.14 86.40
Azerbaijan 43 27 29 –16 –2 89.66 90.97 90.63
Uganda 44 39 42 –5 –3 89.41 85.57 82.59
Philippines 45 36 32 –9 4 88.86 87.28 88.43
Namibia 46 37 38 –9 –1 87.92 86.77 85.89
Tanzania 47 40 40 –7 0 85.98 85.53 84.87
Paraguay 48 28 25 –20 3 85.64 90.88 92.71
Timor-Leste 49 56 50 7 6 85.59 79.10 79.60
Mozambique 50 53 58 3 –5 85.35 81.42 77.54
Kenya 51 46 44 –5 2 85.19 84.12 81.77
Ghana 52 50 47 –2 3 85.16 82.91 80.04
Yemen 53 57 46 4 11 83.15 78.82 80.15
Comoros 54 54 52 0 2 82.82 80.96 78.89
Swaziland 55 49 45 –6 4 82.75 83.47 80.58
Lesotho 56 55 59 –1 –4 81.80 80.41 76.41
Guyana 57 38 33 –19 5 80.78 85.89 87.93
Ethiopia 58 58 54 0 4 80.13 78.28 78.65
Senegal 59 52 43 –7 9 79.65 81.47 82.29
Cote d’Ivoire 60 60 62 0 –2 78.85 77.46 74.24
Guinea 61 62 64 1 –2 76.74 75.94 73.26
Gambia 62 59 56 –3 3 74.23 77.55 78.11
Mauritania 63 63 63 0 0 72.98 74.16 73.79
Chad 64 68 70 4 –2 72.75 67.15 61.67
Pakistan 65 64 65 –1 –1 71.66 71.69 72.66
Burkina Faso 66 65 67 –1 –2 68.59 70.71 70.73
Djibouti 67 66 60 –1 6 63.88 69.96 74.43
Niger 68 70 68 2 2 63.20 64.26 65.74
Sudan 69 69 66 0 3 57.39 65.60 71.31
Liberia 70 67 61 –3 6 50.67 67.37 74.35
Mean – – – – – 87.75 86.53 85.62
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scenario for measured child development. The former two countries experienced
upward movements thanks to education being weighted heavily. However, although
Belarus moved down in rankings, it was the only one out of the three that actually
improved (+8) its ranking under the most pessimistic scenario. Since the pessimistic
scenario places more relative importance to health outcomes of children, it benefits
countries such as Belarus which excels in this dimension. Malaysia also excels in
this dimension which is why it moved up 19 positions under the most pessimistic
scenario for measured child development.
Table 6 presents the rankings for the 2011 - 2016 period. Under the best-case
scenario, Sierra Leone (+30), Paraguay (-20), and Guyana (-19) exhibited the largest
movements in rankings. As a result of education receiving almost three-quarters of
the weight, countries like Sierra Leone were able to improve their relative ranking.
While it achieved a composite index of 64.80 under the worst-case scenario, it was
able to achieve 91.90 under the best-case scenario, a difference of more than 27
points. Paraguay and Guyana experienced a deterioration in their rankings as a result
of relatively poor achievements in net primary-school enrollment rates. Interesting
though, under the worst-case scenario, Paraguay (+3) and Guyana (+5) improved
their ranking as a result of childrens’ health outcomes being weighted more, while
Sierra Leone (-8) moved downwards.
5 Conclusion
Children’s well-being in the era of SDGs is of salient importance for governments
worldwide. The results presented in this paper have multifaceted implications. Much
like the works of Pinar et al. (2013, 2017a) who focused on the HDI, we employed
SDE in deriving the most optimistic scenario for measured child development where
more countries achieve better measured outcomes based on the least variable com-
bination of CDI components. We also derived the most pessimistic scenario where
more countries achieve worse measured child development outcomes. Our analysis
sheds some light and provides partial guidance for researchers and policy makers
interested in measuring child development outcomes. The analysis presented here
goes some ways towards informing public discourse surrounding the well-being of
children.
Our findings revealed that the most optimistic scenario occurs when education
receives more weight over time. While nutrition was the dominant dimension and
main driver for improved measured child development outcomes during 1995 to
1999, more countries now find it easier to achieve better education outcomes for
children as compared to nutrition or health outcomes. This is a result of more coun-
tries having improved net primary-school enrollment rates over time. Between 1995
and 2016, the average net primary-school enrollment improved by almost 10 per-
centage points. The most pessimistic scenario entails shifting majority of the weight
towards the health component which is measured by survival rate for children under
5. Under this scenario, the nutrition component (measured by percentage of healthy
weight children under 5) receives an increasing fraction of the weight over time, but
not as much as health. This goes some ways towards indicating that improvements in
Stochastic Dominance Approach to Measuring Child Development
children’s education systems across countries have outpaced improvements in health
care systems and nutrition.
The cross-country rankings identified countries that are trailing when it comes to
education (e.g., countries which dropped in rankings as a result of the best-case sce-
nario weighting). Those that have achieved good outcomes across the 3 dimensions
of the CDI did not experience any major shifts in rankings as a result of re-weighting.
However, those countries that have imbalanced achievement outcomes (i.e., those that
excel in certain dimensions and not others) exhibited large deviations in rankings.
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Abstract
Ever since the inception of OECD’s Better Life Index in 2011, a string of literature have 
emerged offering different aggregation procedures for the 11 dimensions of the index 
encompassing the broad categories of material living standards and quality of life. What 
is the most optimistic weighting scheme that allows more countries to achieve better meas-
ured well-being outcomes? What is the most pessimistic weighting scheme that worsens 
outcomes for more countries? Stochastic dominance efficiency is a data driven aggrega-
tion method that allows us to answer such questions which may be beneficial to policy 
makers and researchers. We offer rankings of countries across dimensions as well as rank-
ings based on a single composite index aggregating all dimensional indicators. This type 
of analysis not only presents an opportunity to examine the sensitivity associated with 
re-weighting indicators, but this approach also reveals which indicators are driving over-
all improvement in measured well-being and which ones are hindering it. We find that 
the worst-case scenario rankings are generally more correlated with the equal-weighting 
scheme. And the best-case scenario weights offer a far more equal distribution of achieve-
ments across countries.
Keywords Better Life Index · Stochastic dominance · Multidimensional welfare
1 Introduction
The year 2015 marked the end of United Nation’s (UN) Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), and ushered in the era of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), an overarching 
framework for the world to “end poverty, protect the planet and ensure prosperity for all”. 
It is increasingly being recognized that social welfare measures based on a single attribute 
(e.g., income per capita) are inadequate for measuring well-being [see, e.g., Boarini and 
D’Ercole (2013) or Fleurbaey (2012)]. Traditional measures such as gross domestic prod-
uct per capita only provide a partial portrait of a nation’s social well-being as it relies solely 
on income and is insensitive to other aspects individuals may care about in assessing qual-
ity of life (e.g., education, environment, safety, work-life balance, etc.).
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In recent decades, there has been a proliferation of multidimensional welfare measures 
such as the UN’s Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) or Human Development Index 
(HDI), both of which are composite indices comprising health, education, and standard of 
living as its dimensions.1 The ability of single indices to synthesize complex multi-faceted 
phenomena for benchmarking policies or ranking distributions is indeed appealing but the 
inherent subjectivity involved in weighting indicators has long been a point of contention 
among researchers, policy makers, and the public.2
In light of the recommendations put forth by the Commission on the Measurement of 
Economic Performance and Social Progress (Stiglitz et al. 2009), the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) under its Better Life Initiative, introduced 
the Better Life Index (BLI) in 2011, a multidimensional measure for gauging social well-
being of its member as well as some non-member countries (see, e.g., Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 2017). It comprises 11 dimensions which can 
be broadly categorized as material living standards (housing, income, and jobs), and qual-
ity of life (community, education, environment, governance, health, life satisfaction, safety, 
and work-life balance). Each dimension consists of one to four indicators which are nor-
malized to lie between 0 and 10 prior to taking their arithmetic average in order to produce 
composite indices for each dimension (this is tantamount to weighting indicators equally 
within dimensions). A value of 0 is the worst possible outcome while a value of 10 is the 
best possible outcome. The dimensions and their indicators are provided in Table 1.
The BLI differs from the HDI in several ways. The BLI is published only for OECD 
countries and some non-OECD countries and it comprises more dimensions than the HDI. 
Also, unlike the HDI, the BLI does not weight any of its dimensions but rather it allows 
users to construct their own composite index based on their value judgments regarding the 
11 dimensions by visiting www.oecdb etter lifei ndex.org. That is, the OECD does not pro-
vide an “overall” index that encompasses all dimensions. Instead, they leave it up to users 
to assign relative importance to each dimension. What type of weighting scheme does it 
take for more countries to achieve better measured outcomes? Conversely, what type of 
weighting scheme does it take for more countries to achieve worse measured outcomes? 
Our aim in this paper will be to answer these questions. A preference for dimension A over 
dimension B does not necessarily imply that they also prefer all indicators in dimension A 
over those of dimension B. So rather than weighting the 11 dimensions, we go further and 
actually weight all of the indicators embedded within the dimensions. Prior to constructing 
this aggregate index, we also examine each of the dimensions separately.
The introduction of the BLI in 2011 has already been followed up by a number of stud-
ies surrounding the issue of indicator aggregation (e.g., Boarini et al. 2012; Decancq 2017; 
Kasparian 2012; Lorenz et al. 2017; Markovic et al. 2016; Mizobuchi 2014; Monika 2018; 
Nikolaev 2014, or von Reumont et  al. 2017). A wide range of methods have been pro-
posed in the literature from the I-distance method of Markovic et al. (2016) to the “Benefit 
of Doubt” (BOD) of Mizobuchi (2014). The former approach iteratively narrows down a 
given set of indicators based on their correlations while the BOD approach (closely related 
to Data Envelopment Analysis) maximizes composite indices for individual countries by 
assigning the most favourable weights to each country. The latter approach recognizes 
1 For a survey of multidimensional approaches to measuring well-being, see Maasoumi (1999) or Greco 
et al. (2018)
2 See Decancq and Lugo (2013) for an exposition of weighting well-being indicators in a multidimensional 
setting.
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comparative advantages of each country and assigns weights accordingly. However, this 
may not be appropriate since re-weighting indicators differently for each country would 
render the rankings incomparable. A fixed weighting scheme ensures that cross-country 
performance is measured fairly but it does not, however, mean that indicators should be 
weighted equally. Furthermore, much of the existing aggregation procedures are quite reli-
ant on correlations or variability of welfare attributes (i.e., the second moment of the distri-
bution) rather than focusing on the entire distribution.
A fairly common approach for reducing dimensionality is principal component analy-
sis (PCA) which attempts to construct a set of linearly uncorrelated variables from a set 
of (possibly) correlated variables through orthogonal transformation. The first principal 
component explains the highest proportion of the variance in the original variables, and 
each subsequent component accounts for as much of the remaining variability as possi-
ble. Ogwang and Abdou (2003) and Biswas and Caliendo (2002) used the technique in 
examining the HDI. One criticism leveled against PCA is that it relies solely on the second 
moment of the distribution (after standardizing for common mean). Quiet often, welfare 
attributes are not characterized by just a single moment of a distribution.
Table 1  Organisation for economic co-operation and development (OECD) Better Life Index indicators
The (+/−) in parentheses indicates whether the indicator measures a positive (+) or negative (−) component
Dimension Indicator Unit Years
Housing Dwellings without basic facilities (−) Percentage 2011–2017
Housing expenditure (−) Percentage 2012–2017
Rooms per person (+) Ratio 2011–2017
Income Household net adjusted disposable income (+) US Dollar 2011–2017
Household net financial wealth (+) US Dollar 2011–2017
Jobs Labour market insecurity (−) Percentage 2012–2017
Employment rate (+) Percentage 2011–2017
Long-term unemployment rate (−) Percentage 2012–2017
Personal earnings (+) US Dollar 2012–2017
Community Quality of support network (+) Percentage 2011–2017
Education Educational attainment (+) Percentage 2011–2017
Student skills (+) Average score 2011–2017
Years in education (+) Years 2012–2017
Environment Air pollution (−) μg/m3 2011–2017
Water quality (+) Percentage 2012–2017
Civic engagement Stakeholder engagement for developing regulations (+) Average score 2011–2017
Voter turnout (+) Percentage 2011–2017
Health Life expectancy (+) Years 2011–2017
Self-reported health (+) Percentage 2011–2017
Life satisfaction Life satisfaction (+) Average score 2011–2017
Safety Assault rate (−) Percentage 2011–2015
Feeling safe walking alone at night (+) Percentage 2016–2017
Homicide rate (−) Ratio 2011–2017
Work-life balance Employees working very long hours (−) Percentage 2011–2017
Time devoted to leisure and personal care (+) Hours 2011–2017
Employment rate of women with children (+) Percentage 2011
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In this paper, we take into account all moments of the underlying welfare distributions 
by relying on consistent tests of stochastic dominance efficiency (SDE) proposed by Scail-
let and Topaloglou (2010). We obtain weighting schemes along with their associated coun-
try rankings for two extreme scenarios: best-case (optimistic) and worst-case (pessimis-
tic). The former results in more countries achieving better outcomes while the latter results 
in the converse. This gives us a chance to study the sensitivity of rankings to the choice 
of weights, which may be of great interest to policy makers and researchers. The SDE 
approach has several advantages relative to alternative methods, aside from the fact that 
it takes into account all moments of a distribution. The best-case scenario results in more 
countries achieving better measured outcomes based on the least variable components of a 
composite index. Another benefit of the SDE approach is that, under the best-case scenario, 
the SDE weighting scheme provides insight on which indicators are driving improvements 
in measured well-being over time. On the other hand, the SDE weighting scheme under 
the worst-case scenario gives us a glimpse into the indicators hindering improvements in 
measured well-being. We find that in general, the worst-case scenario rankings are more 
correlated with the equal-weighting scheme. Re-weighting has little effect on countries 
with balanced achievements across indicators and thus they experience very little fluctua-
tions in rankings. However, countries that perform well in a few indicators but underper-
form in others, exhibit large shifts in rankings.
SDE is an extension of stochastic dominance which is a nonparametric statistical 
method of ranking distributions in a robust manner taking all moments of a distribution 
into account. Stochastic dominance has gained significant interest across multiple disci-
plines and the importance of robust welfare comparisons have been highlighted in works 
such as Davidson and Duclos (2000), Duclos et al. (2006), Bennett and Mitra (2013), List 
(2004), and Mehdi (2017). The SDE approach has been used to assess the HDI in Pinar 
et al. (2013, 2015), and Pinar et al. (2017a). The approach was also utilized by Pinar (2015) 
in examining the World Governance Indicators published by the World Bank.3 While Pinar 
et al. (2013) and Pinar et al. (2017a) examined human development worldwide, Pinar et al. 
(2015) restricted the analysis to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and 
showed how the choice set of countries can alter rankings. Agliardi et al. (2015) used the 
approach in developing an environmental degradation index. Agliardi et al. (2012, 2014), 
and Pinar et al. (2017b) are examples of how SDE can be applied in the domain of finance.
The reason stochastic dominance was not applied in deriving weights for multidimen-
sional welfare indices prior to Pinar et  al. (2013) was that until Scaillet and Topaloglou 
(2010), only pairwise testing of dominance was possible (e.g., Barrett and Donald 2003, 
or Davidson and Duclos 2000). A typical application of pairwise stochastic dominance, in 
economics, is poverty comparisons between two distributions (e.g., two countries). Rather 
than having to specify a single poverty line, stochastic dominance allows us to evaluate a 
continuum of poverty lines or even the entire income distribution (see, e.g., Davidson and 
Duclos 2000 or Duclos et al. 2006). Stochastic dominance is nonparametric and does not 
require the specification of an explicit social welfare functional form or probability distri-
bution. First-order stochastic dominance (see Sect. 2) satisfies all types of non-decreasing 
utility functions. Stochastic dominance simply requires economic agents to be rational in 
the sense that more of a social “good” increases utility level while more of a social “bad” 
3 Pinar et al. (2013) found that weighting education relatively more results in the most optimistic scenario 
for measured human development. This study was later followed up by Pinar et al. (2017a) who found that 
under the updated methodology of the UN, the health dimension gets weighted increasingly more over time 
in the most optimistic scenario.
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decreases utility level (monotonicity axiom). Scaillet and Topaloglou (2010) extended sto-
chastic dominance by allowing for complete diversification. That is, they devised a method 
for testing a “benchmark” (e.g., equally weighted) set of linearly weighted combination of 
variables against all other possible linear weighting combinations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
the SDE methodology. In Sect. 3, we describe the data. We employ SDE and offer a discus-
sion of our empirical results in Sect. 4. Section 5 concludes and reflects on the findings and 
their implications.
2  Stochastic Dominance Efficient Composite Indices
Consider a strictly stationary process {t;t ∈ ℤ} taking values in ℝK . The observa-
tions consist of a realization of {t;t = 1,… , T} where T is the total number of obser-
vations in the panel dataset of countries. These correspond to the observed values of 
the K indicators. Let F() be the continuous cumulative distribution function (CDF) of 
 = (Y1,… , YK)
� at point  = (y1,… , yK)� . Since different indicators are measured in dif-
ferent units (see Table 1), we follow OECD’s normalization procedure and convert them 
into composite scores between 0 and 10. For positive components, this is done through the 
formula, 10 × [yk,t −min(Yk)]∕[max(Yk) −min(Yk)] while negative components are re-cast 
as positive ones via 10 × [1 − [yk,t −min(Yk)]∕[max(Yk) −min(Yk)]] for k = 1,… ,K, and 
t = 1,… , T  , where yk,t is the kth indicator for observation t.
Consider some weighting vector  ∈  where 𝕃 ∶= { ∈ ℝK
+
∣ e� = 1} , and e is a 
K-vector of ones that imply the (non-negative) weights sum to unity. We denote the CDF of 
the composite index ′ at some well-being level z as
where I(⋅) is the indicator function that equals 1 if its argument (⋅) is true, and 0 otherwise. 
This CDF simply measures the proportion of composite indices that are no higher than 
some given index level, z.
We denote by  = {1∕K}K
k=1
 , the vector of equal weights which the OECD uses to report 
composite scores for its dimensions. We will consider this as our benchmark weighting 
vector. SDE will test whether equal weighting results in the best-case scenario in terms of 
producing the maximum measured well-being and lower variability across countries, given 
the K indicators, or whether it is possible to come up with a different set of weights,  , that 
offers the best-case scenario. The end-result are indices based on the least variable combi-
nation of components that maximize measured well-being. With relatively little guidance 
regarding specifications of preferences and distributional assumptions regarding the com-
ponents of well-being, stochastic dominance offers a generalized approach that allows us to 
relax several assumptions typically synonymous with economic theory.
Distribution of the composite index constructed from  dominates the distribution of the 
composite index constructed from  at first-order if G(z, ;F) ≤ G(z, ;F) for all z ∈ ℝ . This 
is illustrated in Fig. 1. The implication is that the proportion of countries under weighting 
vector,  , with measured well-being below some given level z is less than (or at most equal 
to) the proportion of countries under (equal) weighting vector, .
(1)G(z, ;F) = �
ℝK
I(� ≤ z)dF(),
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In this paper, our focus is strictly on first-order stochastic dominance but generally, 
following Davidson and Duclos (2000), let
Distribution of the composite index constructed from  dominates that of the composite 
index constructed from  at order j if j(z, ;F) ≤ j(z, ;F) for all z ∈ ℝ . It is straightfor-
ward to check that for j = 1 , 1(z, ⋅;F) = G(z, ⋅;F) . Also note that higher order dominance 
is implied by lower order dominance.
Testing for SDE of  against all other linear weighting combinations at order j can be 
formally stated as,
In practice, F will be unknown so expression (2) will need to be replaced by its empirical 
counterpart,
Under the null hypothesis,  is SDE at order j in that no index can be constructed from  
that dominates (at order j) the index based on  . Failure to reject the null implies that it 
is possible that some other alternative weighting combination leads to the nullification of 
dominance by  over .
To test for (first-order) SDE of  which is tantamount to testing whether  offers the 
most optimistic scenario for measured well-being, we use the one-sided weighted Kol-
mogorov-Smirnov type test statistic proposed by Scaillet and Topaloglou (2010),
(2)j(z, ;F) = 1(j − 1)! �ℝK (z − 
�)j−1I(� ≤ z)dF().
H
j
0
∶ j(z, 𝜏;F) ≤ j(z, 𝜆;F) for all z ∈ ℝ and for all 𝜆 ∈ 𝕃,
H
j
1
∶ j(z, 𝜏;F) > j(z, 𝜆;F) for some z ∈ ℝ or for some 𝜆 ∈ 𝕃.
(3)j(z, 𝜆;F̂) = 1
T(j − 1)!
T
∑
t=1
(z − 𝜆�t)
j−1I(𝜆�t ≤ z).
Fig. 1  First order stochastic 
dominance of  weighted index 
over  weighted index
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Naturally, one may be interested in whether  actually gives rise to the most pessimistic 
(worst-case) scenario for measured well-being. The test statistic for the worst-case scenario 
is,
The theoretical underpinnings of these test statistics can be traced back to Barrett and Don-
ald (2003), but this formulation allows for full diversification. That is, it allows us to test 
the benchmark weighting vector,  , against all possible weighting combinations,  . The 
test statistic has a non-standard limiting distribution and thus, p-values need to be obtained 
using bootstrap methods. We use the block bootstrap procedure which is shown to be quite 
reliable even in small samples (see, e.g., Pinar et  al. 2013, or Scaillet and Topaloglou 
2010). The other issue here is the practical computation of Ŝ which involves mixed integer 
linear programming. The computation of the test statistic is enumerated in detail in Pinar 
et al. (2013) and alternatively, Scaillet and Topaloglou (2010). We use R’s Rcplex package 
(Bravo and Theussl 2016, and R Core Team 2018) which is an implementation of IBM’s 
CPLEX optimizer.
If the null is rejected in the best-case scenario, then the benchmark weighting vector, 
 , is not efficient which means it does not offer the most optimistic scenario for measured 
well-being across countries. There exists some other weighting vector,  , that results in 
more countries achieving better outcomes. For the best-case scenario, we solve the follow-
ing maximization problem,
The weights arising from (4) give us an indication as to which indicators drive improve-
ments in measured well-being.
Analogously, if the null is rejected in the worst-case scenario, then there exists some 
weighting vector,  , that lowers outcomes for more countries than  . For the worst-case 
scenario, we simply reverse the above maximization problem and solve,
The resulting weights from (5) shed light on the indicators preventing improvement in 
measured well-being.
3  Data
We obtain the data from OECD’s BLI website: www.oecdb etter lifei ndex.org. They col-
lect information on several aspects of objective and subjective well-being from its member 
countries as well as non-member countries such as Brazil, Russia, and South Africa in 
more recent years. As stated in Sect. 1, they consider 11 dimensions of well-being: hous-
ing, income, jobs, community, education, environment, civic engagement, health, life sat-
isfaction, safety, and work-life balance. The indicators, currently available up to 2017, are 
Ŝ =
√
T
1
T
sup
z,𝜆
[G(z, 𝜏;F̂) − G(z, 𝜆;F̂)].
Ŝ =
√
T
1
T
sup
z,𝜆
[G(z, 𝜆;F̂) − G(z, 𝜏;F̂)].
(4)max
𝜆
[G(z, 𝜏;F̂) − G(z, 𝜆;F̂)] for a given z.
(5)max
𝜆
[G(z, 𝜆;F̂) − G(z, 𝜏;F̂)] for a given z.
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enumerated in Table 1 which also shows yearly availability and whether an indicator meas-
ures a positive or negative component. Since indicators are measured in different units, 
they are normalized to lie between 0 and 10, and the indicators measuring negative compo-
nents were re-cast into positive components (see Sect. 2). The means and standard devia-
tions of the normalized indicators are presented in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. The cover-
age of countries vary by year. The most amount of countries included in the sample was 38 
in 2016 and 2017 while 2011 saw 34 countries in the sample, the fewest amount. Latvia 
and South Africa were excluded prior to 2016 as were Brazil and Russia in 2011.
For all but the environment and civic engagement dimensions, we were able to obtain 
stochastic dominance efficient weights. Since 2011 was the initial year for the BLI, some 
indicators were changed in subsequent years. Only the income and health dimensions main-
tained a consistent set of indicators which is why we were able to make use of all available 
Table 2  Mean normalized indicators
All indicators measuring negative achievements were re-cast into positive achievements. An achievement 
score of 0 is the worst possible outcome while a score of 10 is the best possible outcome
Dimension Indicator 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Housing Dwellings without basic facilities 8.35 8.09 8.21 8.30 8.32 8.46 9.07
Housing expenditure – 3.98 3.89 3.70 3.44 3.28 4.64
Rooms per person 5.18 5.42 4.36 4.74 4.76 5.07 5.23
Income Household net adjusted disposable 
income
4.68 4.77 4.38 4.39 4.20 4.65 4.29
Household net financial wealth 3.58 3.52 2.80 2.66 2.60 2.52 2.71
Jobs Labour market insecurity – 7.57 7.21 8.04 7.88 8.03 8.41
Employment rate 6.00 6.00 5.84 5.61 5.27 5.99 5.70
Long-term unemployment rate 6.66 6.70 6.55 7.69 8.08 8.10 8.13
Personal earnings – 5.53 5.28 5.65 4.95 5.44 5.07
Community Quality of support network 6.66 7.61 6.63 7.58 7.35 6.10 6.28
Education Educational attainment 7.07 7.03 7.05 6.92 6.89 6.99 6.96
Student skills 5.98 5.70 6.50 6.65 6.58 6.78 6.94
Years in education – 6.50 5.41 5.91 5.73 5.59 4.03
Environment Air pollution 7.75 7.88 7.33 7.06 7.06 6.59 5.82
Water quality – 7.26 7.09 7.35 6.51 6.98 6.33
Civic engagement Stakeholder engagement for develop-
ing regulations
5.56 5.47 5.34 5.34 5.34 4.54 4.63
Voter turnout 5.12 5.35 5.42 5.15 4.81 4.91 5.05
Health Life expectancy 6.15 7.34 7.54 7.67 7.34 8.45 8.35
Self-reported health 6.45 7.31 6.29 6.36 6.32 5.93 6.29
Life satisfaction Life satisfaction 6.35 5.98 6.10 6.22 6.60 5.95 6.40
Safety Assault rate 7.95 7.12 7.64 7.61 7.61 – –
Feeling safe walking alone at night – – – – – 5.83 6.31
Homicide rate 8.16 8.82 8.86 8.89 9.00 8.92 9.00
Work-life balance Employees working very long hours 8.25 8.24 7.88 7.81 7.79 7.71 7.45
Time devoted to leisure and personal 
care
6.18 4.22 6.72 5.54 5.54 6.25 5.95
Employment rate of women with 
children
6.75 – – – – – –
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years (2011–2017) for those two dimensions. For dimensions other than safety, we used 
data from 2012 to 2017. From 2016 onwards, one of the indicators from the safety dimen-
sion, assault rate, was replaced by an indicator measuring whether one feels safe walking 
alone at night which has more variability as reported in Table 3. To maximize the number 
of observations in our panel for the safety dimension, we use data from 2011 to 2015 which 
consistently used assault rate and homicide rate as its indicators. For the overall composite 
index based on all the dimensional indicators, we use data from 2012 to 2015 to maximize 
the number of observations in the panel. Rankings for the best-case scenario, worst-case 
scenario, and equal-weight are obtained for the latest year of the sub-period.
Table 3  Standard deviations of the normalized indicators
All indicators measuring negative achievements were re-cast into positive achievements. An achievement 
score of 0 is the worst possible outcome while a score of 10 is the best possible outcome
Dimension Indicator 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Housing Dwellings without basic facilities 2.48 2.76 2.49 2.49 2.48 2.34 1.79
Housing expenditure – 1.95 1.88 1.78 1.90 1.96 2.19
Rooms per person 2.51 3.15 2.59 2.74 2.70 2.59 2.62
Income Household net adjusted disposable 
income
2.20 2.36 2.50 2.39 2.45 2.49 2.42
Household net financial wealth 2.73 2.66 2.49 2.34 2.28 2.21 2.23
Jobs Labour market insecurity – 2.31 2.26 1.87 1.80 2.14 2.05
Employment rate 2.26 2.18 2.31 2.38 2.30 2.10 1.90
Long-term unemployment rate 2.71 2.65 2.84 2.27 2.12 2.18 2.20
Personal earnings – 2.84 2.78 2.72 3.25 2.64 2.79
Community Quality of support network 2.63 1.90 2.29 2.25 2.12 2.23 2.05
Education Educational attainment 2.66 2.79 2.79 2.69 2.76 2.63 2.76
Student skills 2.01 2.39 2.13 2.24 2.17 2.18 2.43
Years in education – 2.13 2.54 2.26 2.40 2.40 2.18
Environment Air pollution 2.06 2.02 2.12 2.22 2.22 2.16 2.34
Water quality – 2.54 2.27 2.27 2.59 2.41 2.45
Civic engagement Stakeholder engagement for develop-
ing regulations
2.70 2.73 2.82 2.82 2.82 2.62 2.58
Voter turnout 2.62 2.61 2.59 2.56 2.77 2.63 2.75
Health Life expectancy 2.78 2.24 2.39 2.31 2.36 1.80 1.77
Self-reported health 2.53 2.35 2.42 2.40 2.40 2.52 2.51
Life satisfaction Life satisfaction 2.69 2.78 2.76 2.91 2.92 2.84 2.88
Safety Assault rate 1.93 2.35 1.98 1.95 1.95 – –
Feeling safe walking alone at night – – – – – 2.61 2.56
Homicide rate 2.03 2.16 2.19 2.27 2.30 2.19 2.00
Work-life balance Employees working very long hours 1.95 1.96 2.14 2.10 2.05 2.11 2.32
Time devoted to leisure and personal 
care
2.10 2.87 1.92 2.05 2.05 1.90 2.00
Employment rate of women with 
children
1.91 – – – – – –
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4  Results
We now present our findings and offer a discussion on the implications of our results. Since 
the community and life satisfaction dimensions consist of a single indicator, that indica-
tor always gets a weight of unity and thus they were not considered for the dimensional 
analyses. They were, however, considered for the aggregate composite index which uses all 
dimensional indicators (see Sect. 4.8). Other than the environment and civic engagement 
dimensions, the null hypotheses for the remaining seven dimensions were rejected at the 
1% or 5% level suggesting that there exist other weighting schemes that dominate equal-
weighting. Our tests were based on 999 block bootstrap replications.
Upon rejecting the null, we proceed with maximizing the objective functions (4) and 
(5) in order to determine the best-case and worst-case scenario weighting schemes, respec-
tively. Recall that the two scenarios represent two extremes and will allow us to exam-
ine the sensitivity of BLI. Under the best-case scenario, more countries achieve better 
measured outcomes while under the worst-case scenario, more countries achieve worse 
measured outcomes. We consider each dimension separately, before proceeding with con-
structing an aggregate composite index comprising all indicators from every dimension 
in Sect.  4.8. The SDE weights, when examining dimensions separately, are reported in 
Table 4 (weights sum to unity within dimensions) while weights for the aggregate compos-
ite index can be found in Table 12 (weights sum to unity across all indicators). The country 
rankings along with their composite scores are reported in Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 
13. In addition to the best-case and worst-case scenario, rankings and composite scores are 
also provided for the benchmark equal-weight scenario case. The last column of the tables 
report the index ranges, calculated as a country’s maximum observed composite score less 
the minimum observed composite score.
The best-case scenario always produces the highest mean achievement scores while the 
worst-case scenario produces the lowest mean scores. This is to be expected as one of the 
properties of first-order stochastic dominance is that the dominating distribution is guaran-
teed to have the higher mean. The tables also present Spearman rank correlations and Gini 
coeffients for the indices.4 The Spearman rank correlation is a metric that lies in the unit 
interval. Given two rankings, a number closer to 0 is an indication of relatively weak rank 
correlation while a number closer to unity is an indication of relatively strong rank correla-
tion. An overarching theme we found is that generally the worst-case scenario rankings are 
more correlated with the equal-weight rankings. The Gini coeffient, a well-known metric 
for measuring the degree of dispersion in data, is almost always lower for the best-case 
scenario indices suggesting that not only do the best-case scenario weights result in more 
countries achieving better outcomes, but the distribution of achievements between coun-
tries is more stable than the equal-weight and worst-case scenarios.
The remainder of this section is organized into eight Sects. 4.1 (housing), 4.2 (income), 
4.3 (jobs), 4.4 (education), 4.5 (health), 4.6 (safety), 4.7, and 4.8 (aggregate index). The 
first seven subsections offer a focused discussion on the individual dimensions we ana-
lyzed while the last subsection discusses the aggregate composite index comprising all 
indicators.
4 The Gini coeffcient for some vector of composite indices, x1,… , xn , is computed as 
2
x̄n2
∑n
i=1
x(i)(i − 0.5) − 1 , where x̄ is the mean and x(i) is the ith order statistic of the vector (see, e.g., David-
son 2009).
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4.1  Housing
The housing dimension comprises three indicators: dwellings without basic facilities, 
rooms per person, and housing expenditure. Dwellings without without basic facilities 
measures the proportion of the population living in a dwelling without indoor flushing toi-
let for the sole use of their households. Rooms per person excludes kitchens, scullery/util-
ity rooms, bathrooms, garages, consulting rooms, offices, and shops. Housing expenditure 
measures the proportion of household gross adjusted disposable income devoted towards 
housing and maintenance of the house.
Under the best(worst)-case scenario, the weights were 0.864 (0.014) for dwellings with-
out basic facilities, 0.126 (0.655) for housing expenditure, and 0.010 (0.331) for rooms per 
person. This reveals that the dwellings without basic facilities indicator is the dominant 
component or main driving force behind improved measured well-being in the housing 
Table 12  Mean stochastic dominance efficient weights for best-case and worst-case scenario for the com-
posite Better Life Index
Indicator Period Obs. Best-case scenario Worst-case sce-
nario
Domi-
nating 
indices
Weight Domi-
nating 
indices
Weight
Dwellings without basic facilities 2012–2015 124 122 0.049 73 0.000
Housing expenditure 2012–2015 124 122 0.006 73 0.066
Rooms per person 2012–2015 124 122 0.000 73 0.000
Household net adjusted disposable income 2012–2015 124 122 0.000 73 0.000
Household net financial wealth 2012–2015 124 122 0.000 73 0.337
Labour market insecurity 2012–2015 124 122 0.029 73 0.000
Employment rate 2012–2015 124 122 0.000 73 0.003
Long-term unemployment rate 2012–2015 124 122 0.133 73 0.000
Personal earnings 2012–2015 124 122 0.000 73 0.000
Quality of support network 2012–2015 124 122 0.000 73 0.000
Educational attainment 2012–2015 124 122 0.012 73 0.000
Student skills 2012–2015 124 122 0.000 73 0.000
Years in education 2012–2015 124 122 0.000 73 0.000
Air pollution 2012–2015 124 122 0.049 73 0.000
Water quality 2012–2015 124 122 0.000 73 0.000
Stakeholder engagement for developing 
regulations
2012–2015 124 122 0.000 73 0.361
Voter turnout 2012–2015 124 122 0.056 73 0.229
Life expectancy 2012–2015 124 122 0.000 73 0.000
Self-reported health 2012–2015 124 122 0.022 73 0.000
Life satisfaction 2012–2015 124 122 0.000 73 0.000
Assault rate 2012–2015 124 122 0.052 73 0.000
Homicide rate 2012–2015 124 122 0.489 73 0.000
Employees working very long hours 2012–2015 124 122 0.103 73 0.000
Time devoted to leisure and personal care 2012–2015 124 122 0.000 73 0.004
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dimension, evidenced by the fact that the most optimistic view has it being weighted con-
siderably higher than the other two indicators. In other words, more countries find it easier 
to achieve better measured outcomes when this component receives relatively more weight 
because its upper bound is more achievable. Tables 2 and 3 sheds some light on this as well 
by showing that the dwelling without basic facilities indicator has the highest mean and 
additionally also happens to be the least variant among the housing indicators. The most 
pessimistic view weights housing expenditure relatively more suggesting that more coun-
tries find it harder to achieve better measured outcomes when this receives relatively more 
weight because its upper bound is harder to achieve.
Table 5 reports the rankings for 2017. There are several drastic rank deviations between 
scenarios. Under the best-case scenario weighting scheme, Korea, Belgium, Estonia, Japan, 
and Chile dropped at least 10 positions from the equal-weight ranking, with Chile dropping 
22 positions going from being ranked 13th under equal-weighting to 35th (out of 38 coun-
tries). On the other hand, under the worst-case scenario weighting scheme, Chile moved to 
4th place as a result of weighting housing expenditure more heavily. Another case where 
ranking changes quite dramatically is Estonia which ranked 16th under equal-weighting, 
31st under best-case scenario, and 6th under worst-case scenario.
As discussed before, SDE gives us a chance to study the sensitivity of rankings associ-
ated with re-weighting indices. The last column of Table 5 reports the index ranges which 
shows the composite score variation achieved by each country. They are calculated as the 
maximum observed composite score less the minimum observed composite score. Unsur-
prisingly, the top 2 countries (Norway and the United States) exhibited little variation in 
achievement scores (1.68 for Norway and 1.60 for the United States) and they remained 
in the top 2 regardless of our weighting scenarios. This goes some ways towards indicat-
ing that such countries are less subject to normative judgments (i.e., re-weighting has little 
effect) as they have achieved well-balanced outcomes across the housing dimension com-
ponents. The highest composite score variations were observed for Greece (6.53), Slovak 
Republic (6.51), and Czech Republic (6.15), all of which ranked among the bottom half 
of countries regardless of the three scenarios. Although in 2017, Greece, Slovak Repub-
lic, and Czech Republic achieved relatively good outcomes for the dwellings without basic 
facilities indicator (relatively more important to induce the best-case scenario), they ranked 
near the bottom when it came to housing expenditure (relatively more important for the 
worst-case scenario).
The Gini coefficients for the best-case, equal-weight, and worst-case scenarios were 
0.07, 012, and 0.18, respectively, suggesting that the best-case scenario not only produces 
higher mean achievement scores but it also offers the most stable distribution of measured 
outcomes. The Spearman rank correlation with the equal-weight scenario was 0.78 for the 
best-case scenario while it was 0.84 for the worst-case scenario which indicates that the lat-
ter ranking is a little more correlated with the benchmark case.
4.2  Income
Income has traditionally been the “yard stick” used to judge welfare distributions. For the 
BLI, this dimension is captured by household net adjusted disposable income, and house-
hold net financial wealth. Both are measured in current US dollars at current purchas-
ing power parities. Household net adjusted disposable income is the maximum amount a 
household can afford to consume without having to reduce its assets or increase liabilities. 
Household net financial wealth includes currency and deposits, securities other than share, 
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loans, shares and other equity, insurance technical reserves, and other accounts receivable 
or payable, net of household financial liabilities.
SDE weights for the best(worst)-case scenario were 0.972 (0.302) for household net 
adjusted disposable income, and 0.028 (0.698) for household net financial wealth. Table 6 
reports the rankings for 2017. Spearman rank correlations with equal-weight ranking for 
best-case and worst-case scenarios were 0.93 and 0.99, respectively, suggesting both sce-
narios are highly correlated with the benchmark ranking (i.e., equal-weight). United States 
consistently ranked at the top in all three scenarios (with a perfect composite score of 10) 
which is not surprising given that it had the highest household net adjusted disposable 
income as well as household net financial wealth of all the countries in the sample. Under 
the best-case scenario which favours household net adjusted disposable income, Japan 
dropped 10 positions going from 6th (equal-weight) to 16th (best-case), while Norway 
improved its standing by 12 spots going from 16th (equal-weight) to 4th (best-case).
Majority of the countries experienced very little variation in composite scores under 
the three scenarios suggesting that there weren’t much variation between achievements in 
the two indicators for most countries. This is re-enforced by the Gini coefficients (0.32 for 
the best-case scenario, 0.34 for equal-weight, and 0.37 for worst-case scenario) which sug-
gest the distribution of measured outcomes are about the same across the three different 
scenarios.
4.3  Jobs
A nation’s prosperity depends on a productive citizenry which goes hand-in-hand with the 
ability to create meaningful employment opportunities. The jobs dimension includes four 
indicators, more than any other dimension. They are employment rate, long-term unem-
ployment rate, labour market insecurity, and personal earnings.5 Employment rate meas-
ures the proportion of employed persons between the ages of 15 and 64. Long-term unem-
ployment rate is the proportion of persons in the labour force who have been unemployed 
for at least one year. Labour market insecurity (an indicator that is used after 2015) is a 
measure of expected earnings loss, expressed as the proportion of previous earnings associ-
ated with unemployment. Personal earnings is reported in US dollars at current purchasing 
power parities. It measures the average annual wages per full-time equivalent employee.
The best(worst)-case scenario weights were 0.700 (0.022) for labour market insecurity, 
0.264 (0.038) for long-term unemployment rate, 0.029 (0.329) for personal earnings, and 
0.007 (0.611) for employment rate. As seen in Tables 2 and 3, although the personal earn-
ings and employment rate indicators are less variable, the other two indicators had higher 
means in 2017. Labour market insecurity with a weight of 0.700 under the best-case sce-
nario is the main indicator driving improvement in the jobs dimension as more countries 
achieve better measured outcomes if it gets weighted more. More than a quarter of the 
weight goes towards long-term unemployment rate so in the most optimistic scenario, this 
indicator also plays a role. The 2017 rankings are reported in Table 7 and from the Spear-
man rank correlation, we can see that the worst-case scenario is substantially more corre-
lated with the equal-weight rank.
5 Labour market insecurity was introduced after 2015. Prior to that a similar but slightly different metric, 
job security, was used in its place that measured duration of employment tenure or probability of becoming 
unemployed.
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The best-case scenario has Japan, Korea, Israel, Czech Republic, and Mexico improv-
ing their ranks by at least 10 positions. This is because in 2017, these countries were either 
near the top of the rankings in terms of job security, and/or long-term employment. Inter-
estingly, the bottom 6 countries (Portugal, Italy, Turkey, Spain, Greece, and South Africa) 
did not deviate from their equal-weight rank at all in the best-case scenario (minor devia-
tions under the worst-case scenario). These countries were among the bottom 10 in terms 
of labour market insecurity in 2017 and with the exception of Turkey, they ranked at the 
very bottom in terms of long-term unemployment rate as well. Regardless of the scenario, 
Iceland and Switzerland ranked in the top 3 suggesting their rank is invariant to the weight-
ing schemes because they have achieved good outcomes across the jobs dimension.
Mexico exhibited the largest index variation with an index range of 5.46. This is due to 
an imbalance of achievements across the jobs dimension. When it came to labour market 
insecurity and long-term unemployment rate, the dominant indicators under the most opti-
mistic scenario, Mexico ranked relatively high. However, in terms of the employment rate 
and personal earnings indicators, which receive relatively greater importance in the most 
pessimistic scenario, Mexico ranked near the bottom.
4.4  Education
Education is arguably one of the top priorities for many parts of the world. According to 
Irwin et  al. (2007), “economists now argue on the basis of the available evidence that 
investment in early childhood is the most powerful investment a country can make, with 
returns over the lifecourse many times the size of the original investment”. The compo-
nents of this dimension are educational attainment, student skills, and years in education. 
Educational attainment measures the proportion of 25–64 years olds with at least an upper 
secondary degree. Student skills are average scores in reading, mathematics, and science as 
assessed by the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). Years 
in education are the average years of education in which a 5 years old child can expect to 
enroll during their lifetime until they turn 39.
Under the best(worst)-case scenario, the weights were 0.731 (0.099) for educational 
attainment, 0.195 (0.176) for student skills, and 0.074 (0.725) for years in education. 
Clearly, the fact that the most optimistic view of measured education outcomes has educa-
tional attainment receiving nearly three-quarters of the weight is indicative of the fact that 
OECD countries, on average, are becoming more educated over time. In 2017, the propor-
tion of of 25–64 years olds with at least an upper secondary degree was 74% among OECD 
countries.
Table  8 reports the 2017 rankings. Some drastic deviations in rankings are apparent. 
Russia, Czech Republic, Estonia, United States, and Slovak Republic moved up at least 
10 positions in the most optimistic scenario, with Russia gaining 20 positions going from 
22nd (equal-weight) to 2nd (best-case). The fact that 94.9% of 25–64 years olds in Russia 
had at least an upper secondary degree in 2017, the highest observed rate in the sample, 
goes some ways towards explaining its drastic rank improvement. However, when weight 
was shifted towards years in education, Russia ranked 30th out of the 38 countries, quite 
a stark contrast. Japan’s educational attainment in 2017 at 94.4% was not too far behind 
Russia’s. Japan had the highest average PISA score at 529 in 2017. This combined with its 
educational attainment resulted in Japan ranking as the top country in education under the 
best-case scenario. However, shifting weight heavily towards years in education (worst-
case scenario) results in Japan being ranked 22nd and Australia being ranked at the top.
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Finland ranked in the top 3 regardless of the scenario and furthermore due to its rela-
tively good achievements across the components, its composite index range was only 0.66. 
Russia’s composite index was 8.89 (2nd) under the best-case scenario but 3.75 (30th) under 
the worst-case scenario, a difference of 5.14 which was the highest observed in the educa-
tion dimension. This has to do with the fact that Russia performs well when it comes to 
educational attainment but ranks near the bottom in terms of years in education.
4.5  Health
Health is an essential component of the well-being of a nation. Good health and longevity 
have long been a universal goal. The health dimension consists of life expectancy, and self-
reported health (proportion of the population aged 15 or older who report “good” or better 
health).
The best(worst)-case scenario weights were 0.908 (0.150) for life expectancy and 0.092 
(0.850) for self-reported health. Interestingly, the most optimistic scenario for measuring 
well-being in the health dimension has the objective indicator (life expectancy) getting 
substantially more of the weight than the subjective indicator (self-reported health). This 
is consistent with the fact that longevity has steadily risen in OECD countries over time 
(around 80 years in 2017). So it’s not surprising that weighting life expectancy more results 
in more countries with better measured health outcomes. The 2017 rankings are in Table 9 
which shows that the worst-case scenario rankings are highly correlated with the equal-
weight ranking (Spearman rank correlation of 0.98).
Under the best-case scenario, Japan and the United States exhibited large rank devia-
tions. Japan moved up by 21 positions going from 34th under equal-weight to 13th under 
best-case scenario weighting. At 83.9 years, Japan ranked at the top in terms of life expec-
tancy. The United States dropped 20 positions going from 6th (equal-weight) to 26th (best-
case) due to a life expectancy of 78.8 years (although quite high, it is one of the 13 coun-
tries out of the 38 which had a life expectancy below 80 years). On the other hand, for the 
most pessimistic view of measured health outcomes with self-reported health getting most 
of the weight, Japan ranked second last (after Korea) since just 35.4% of Japan’s popula-
tion aged 15 or older reported “good” or better health (second lowest after Korea which 
reported 32.5%). The United States, under the pessimistic scenario, moved to 3rd place 
thanks to 88.1% of its population aged 15 or older reporting “good” or better health. (tied 
with Canada which ranked at the top).
Japan and Korea also happen to exhibit the highest variations in achievement scores 
with index ranges of 7.19 and 7.06, respectively. Although both countries enjoy relatively 
high life expectancy, their self-reported health is relatively low compared to the other 
countries due to a smaller share of their populations reporting “good” or better health. This 
could reflect demographic shifts such as an increasing elderly population who are more 
likely to report poor health conditions (see, e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development 2013). According to World Bank (2017), Japan’s share of the population 
aged 65 or older has increased from 15% in 1997 to 27% in 2017. Likewise, Korea’s share 
has increased from 6% to 14%.
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4.6  Safety
How safe an individual feels living in their country has a significant impact on how they 
perceive their own well-being. Safety is measured by assault rate (prior to 2016), and hom-
icide rate. We focus exclusively on the period from 2012 to 2015 which consistently used 
the two indicators. Assault rate is the proportion of the population that self-reported being 
assaulted or “mugged” within the past year (World Gallup Poll). Homicide rate measures 
unlawful homicides per 100,000 persons.
The best(worst)-case scenario SDE weights were 0.921(0.129) for homicide rate, and 
0.079(0.871) for assault rate. In 2015, 19 out of 36 countries had a homicide rate of of less 
than 1 per 100,000 persons and little variability was observed among them. Furthermore, 
looking at Table 2, the mean normalized homicide rate indicator remains consistently over 
8 (out of 10) across time. The rankings for 2015 are reported in Table 10. It is evident that 
considerably more countries achieve better measured safety outcomes in the best-case sce-
nario which weights the homicide rate indicator heavily. In fact, 29 out of the 36 countries 
actually achieved an index greater than 9. Japan ranked in the top with an index of 9.99 
while Belgium ranked at 29th with an index of 9.34, a separation of just 0.65, in the most 
optimistic scenario. Only Russia, Mexico, and Brazil had an index below 8 in the best-
case scenario. Mexico and Brazil ranked among the bottom 2 countries regardless of the 
scenario. On the other hand, Japan ranked in the top 2 regardless of the scenario with an 
index range of 0.07, suggesting that it’s a country that has achieved very good outcomes 
when it comes to safety. Re-weighting seemed to have a big impact on the United States 
which ranked at 31st under the best-case scenario, 16th under equal-weighting, and 4th 
under the worst-case scenario. The United States is one of the few countries in the sam-
ple which achieved a composite index less than 9 when homicide rate was weighted more 
under the best-case scenario, but its index improves to 9.6 under the worst-case scenario 
which weights assault relatively rate more (its homicide rate is higher than the OECD aver-
age but its assault rate is lower).
An even distribution of achievements is reflected by fairly low Gini coefficients of 0.08 
(best-case), 0.10 (equal-weight), and 0.12 (worst-case) for the composite indices. How-
ever, the worst-case scenario ranking is substantially more consistent with the equal-weight 
ranking (Spearman rank correlation of 0.96).
4.7  Work‑Life Balance
Balancing work and personal time is an aspect of well-being that is receiving increasingly 
more attention. The dimension of work-life balance includes two components: employees 
working very long hours (exceeding 50 h per week), and time devoted to leisure and per-
sonal care.
Under the best(worst)-case scenario, the weights were 0.948 (0.066) for employees 
working very long hours, and 0.052 (0.934) for time devoted to leisure and personal care. 
Table 11 reports the 2017 rankings which are demonstrably different for a few countries. 
In the most optimistic view of work-life balance, Latvia improved its ranking by 22 posi-
tions shifting from 27th (equal-weight) to 5th (best-case) while France dropped 20 posi-
tions going from 3rd (equal-weight) to 23rd (best-case). In the worst-case scenario which 
weights time devoted to leisure and personal care, Latvia ranked 35th out of the 38 coun-
tries while France moved right to the top of the rankings. Latvia also had the highest 
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composite score variation at 5.42 (an index of 9.11 under the best-case scenario but 3.69 
under the worst-case). Netherlands ranked as the best or second-best country regardless of 
the scenario and its composite score only varied by 1.01 thanks to its balanced achieve-
ments across the dimension.
Mexico and Turkey ranked at the bottom regardless of which weighting scheme we 
used. Re-weighting had no effect on these countries because they ranked at the bottom 
in terms of both indicators in the work-life balance dimension. For Mexico, 29.48% of 
employees reported working more than 50  h per week while for Turkey it was 33.77%. 
Number of hours devoted to leisure and personal care was 12.74 and 12.59 for Mexico and 
Turkey, respectively.
4.8  Aggregate Index
We now focus on constructing a composite index synthesizing every single indicator, 
something not done by the OECD. Instead, they leave it up to its website visitors to assign 
relative importance to each dimension. However, our concern here is not weighting the 
dimensions but rather all of the indicators embedded within the dimensions. von Reumont 
et al. (2017) provides a discussion of the perils involved in weighting dimensions rather 
than individual indicators contained in the dimensions. For example, one may have a pref-
erence for education over the jobs dimension, yet they may prioritize personal earnings (an 
indicator belonging to the jobs dimension) over student skills (an indicator belonging to the 
education dimension).
We consider all 24 indicators for the 2012–2015 period which has the most consist-
ent set of indicators, in constructing an overall composite index. The weights were pro-
vided in Table 12. A total of 11 indicators are identified in the best-case scenario, that are 
responsible for driving improvement in composite well-being. The weights were 0.489 for 
homicide rate, 0.133 for long-term unemployment rate, 0.103 for employees working very 
long hours, 0.056 for voter turnout, 0.052 for assault rate, 0.049 for both air pollution as 
well as dwellings without basic facilities, 0.029 for labour market insecurity, 0.022 for self-
reported health, 0.012 for educational attainment, and 0.006 for housing expenditure, with 
the remaining indicators receiving weights of zero. The fact that homicide rate receives 
nearly half of the weight can be explained by Table 2 which shows the indicator has con-
sistently had the highest mean in most years and from Table 3 we also know that it has 
been fairly stable.
For the worst-case scenario, 6 indicators are identified as holding back improvements in 
composite measured well-being. The weights were 0.361 for stakeholder engagement for 
developing regulations, 0.337 for household net financial wealth, 0.229 for voter turnout, 
0.066 for housing expenditure, 0.004 for time devoted to leisure and personal care, and 
0.003 for employment rate, with the remaining indicators receiving weights of zero. From 
Table 2, we know that the stakeholder engagement for developing regulations along with 
household net financial wealth indicators have relatively low means. Thus, when such indi-
cators receive relatively more importance, more countries find it harder to achieve better 
measured outcomes.
The 2015 rankings are reported in Table  13. In this instance, the best-case scenario 
rankings are more correlated with the equal-weight ranking as opposed to prior cases 
where the worst-case scenario was more correlated. The United States exhibited large fluc-
tuations as it ranked 27th in the best-case scenario, 6th under equal-weight, and first in 
the worst-case scenario. This can be explained by the fact that the United States had the 
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fourth highest homicide rate at 5.2 homicides per 100,000 persons among the 36 countries 
in 2015 and we know that the best-case scenario entails shifting almost half the weight 
towards homicide rate. This is in contrast with Luxembourg which had a homicide rate 
of 0.3 per 100,000 persons, moving from 13th (equal-weight) to first. However, under the 
worst-case scenario which weights household net financial wealth and stakeholder engage-
ment for developing regulations relative more, the United States moved to the top position. 
The United States generally leads all countries in the income dimension so this goes some 
ways towards explaining this. Weighting stakeholder engagement for developing regula-
tions more heavily in the worst-case scenario also resulted in Korea moving from 22nd 
(equal-weight) to 5th place.
Under the best-case scenario, 27 out of the 36 countries achieved an index greater than 
8 (including the United States and Korea). Under the worst-case scenario, all countries, 
except for the United States, achieved composite indices lower than 7. Australia and Swe-
den rank among the top 5 countries regardless of the scenario reflecting well-balanced 
achievements across most aspects of the BLI.
Due to a large number of indicators, there exists a great deal of variation in composite 
scores between scenarios. The highest index ranges are observed for Chile (6.12), Estonia 
(5.99), Czech Republic (5.95), Slovak Republic (5.74), Israel (5.57), France (5.30), Ger-
many (5.50), and Iceland (5.16). Chile and Estonia consistently ranked among the bottom 
10 countries despite which weighting scheme was used, reflecting the fact that both coun-
tries had relatively low achievements across many of the indicators.
The distribution of achievements were most equal under the best-case scenario (Gini 
coefficient of 0.08) while the worst-case scenario showed the most disparity (Gini coef-
ficient of 0.20).
5  Conclusion
It is increasingly being understood that traditional measures of well-being such as income 
per capita are insufficient measures of social welfare. In light of such criticism, there has 
been a growing body of research surrounding multidimensional social welfare meas-
ures. One such metric is OECD’s Better Life Index (BLI) which measures well-being 
in 11 dimensions which can be broadly categorized as material living standards (hous-
ing, income, and jobs), and quality of life (community, education, environment, govern-
ance, health, life satisfaction, safety, and work-life balance). Components within a given 
dimension are aggregated into a single composite index to summarize a country’s com-
posite achievement in that dimension. The aggregation procedure uses an equal-weighting 
scheme (i.e., the composite index is simply taken as the arithmetic average of the dimen-
sional indicators).
In this paper, we utilized consistent tests of stochastic dominance efficiency (SDE) to 
derive the best-case and worst-case scenarios for measured well-being using the BLI. The 
former scenario weights indicators under the most optimistic conditions such that more 
countries achieve better measured outcomes based on the least variable combination of 
components over time, while the latter scenario results in more countries achieving worse 
measured outcomes. This type of analysis not only allowed us to examine the sensitivity 
of the BLI, but it also revealed which indicators are implicitly favoured by more countries 
(i.e., the indicators for which the upper bounds are relatively more achievable).
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We found that other than the environment and civic engagement dimensions, weighting 
indicators equally does not offer the most optimistic scenario, nor does it offer the most 
pessimistic scenario. There exist several other weighting combinations that dominate equal-
weighting. The weights arising from SDE revealed which indicators are most responsible 
for improvements in measured well-being over time and which ones hinder improvements. 
We derived weighting schemes for the best-case as well as the worst-case scenario, and 
this allowed us to study which countries are more/less susceptible to normative judgments. 
That is, countries with relatively good achievements across different aspects of well-being 
were less sensitive to re-weighting while those with poor achievements or good achieve-
ments in some indicators but not others, were more prone to experience large fluctuations 
in rankings. The worst-case scenario rankings were generally found to be more correlated 
with the equal-weight ranking. Not only do more countries achieve better outcomes in the 
best-case scenario but the distribution of outcomes were generally more equal as well.
For the housing dimension, we found that attaching relatively more weight to the dwell-
ings without basic facilities indicator induced the best-case scenario (i.e., more countries 
would find it easier to achieve better measured outcomes in the housing dimension). Shift-
ing weight towards the other two indicators, housing expenditure and rooms per person, 
induced the worst-case scenario where more countries find it harder to achieve better meas-
ured outcomes. This revealed that the upper bound of the dwellings without basic facilities 
indicator is relatively more achievable for most countries as compared to the other housing 
indicators.
In the income dimension, the most optimistic scenario for better measured outcomes 
across countries entails shifting almost all the weight towards household net adjusted dis-
posable income. Weighting the other indicator, household net financial wealth, heavily 
results in the most pessimistic scenario for measured outcomes in the income dimension.
The jobs dimension consists of four indicators: labour market insecurity, long-term 
unemployment rate, personal earnings, and employment rate. The best-case scenario for 
better measured job outcomes occurs when the first indicator is given majority of the 
weight, while the worst-case scenario occurs when the fourth indicator is given majority of 
the weight.
The education dimension comprises educational attainment, student skills, and years in 
education. More countries find it easier to achieve better measured outcomes in this dimen-
sion when nearly three-quarters of the weight gets attached to the first indicator. On the 
other hand, if we were to shift almost three-quarters of the weight towards the last indica-
tor, more countries find it harder to achieve better measured outcomes.
In the health dimension, the best-case scenario is obtained when the vast majority of the 
weight is given to life expectancy. The worst-case scenario occurs when most of the weight 
is shifted to self-reported health. Given that longevity among OECD countries has gener-
ally been steadily rising over time, it is not surprising that more countries do well in the 
health dimension when life expectancy gets weighted more.
The safety dimension consists of homicide rate and assault rate. Relative to other indi-
cators across the different dimensions, homicide rate has been reliably stable across OECD 
countries. The most optimistic scenario is induced when majority of the weight gets shifted 
to homicide rate. Conversely, if assault rate gets most of the weight, it results in the most 
pessimistic scenario.
The best-case scenario for the work-life balance dimension occurs when majority of the 
weight is given to the employees working very long hours indicator while the worst-case 
scenario occurs when most of the weight is shifted to the time devoted to leisure and per-
sonal care indicator.
953Stochastic Dominance Approach to OECD’s Better Life Index 
1 3
Although the OECD does not produce an overall index that aggregates all the well-
being aspects, it does let users weight the 11 dimensions which is quite different than what 
we did in constructing the overall index. A preference for dimension A over dimension B 
does not necessarily imply that they also prefer all indicators in dimension A over those 
of dimension B. For this reason, it might be more beneficial to allow users to weight the 
individual indicators rather than the dimensions. In constructing the aggregate composite 
indicator, we actually weighted all 24 indicators as opposed to just weighting the dimen-
sions due to embedding effects.
We identified 11 out of 24 indicators as driving overall improvement in measured well-
being with homicide rate receiving almost half the weight in the best-case scenario. This is 
an indication that the upper bound of the homicide rate indicator is relatively more achiev-
able as compared to other indicators. To induce the worst-case scenario, 6 indicators were 
identified, with household net financial wealth and stakeholder engagement for developing 
regulations receiving relatively more weight. This suggests that the upper bounds of such 
indicators are harder to achieve for more countries.
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 Assessing Job Quality in Canada: 
A Multidimensional Approach 
 W EN-HAO  CHEN AND  TAHSIN  MEHDI 
 Statistics Canada, Ottawa, Ontario 
 Dans l’examen auquel ils soumettent les aspects multidimensionnels de la qualité des emplois au Canada, 
les auteurs évaluent six grandes dimensions de cette qualité : les revenus et avantages sociaux, les per-
spectives de carrière, l’intensité du travail, la qualité de l’horaire de travail, les compétences et le degré de 
latitude, ainsi que le milieu social. Les résultats de l’analyse descriptive et de l’analyse à structure latente 
auxquelles ils procèdent révèlent l’existence d’une grande variation dans la qualité du travail selon les 
secteurs et les groupes sociodémographiques. Ils constatent notamment que certains des segments les plus 
importants du marché de l’emploi, comme celui de l’hébergement et des services personnels, sont asso-
ciés à de multiples caractéristiques négatives de l’emploi. De plus, les travailleurs dont les contrats sont 
atypiques ou qui occupent des emplois à temps partiel subissent maints inconvénients rattachés au milieu 
du travail, outre celui d’être mal rémunérés. 
 Mots clés : bien-être, conditions de travail, qualité du travail, sécurité d’emploi 
 In this article, we examine multidimensional aspects of job quality in Canada. Six broad dimensions of job 
quality were assessed: income and benefi ts, career prospects, work intensity, working-time quality, skills 
and discretion, and social environment. Results from both descriptive and latent class analysis reveal a 
great deal of variation in job quality across sectors and socio-demographic groups. In particular, we found 
that some of the largest labour market segments, such as hospitality and personal services, are associated 
with many negative job features. Moreover, workers with atypical contracts or in part-time employment 
have many disadvantages in the workplace other than being low-paid. 
 Keywords: job quality, working conditions, well-being, employment security 
 Introduction 
 In the past decade, work surrounding statistical indica-
tors for measuring individual and societal well-being has 
proliferated. It is now widely recognized that the meas-
ure of a country’s progress encompasses more than just 
economic quantity or the monetary value of goods and 
services. Economic quality and social and environmental 
well-being also matter. Initiatives such as the United Na-
tion’s Happiness Index or the OECD’s Better Life Index 
offer complementary statistics that can capture different 
aspects of life across populations. In this context, the focus 
of employment growth has also shifted from the number 
of jobs created to the types of jobs created. 
 The notion of job quality has traditionally been under-
stood as being represented by wage level or type of 
employment, information about which is often accessible in 
most labour force surveys. However, job quality could also 
refer to physical working conditions, social environments, 
fl exibility, or skills development, which affect or foster 
a worker’s well-being. Although there is no commonly 
accepted defi nition of job quality, considerable effort has 
been made by international organizations to identify various 
dimensions of workplace quality in ways that cover its many 
facets ( Cazes, Hijzen, and Saint-Martin 2016 ;  OECD 2014 ). 
 The conceptual underpinnings of multidimensional job 
quality frameworks are closely related to the well-being 
discussion. There is growing international evidence that 
different job characteristics (such as excessive job demands, 
low workplace autonomy, or an unsafe work environment) 
have an independent infl uence on workers’ well-being, 
including their physical and mental health (see  OECD 2014 
for a review) as well as their life satisfaction—a measure 
of overall quality of life ( Drobnic, Beham, and Prag 2010 ; 
 Garcia-Mainar, Montuenga, and Navarro-Paniagua 2015 ). 
 The focus on multidimensional job quality is pertinent 
to the discussion of equality and economic empowerment 
in the fast-changing world of work. The modern economy 
is becoming increasingly knowledge based, which tends 
to benefi t those who are highly educated. As a result of 
an aging population, many new jobs have been created in 
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personal care services. At the same time, so-called atyp-
ical employment (which includes self-employment and 
temporary and part-time jobs) has increased ( ILO 2016 ). 
Whether this changing economy is inclusive or not can 
be better understood by looking at multiple aspects of job 
quality in addition to wages or compensation. These as-
pects also have important implications for gender equality; 
women are still more likely than men to work part time, 
often by choice, and to be overrepresented or underrepre-
sented in particular industries and occupations ( Moyser 
2017 ). Variability in the quality of jobs offered in these 
sectors could have ramifi cations for an inclusive economy. 
 Moreover, job quality has implications for economic 
and labour market performance. Empirical evidence has 
shown that high-quality jobs improve employees’ sub-
jective well-being ( Horowitz 2016 ;  Salvatori 2010 ) and 
contribute to at-work productivity ( Arends, Prinz, and 
Abma 2017 ). Better job quality also makes work more 
attractive and thus stimulates employment growth by 
encouraging inactive persons to enter the labour market 
and prevent early exits. However, a poor working en-
vironment is often associated with health risks, leading 
to quitting ( Green 2010 ), labour market withdrawal ( Park 
2010 ;  Turcotte and Schellenberg 2005 ), and more sickness 
absence ( Catalina-Romero et al. 2015 ;  Milner et al. 2015 ). 
 To date, the Canadian literature on job quality has been 
rather scarce, in part because of a lack of comprehensive 
data on workplace issues as well as a lack of consensus 
on which of the frameworks that have been developed to 
measure job quality are suitable. Some early studies paint 
a partial portrait of job quality, either by focussing solely 
on compensation-based quality using the Labour Force 
Survey ( Tal 2016 ) or by combining a wide range of data 
sources or using small-scale surveys ( Brisbois 2003 ;  Jack-
son and Kumar 1998 ;  Lowe 2007 ;  Lowe and Schellenberg 
2001 ;  Shields 2006 ), but a comprehensive assessment of 
multiple job quality aspects using a unifi ed data source 
has remained elusive. This study fi lls this gap by using 
the rich information on working conditions collected by 
the 2016 General Social Survey (GSS) to construct indica-
tors of job quality situated in an international framework. 
 The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In 
the next section, we review the international framework 
on job quality and discuss how the 2016 GSS can be used 
to construct relevant indicators. We then present a portrait 
of multidimensional job quality in Canada across sectoral, 
occupational, and socio-economic groups. Finally, we 
use a latent class analysis (LCA) to categorize workers 
with similar-quality jobs and assess the relationship be-
tween the predicted job quality profi les and the observed 
characteristics. 
 Framework and Data 
 Various multidimensional frameworks have been pro-
posed in the literature to assess job quality. Some focus on 
the attributes of the job itself, some include employment 
relationships, and others encompass broader labour mar-
ket and social contextual information, such as provisions 
of social protection schemes (see  Cazes et al. 2016 for a 
review). Depending on the framework, suggested indica-
tors may be objective or subjective and measured at an 
individual or aggregate level, or both. In this study, we 
incorporate the framework proposed by  Eurofound (2016 ). 
 One important feature of the Eurofound framework 
is that it is data driven: the organization used its own 
surveys (i.e., the European Working Conditions Survey 
[EWCS]) to construct the proposed job quality indicators. 
This ensures that all indicators are measured in a consist-
ent manner. We use the  Eurofound framework because 
the  2016 Canadian GSS also included several core job-
quality-related questions based on the EWCS modules. 
The GSS data allow us to construct multiple dimensions 
of job quality indicators for Canada according to a well-
developed international framework, with potential for 
comparability to European studies. 
 Figure 1 illustrates the seven dimensions of job qual-
ity developed by Eurofound, with minor modifi cations: 
(a) prospects, (b) work intensity, (c) working-time quality, 
(d) skills and discretion, (e) social environment; (f) income 
and benefi ts from employment, and (g) physical health 
risks. Each of these dimensions include one or more sub-
topics, which can be assessed through a set of questions 
in the survey. The fi rst and the sixth dimensions relate to 
extrinsic job features, and the remaining fi ve dimensions 
together measure the quality of the working environ-
ment. The latter grouping can further be divided into job 
demands and job resources ( OECD 2014 ). 
 We constructed indicators of job quality dimensions 
following three guidelines ( Eurofound 2016 ). First, all 
indicators were defi ned at the level of the job or worker 
on the basis of microdata, which allows us to examine job 
quality outcomes across socio-economic groups or sectors 
to address distributional issues. Second, each indicator 
can be categorized into either a positive or a negative job 
feature. Higher job demands, such as heavy workload, 
would be regarded negatively, and better job resources 
(e.g., paid training) are indicative of positive job features. 
Third, we did not consider purely subjective measures 
that involve an individual’s feelings or perceptions (e.g., 
job satisfaction). 
 Job Quality Indicators: Data and Summary 
Statistics 
 Our analysis draws data primarily from the 2016 GSS. 
The GSS is an annual cross-sectional survey conducted by 
Statistics Canada since 1985, with each year covering one 
topic in-depth. It selects representative samples aged 15 
years or older from Canada’s 10 provinces. A weight was 
assigned to each respondent to refl ect the probability of se-
lection. The 2016 cycle focussed on the lifestyle behaviour 
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 Table 1 : Job Quality Indicators 
Job Quality Dimension 
and Sub-Topics Indicator
P or N 
Indicator
Mean %a 
(weighted)
 1. Prospects      
  Job security  1. May lose job in the next 6 months  N  10.5 
  Career prospects  2. Job offers good prospects for career advancement b  P  51.7 
 2. Work intensity       
  Quantitative demands  3. Workload not often manageable  N  26.2 
   4. Can’t often fi nish assigned work during regular working hours b  N  25.2 
 3. Working-time quality       
  Atypical work schedule  5. Involuntary irregular (rotating, split, on-call) shift job  N  12.1 
  Time arrangement  6. Can choose start and end time of your work day b  P  41.5 
 Flexibility  7. Easy to take 1 or 2 hours for personal matters b  P  71.2 
 4. Skills and discretion       
 Autonomy  8. Can choose the sequence of tasks  P  66.4 
   9. Have opportunities to provide input into decision b  P  77.0 
  Training  10. Had formal training paid by employer b  P  41.5 
   11. Had informal or on-the-job training b  P  56.1 
 5. Social environment       
 Adverse social behaviour  12. Experienced verbal, sexual, or physical violence at work  N  15.1 
 Managerial support  13. Received support from managers b  P  63.8 
   14. Had a formal job performance assessment b  P  58.5 
 Collective representation  15. Covered by a union contract or collective agreement b  P  32.1 
 6. Income and benefi ts       
 Hourly wage (from LFS), $  16. Mean hourly earnings  P  26.8 
 Employment benefi ts  17. Workplace pension plan b  P  39.0 
   18. Paid sick leave b  P  42.4 
   19. Paid vacation leave b  P  56.1 
   20. Disability insurance b  P  42.3 
   21. Supplemental medical/dental care b  P  46.6 
   22. Worker’s compensation b  P  49.6 
   23. Maternity, parental, or layoff benefi ts  P  42.4 
 Notes: Indicators were constructed from 2016 GSS questions, except for hourly wage, which was derived from the monthly LFS data (March 
2016). The sample was restricted to workers (including those who were self-employed) aged 18 y and older. The number of overall observa-
tions is 10,680. Actual sample size, however, varies across indicators because not every person in the sample answered all the job quality 
questions. GSS = General Social Survey; LFS = Labour Force Survey; N = negative; P = positive. 
 a  Unless otherwise indicated. 
 b Excluding the self-employed. 
 Source: Statistics Canada, 2016 GSS and 2016 LFS data. 
of Canadians that affects their health and well-being in the 
workplace and at home. 
 Following the described framework, we constructed 
23 indicators to capture six of the seven job quality 
dimensions mentioned. 1 The omission is the physical 
environment dimension, for which information was not 
available. Table 1 lists a brief description of the 23 job 
quality indicators and their mean value. The sample was 
restricted to current workers (including those who were 
self-employed) aged 18 years and older. Survey weights 
were used in the entire analysis.  
 We used two indicators to capture the prospects di-
mension of the current job: the future continuity and the 
possibility of career progression. Only about 11 percent 
of workers indicated that they might lose their job in the 
next 6 months, and more than half said their job offered 
good prospects for career advancement. Note that we 
did not consider contract type as a prospects indicator, 
which is commonly seen in the European literature. This 
is because from a Canadian standpoint, it is diffi cult to 
associate some atypical forms of work with negative or 
positive prospects. Some self-employed professionals 
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and entrepreneurs indeed improve their job security and 
career prospects as they gain more experience. Similarly, 
fi xed-term jobs are frequently renewed, whereas indefi n-
ite contracts can easily be terminated. This is echoed by 
 OECD (2013 ), in which Canada ranked low among OECD 
countries in terms of the protection of permanent workers 
against dismissal. 
 Work intensity is captured by two negative indicators 
of job quality: workload not often manageable and often 
cannot fi nish work during regular hours. The former gives 
a broad sense of time pressure from work, and the latter 
reveals a certain degree of constant pressure on a regular 
basis. Using these two indicators, we found that about a 
quarter of workers reported high work intensity. 
 The assessment of working-time quality includes 
three indicators: involuntary atypical work schedule, 
time arrangement, and flexibility regarding working 
time. About 12 percent of workers reported an irregular 
work schedule. This is considered a negative job feature 
because of its involuntary nature. For control over time 
arrangement, nearly 42 percent of workers reported the 
ability to choose the start or end time of the work day, and 
71 percent indicated they had the fl exibility to take some 
hours off for personal matters. 
 The dimension of skills and discretion refers to the job 
aspect that allows workers to apply their skills with some 
degree of autonomy over their tasks and resources, as well 
as the training opportunity to develop the skills required 
for the job. Four indicators were used. For autonomy, we 
measured the ability to choose the sequence of tasks and 
the opportunity to provide input into decisions that af-
fect work. Overall, about two-thirds to three-quarters of 
workers reported a high degree of autonomy in their job. 
For training opportunities, about 42 percent of workers 
had received formal training in the past 12 months and 
about 56 percent had received informal training. 
 We assessed social environment in the workplace by 
means of indicators covering three elements: adverse 
social behaviour, managerial support, and collective 
representation. About 15 percent of workers reported 
abusive experiences at work, such as verbal abuse, sexual 
harassment, threats, humiliation, or physical violence. The 
extent of managerial support was measured with two indi-
cators: received support from manager and had a formal 
job performance assessment. The former refers to support 
from an immediate supervisor, and the latter refers to a 
management system that enables lines of communication, 
recognition, and identifi cation of areas of improvement. 
Overall, about 60 percent of employees received some type 
of managerial support in their job. Another indicator of 
social environment was captured by collective representa-
tion. In 2016, fewer than one-third of workers were covered 
by a union contract or collective agreement. 
 The dimension of income and benefi ts includes hourly 
wages 2 and seven employment benefits (workplace 
pension plan, paid sick leave, paid vacation leave, dis-
ability insurance, supplemental medical or dental care, 
workers’ compensation, and parental or layoff benefi ts). 
These seven employment benefi ts are employer-provided 
benefi ts in addition to provisions mandated by govern-
ment laws (e.g., provincial regulations on vacation leave). 
It is noteworthy that the Eurofound framework did not 
include employment benefi ts because the EWCS surveys 
did not collect such information. However, they acknow-
ledged that those benefi ts, such as a pension plan, may 
be considered “suspended” earnings and are therefore 
important in capturing the job’s earnings quality ( Euro-
found 2016 , 38). Overall, about 40 percent or more of paid 
workers stated that their job included at least one of the 
employment benefi ts mentioned. 
 Do the proposed positive and negative nature of 
various job quality indicators correspond to workers’ 
subjective life experience in general? For example, one 
can argue that having fl exible start and end times should 
not be considered a positive job feature if persons in such 
jobs tend to work very long hours because no one is telling 
them exactly what time their work starts and ends. In that 
case, those with fl exible work hours may not feel better 
than those without such fl exibility. To investigate this, 
Appendix  Table A.1 relates all job quality indicators in the 
GSS to the life and job satisfaction questions and confi rms 
that persons with positive job attributes do express greater 
life and job satisfaction than those without. 
 Finally, although we closely follow Eurofound’s job 
quality framework, we acknowledge some limitations. 
In particular, the Eurofound framework excludes certain 
aspects of job quality and does not account for the inter-
relationships between the different quality measures at 
the level of individual workers ( OECD 2014 ). For example, 
the role of institutions (e.g., social benefi ts, employment 
protection) in providing workers with better labour mar-
ket security was not included. Also, their approach does 
not measure some combined effects, such as job strain, 
that capture the imbalance between job demands and 
resources. 
 Portrait of job quality in Canada 
 In this section, we present a portrait of job quality in 
Canada using the multidimensional indicators defi ned 
earlier. We examine the distribution of job quality by 
sector and occupation and by socio-demographic group. 
This makes it possible to assess whether jobs associated 
with the larger or fastest growing sectors and professions 
are of higher or lower quality and also to assess whether 
workers from different demographic backgrounds have 
equal representation in higher quality jobs. 
 How Do Sectors and Occupations Compare? 
 Table 2 presents the six job quality dimensions for nine 
industrial and eight occupational groups. 3 The top row 
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shows the overall mean for each of the 23 job quality indi-
cators, and the remainder of the table reports deviations 
from the respective means. Cells are presented in fi ve grey 
scales to indicate the signifi cance level of their deviation 
values. A white (black) colour indicates signifi cantly bet-
ter (worse) than average job quality, a light (dark) colour 
indicates better (worse) than average job quality, and a 
medium colour indicates average job quality. 4 
 Overall, job quality seems to be better than aver-
age in public administration, primary, and fi nance and 
professional service sectors; average in education, trade, 
transportation, and construction; and worse than average 
in health care, manufacturing, and hospitality. Public 
administration jobs scored relatively high in nearly all 
quality dimensions, particularly in working-time quality, 
training, social environment, and income and benefi ts. 
For example, nearly 60 percent of public administration 
workers had paid formal training over the previous year, 
compared with only 42 percent on average overall. The 
fi nancial and professional sector also did well in the areas 
of prospects, fl exibility, and autonomy, whereas workers 
in the primary sector (agriculture, fi shing, and oil extrac-
tion) were slightly above average across the board. 
 However, some of the larger (and fastest growing) 
sectors, such as health care, hospitality (accommodation 
and food services), and construction did poorly in mul-
tiple job quality dimensions. Health care, which saw a 35 
percent growth in employment between 2006 and 2016 
and accounted for 13.4 percent of the workforce in 2016, 
exhibited low scores in working-time quality and high 
incidence of workplace violence. This is consistent with the 
literature on workplace aggression in health care profes-
sions ( Chappell and Di Martino 2006 ;  Shields and Wilkins 
2009 ). Similarly, hospitality (16 percent of workforce) 
performed poorly in nearly all job quality dimensions, 
especially training opportunity, social environment, and 
income and benefi ts. 
 Cross-sectoral differences in job quality are more evi-
dent in the dimensions of working-time quality, training, 
social environment, and benefi ts. For example, 59 percent 
of fi nance and professional sector workers enjoyed fl exible 
starting and end hours, compared with only 28 percent 
in education and 31 percent in health care. Nearly 56 
percent of public administration employees had a retire-
ment pension plan, whereas only 21 percent of hospitality 
workers did. 
 There is also marked heterogeneity across job quality 
dimensions within sectors. In education, for instance, 
some job features are very favourable (skills and discretion 
and social environment), and some are very disadvanta-
geous (work intensity and infl exibility). Similar patterns 
are also evident in health care and, to a lesser extent, in 
construction. 
 Such diverse sectoral patterns may refl ect very differ-
ent job types within a broadly defi ned sector.  Table 2 also 
reports how job quality is distributed across occupations. 
Overall, differences in job quality are more visible along 
the blue-collar–white-collar line. Offi ce-based jobs gener-
ally exhibit more desirable job features in three or more of 
the quality dimensions, whereas jobs that require manual 
labour or customer interaction do poorly in nearly all areas 
(the only exception is work intensity). 
 It is of interest to relate these fi ndings to the job polar-
ization literature, which argues that employment growth 
has been polarized into both high-skill professional jobs 
and low-skill service-related jobs, with a hollowing out 
of the middle over the past few decades ( Autor and Dorn 
2013 ;  Goos, Manning, and Salomons 2009 ), although the 
pattern seems to have stalled after 2000 in Canada ( Green 
and Sand 2015 ). Our fi ndings of marked job quality gaps 
between professional and low-end service jobs imply that 
if the pattern of job polarization continues, it could lead 
to an increasingly divided labour market in which jobs 
are associated with either many good quality features or 
many poor features, not somewhere in between. 
 How Do Workers Compare? 
 The population groups more likely to get lower quality 
jobs were youth, less educated persons, and persons with 
disabilities (Table 3). Although the literature has shown 
that these groups are often associated with low pay, their 
poor outcomes along multiple job quality dimensions 
make them even more vulnerable. Workers with a high 
school diploma or less, for instance, were more likely 
to work in jobs with less fl exible work schedules, low 
autonomy, and lack of training opportunities and employ-
ment benefi ts, in addition to low pay. They were also less 
likely to be recognized for their work efforts, given the 
low access to performance evaluation: only 47 percent of 
less-educated workers reported having a formal job per-
formance assessment over the past year, compared with 
nearly 70 percent of university-educated workers. Marked 
differences in nearly all job quality dimensions along the 
education line indicate a wider gap between skilled and 
less-skilled workers. 
 Table 3 also indicates that the concerns relating to the 
youth labour market pertain to more than just unemploy-
ment, as often emphasized. Younger workers are more 
likely to be in a job with an irregular work schedule, 
without formal performance assessments, and with lim-
ited or no employment benefi ts. This may refl ect the fact 
that fewer employed youth today are in full-time jobs 
( Morissette 2016 ). Nevertheless, young workers still did 
relatively well in terms of career prospects, manageable 
workload, and access to informal training. 
 Visible minorities generally faced no signifi cant dis-
advantages in job quality compared with non-visible 
minorities. By contrast, persons with disabilities fared 
much worse in all job quality dimensions. Their workplace 
disadvantages include not only lower income benefi ts 
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and higher incidence of workplace violence but also low 
advancement prospects, high time pressure, lack of control 
over tasks, and limited support from managers. These 
fi ndings suggest that discussions aimed at extending 
working lives to cope with fiscal or macroeconomic 
pressures need to take into consideration the impacts of 
health status on access to quality jobs to ensure a healthy 
labour force. 
 Table 3 provides a new perspective for assessing 
gender equality in the workplace. Overall, we found sig-
nifi cant gender differences—at the 1 percent level—in 10 
of 23 job quality indicators. For example, female workers 
earned less (about $3.80, or 13 percent lower) than their 
male counterparts in hourly wages. This is consistent 
with the literature. Other noticeable disadvantages faced 
by female workers include higher incidence of workplace 
violence, poor career prospects, less working-time fl ex-
ibility, and limited access to certain employee benefi ts 
(such as disability and supplemental medical insurance). 
However, the data show small or little gender gap in job 
features relating to work intensity, skills and discretion, 
performance evaluation, paid sick leave, and parental or 
layoff benefi ts. 
 Identifying groups of workers with similar-
quality jobs: A Latent Class Analysis 
 In this section, we examine which workers are more likely to 
have jobs associated with multiple good or bad job features 
and what the potential drivers for these outcomes are. The 
descriptive analysis we have presented seems to suggest 
that workers can be assigned to a small number of groups, 
each with broadly similar job quality outcomes. Unfortu-
nately, we do not have a single variable that identifi es the 
groups. One common approach is to construct a composite 
index from an aggregation of all indicators and use it to 
classify workers into different job quality groups. However, 
there are often technical issues (weighting, in particular) 
involved in aggregating indicators. Without constructing 
an overall index, we identify the unobserved groups by ap-
plying a technique known as Latent Class Analysis (LCA) 
to cluster workers into similar classes according to their 
responses to job quality indicators. 
 LCA, or fi nite mixture modelling, is a statistical pro-
cedure for identifying unmeasured class membership 
probabilities among subjects, using their responses to a 
set of observed variables ( Vermunt and Magidson 2002 ). 
In the context of this study, observed variables are the six 
job quality dimensions, each of which contains a number 
of indicators, as mentioned earlier. For simplicity, we cre-
ated a categorical variable with three responses for each of 
the job quality dimensions; the item response was coded 
as “1” if workers experienced none or very few good job 
quality features in the dimension in question, as “2” if they 
experienced partial good job features, and as “3” if they 
experienced all or most good job features. 5 
 Table 4 shows the distribution of the six job quality 
dimensions. The sample was restricted to individuals who 
provided valid responses to all job quality questions in 
the GSS. This excluded all self-employed workers because 
they were exempt from answering certain questions. The 
analysis included about 8,000 workers in the analysis. 
Overall, 80–90 percent of workers reported having at least 
partial good job features (Categories 2 or 3) in fi ve of the six 
job quality dimensions. The only exception is benefi ts, for 
which 43 percent of workers indicated that their jobs pro-
vided none or only one of the seven employment benefi ts 
 Table 4:  Distribution of Categorical Response of Job Features by Job Quality Dimension 
 Item-Response Category 
( N = 8,004) 
 Dimension 
 1. Prospects  2. Work 
Intensity 
 3. Working-Time 
Quality 
 4. Skills and 
Discretion 
 5. Social 
Environment 
 6. Benefi ts 
 No. of indicators used 
within the dimension 
 2  2  3  4  4  7 
 1  (none or very few good 
job quality features) 
 5.9  3.1  8.4  19.8  14.3  43.4 
 2  (some good job quality 
features) 
 47.6  8.7  60.3  32.0  37.7  22.2 
 3  (all or most good job 
quality features) 
 46.6  88.3  31.3  48.3  48.1  34.4 
 Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
 Notes: For Dimensions 1 and 2, Categories 1, 2, and 3 refer to having zero, one, and two good features, respectively. For Dimension 3, Cat-
egories 1, 2, and 3 refer to having zero, one to two, and three good features, respectively. For Dimensions 4 and 5, Categories 1, 2, and 3 refer 
to having zero to one, two, and three to four good features, respectively. For Dimension 6, Categories 1, 2, and 3 refer to having zero to one, 
two to fi ve, and six to seven good features, respectively. 
 Source: Statistics Canada, 2016 General Social Survey. 
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included (Category 1). The other stand-out dimension is 
work intensity, for which more than 88 percent of workers 
reported being in the best category (i.e., their jobs were 
not associated with the two negative indicators listed). 
 Using these categorical variables, which indicate 
whether workers experienced none, partial, or all good 
job features in each of the six job quality dimensions, we 
estimated a latent class model with  n unobserved job qual-
ity profi les with and without the inclusion of covariates. 
The model was fi tted using a STATA Plugin developed by 
 Lanza et al. (2015 ). When no covariates were included, we 
estimated two sets of parameters: (a) probabilities of latent 
class membership and (b) item-response probabilities that 
express the correspondence between the observed six job 
quality dimensions and the latent classes. When covariates 
are included, the probabilities of latent class membership 
are predicted as functions of regression coeffi cients for co-
variates and the values of the covariates ( Lanza et al. 2015 ). 
 The optimal number of latent classes,  n, can be deter-
mined by selecting the model that results in the lowest 
Bayesian information criterion statistic.  Table A.2 in 
the Appendix fi tted a baseline model with each addi-
tional class up to the six-class model. An inspection of the 
Bayesian information criterion values indicates that the 
four-class model is optimal because the addition of classes 
beyond four results in no improvement. After selecting 
the number of latent classes,  Table 5 reports the estimated 
class membership probabilities (top half) as well as the 
item-response probabilities of the six job quality dimen-
sions (bottom half) for each class without covariates. More 
alternative model specifi cations and sensitivity analysis 
can be found in  Chen and Mehdi (2018 ). 
 Four very distinct job quality profi les were identifi ed 
from the LCA. About 37 percent of workers were predicted 
to be in the best job quality group (Class 1), judging by 
the probabilities of having many or all good job features 
in all six quality dimensions. Conversely, 23 percent of 
workers were predicted to be in the worst job quality 
group (Class 4), with very low probabilities of experi-
encing many good job features in most dimensions. The 
 Table 5 : Four-Class Latent Class Analysis Model Estimates: Class Membership and Item-Response Probabilities 
 Job Quality Dimensions by 
Response Category 
 Jobs with 
 High Overall 
Quality: Class 1 
 Decent Work Benefi ts & Social 
Environment, Poor Working-
Time and Skills: Class 2 
 Manageable Work De-
mands, Poor Benefi ts & 
Social Environment:  Class 3 
 Poor Overall 
Quality: Class 4 
 Class membership prob-
ability, sample  M ( SE ) 
 0.368 (0.044)  0.122 (0.053)  0.278 (0.048)  0.232 (0.033) 
 Item 1: Probability of having none or few good job features 
 Prospects  0.013  0.044  0.039  0.167 
 Work intensity  0.020  0.078  0.002  0.056 
 Working-time quality  0.067  0.109  0.053  0.136 
 Skills & training  0.008  0.447  0.083  0.525 
 Social environment  0.016  0.081  0.135  0.388 
 Benefi ts  0.325  0.085  0.479  0.714 
 Item 2: Probability of having partial good job features 
 Prospects  0.311  0.529  0.478  0.710 
 Work intensity  0.088  0.149  0.025  0.126 
 Working-time quality  0.509  0.751  0.588  0.703 
 Skills & training  0.198  0.413  0.493  0.268 
 Social environment  0.215  0.395  0.556  0.420 
 Benefi ts  0.097  0.113  0.451  0.212 
 Item 3: Probability of having many or all good job features 
 Prospects  0.676  0.427  0.482  0.123 
 Work intensity  0.892  0.773  0.973  0.818 
 Working-time quality  0.424  0.140  0.359  0.161 
 Skills & training  0.793  0.140  0.424  0.207 
 Social environment  0.769  0.525  0.309  0.192 
 Benefi ts  0.578  0.801  0.070  0.074 
 Note: Sample includes 8,001 respondents. The latent class analysis model was estimated without the covariates. 
 Source: Statistics Canada, 2016 General Social Survey. 
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remaining two classes were considered to have average 
jobs but still differed substantially from each other in some 
aspects. Workers in Class 2 (12 percent) in general enjoyed 
good employment benefi ts and social environment but 
tended to have lower quality in terms of working time 
as well as skills and training. The probability of having a 
positive response to all three indicators in the working-
time dimension was rather small, indicating a lack of 
work–life balance for this class. Finally, the remaining 28 
percent (Class 3) did well in work intensity and fl exibility 
but less so in benefi ts and social environment. Very few 
workers in this class had jobs that offered six or all seven 
employment benefi ts listed. 
 Latent Class Job Profi les by Socio-Economic 
Characteristic 
 Table 6 reports the proportions of workers in each job qual-
ity class by selected personal and job characteristics, based 
on each worker’s posterior probabilities derived from the 
model in the preceding section. This would allow us to 
explore whether some variables of interests could affect 
the probability of class membership and, consequently, 
may be considered for inclusion in the LCA regression 
as predictors.  
 Youth, less-educated people, and those in blue-collar 
occupations were underrepresented in the best job quality 
group. This is consistent with the broad patterns in the 
“Portrait of Job Quality in Canada” section. For instance, 
only about 29 percent of workers with a high school 
diploma or less were in Class 1, whereas 46 percent of 
university graduates were in that class. At the same time, 
young or less-educated workers were more likely than 
their counterparts to be in the worst job class. Never-
theless, they were overrepresented in jobs that offered 
poor social environment and fewer employment benefi ts 
(Class 3). A great deal of variation exists in job quality 
profi les across sectors. Nearly 60 percent of workers in 
public administration, 49 percent of those in education, 
and 45 percent of those in fi nance and professional ser-
vice sectors were clustered into high overall quality jobs, 
whereas at least one-quarter to one-third of workers in 
hospitality, manufacturing, and trade or transportation 
were associated with the worst job quality class. 
 Table 6 also reveals a strong association between 
job quality class and contract type, part-time and full-
time status, and workplace size. Concerning the effects 
of employment contract on job quality, there has been 
much debate about whether the growing volume of non-
standard contract jobs are associated with precarious 
work ( Galarneau 2010 ;  OECD 2015 ).  Table 6 indicates 
that workers in atypical forms of employment—which 
includes seasonal, fi xed-term, and casual workers—were 
overrepresented in the worst job quality class (36 percent) 
compared with 21 percent for regular contract holders. At 
the same time, the vulnerability of atypical workers was 
further reinforced by their limited representation in the 
best class (24 percent) versus regular contract workers 
(40 percent). 
 The other noteworthy contrast in job quality is along the 
line of hours of work. Part-time workers were much more 
likely than their full-time counterparts to be in poor job 
categories and less likely to be in good job categories. The 
fi ndings add to the part-time penalty literature, which has 
focussed primarily on hourly wages ( Bardasi and Gornick 
2008 ;  OECD 2015 ;  O’Dorchai, Plasman, and Rycx 2007 ), by 
suggesting that part-time penalty can also be refl ected in a 
wider range of job quality indicators, including prospects, 
working-time quality, skills, and social environment. 
 Marked differences are also seen for fi rm size: the num-
ber of employees at a workplace is positively associated 
with job quality. Among workers in large fi rms (with 500 
or more employees), about 50 percent were clustered into 
the best-quality class and only 17 percent were clustered 
in the worst job class. The comparable fi gures for work-
ers in small fi rms with fewer than 20 employees were 26 
percent and 29 percent, respectively. Not surprisingly, 
small fi rm workers were overrepresented in jobs that of-
fer fewer employment benefi ts and a less desirable social 
environment (Class 3). This suggests that the demand-side 
factor also plays a role in shaping the distributions of job 
quality profi les. 
 Job Quality Profi les for Groups at Risk of Non-
Standard Employment 
 Table 6 shows that non-standard work (NSW) arrange-
ments (i.e., part-time and atypical contracts) seem to be 
strong predictors of the latent class membership prob-
ability. For some groups (women, youth, older adults, 
and less educated persons, in particular), the chances of 
working part time or having an atypical job were higher 
than for the other groups. This was either by choice or the 
result of a lack of access to standard employment. Here, 
we examine whether being in these groups predicts job 
quality profi les. We assess this by including atypical em-
ployment and selected socio-demographic variables (and 
their interaction) in the LCA regression as predictors of 
the conditional latent class membership. 
 We computed the impact of a specifi c covariate on 
latent class membership probability through the estimated 
coeffi cients from the corresponding LCA regression ( Ap-
pendix Tables A.3 and A. 4 ). For example, the β coeffi cient 
on the part-time variable in Class 4 is 1.79 (or 5.97 in relative 
risk ratio). It refl ects, for a part-time worker, that the odds 
of belonging to Class 4 (relative to reference Class 1) are 
nearly six times larger than the odds for a full-time worker. 
 Job Quality Profi les among Frequent Part Timers 
 In 2016, about one-third of young Canadian workers were 
in part-time jobs, whereas this was the case for one-tenth 
of prime-age workers. High rates of part-time work were 
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 Table 6 :  Job Quality Profi les by Selected Characteristics (Proportion of Workers in Each Class) 
 Characteristic  Jobs with 
 High Overall Quality: 
Class 1 
 Decent Work Benefi ts & Social 
Environment, Poor Working-
Time and Skills: Class 2 
 Manageable Work Demands, 
Poor Benefi ts & Social 
Environment: Class 3 
 Poor Overall 
Quality: Class 4 
 Overall  0.368  0.122  0.278  0.232 
 Men  0.383  0.115  0.276  0.226 
 Women  0.373  0.109  0.279  0.239 
 Age group, y         
 18–29  0.313  0.083  0.339  0.265 
 30–44  0.411  0.117  0.270  0.202 
 45–59  0.401  0.127  0.240  0.233 
  60  0.337  0.120  0.282  0.261 
 Education         
 High school or less  0.292  0.109  0.325  0.274 
 Some post-secondary  0.369  0.130  0.269  0.232 
 University  0.462  0.095  0.246  0.197 
 Employment         
 Full time  0.412  0.121  0.259  0.208 
 Part time (<30 hr/week)  0.247  0.079  0.348  0.326 
 Contract type         
 Regular  0.398  0.117  0.270  0.214 
 Atypical  0.235  0.073  0.332  0.360 
 Firm size         
 <20  0.263  0.076  0.372  0.289 
 20–99  0.362  0.118  0.283  0.237 
 100–500  0.443  0.144  0.215  0.198 
  500+  0.504  0.122  0.201  0.173 
 Industry         
 Public administration  0.589  0.118  0.158  0.135 
 Primary  0.435  0.123  0.234  0.208 
 Finance or professional  0.449  0.096  0.270  0.184 
 Education  0.490  0.126  0.217  0.167 
 Trade or transportation  0.322  0.118  0.298  0.262 
 Construction  0.263  0.104  0.393  0.240 
 Health  0.399  0.143  0.248  0.210 
 Manufacturing  0.322  0.122  0.288  0.268 
 Hospitality  0.242  0.078  0.351  0.328 
 White collar         
 Professionals  0.495  0.108  0.231  0.165 
 Clerks  0.376  0.116  0.282  0.226 
 Technicians  0.415  0.116  0.255  0.213 
 Managers  0.480  0.083  0.264  0.174 
 Operators  0.301  0.135  0.317  0.246 
 Elementary  0.309  0.116  0.264  0.311 
 Sales  0.299  0.097  0.317  0.287 
 Personal  0.276  0.120  0.315  0.289 
 Source: Authors’ calculations based on the posterior probabilities derived from the baseline latent class analysis model. 
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also observed among older adults (31 percent), women 
(26 percent), and less educated persons (25 percent). 6 
 Figure 2 presents the predicted job quality profi les for 
these groups. Overall, the majority of part-time workers 
were predicted to be in either poor overall quality jobs 
(32 percent) or jobs with poor social environment and 
employment benefi ts (49 percent) compared with 17 per-
cent and 26 percent, respectively, of full-time workers. The 
interactions of part-time and selected groups indicate that 
the risks of falling into the worst job quality class became 
even higher for 18- to 29-year-olds (44 percent) and older 
adults (49 percent), but less so for women (34 percent) 
and less educated persons (31 percent). These are 15 to 30 
percentage points higher than the rates for their respective 
counterparts in full-time jobs. Meanwhile, their chances of 
being in high overall quality jobs were very limited. Those 
with less education (youth) in part-time employment, for 
example, had almost zero chance to be in the best job class. 
In stark contrast, the comparable fi gure was 58 percent for 
university graduates in full-time jobs and 45 percent for 
prime-age workers. 
 Job Quality Profi les among Frequent Atypical 
Contract Workers 
 The literature has also shown that some groups (youth and 
less-educated persons, in particular) as well as workers in 
small fi rms were more likely to be in jobs with NSW ar-
rangements ( Galarneau 2010 ;  Kapsalis and Tourigny 2004 ; 
 OECD 2015 ).  Figure 3 presents the predicted job quality 
profi les for selected groups on the basis of employment 
contract type. Similar to the patterns of part-time employ-
ment, as many as 44 percent of workers in atypical forms 
of employment were predicted to be in the lowest quality 
jobs, and 41 percent were predicted to be in jobs with poor 
social environment and limited employment benefi ts. The 
fi gures were only 19 percent and 28 percent, respectively, 
among regular contract workers. 
 When interacting NSW with selected groups, older 
adults in atypical contracts faced a signifi cantly higher 
probability (59 percent) of falling into the worst job quality 
class, and more than one-half of young (and less-educated) 
workers in NSW were predicted to be in jobs with poor 
social conditions and limited employment benefi ts. At the 
same time, their chances of being in high overall quality 
jobs were relatively low: about 35 percentage points or 
lower compared with their respective counterparts in 
regular contract jobs. 
 Moreover, the incidence of non-standard employment 
also tended to be higher in small fi rms. This is because 
atypical contracts are often less costly and more fl exible for 
small fi rms to cope with fl uctuations in demand ( Bentolila 
and Saint-Paul 1994 ) or are used as a screening process 
( Portugal and Varejao 2009 ). In Canada, about one in three 
non-standard workers worked in a company with fewer 
than 20 employees, whereas one in fi ve standard workers 
did so ( Kapsalis and Tourigny 2004 ). 
 Figure 3 shows a stark contrast in job quality profi les 
between atypical contract workers in small fi rms (less 
than 20 employees) and regular contract workers in lar-
ger fi rms. All non-standard workers in small fi rms faced 
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 Figure 2 : Predicted Probability of Job Quality Profi les for Selected Groups on the Basis of Full-Time or Part-Time Employment Status 
 Notes: The results were based on the latent class analysis in  Table A.2 . The values refer to predicted probabilities of belonging to a certain 
latent class with selected characteristics. HS = high school; PSE = post-secondary; Univ = university. 
 Source: Authors’ calculations based on estimations from the 2016 General Social Survey. 
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a very high risk (around 68 percent) of poor job quality 
outcome and a very low probability (around 4 percent) 
of belonging to the best job class. This may not be too 
surprising because small fi rms often lack many of the 
job features (e.g., unionization, benefi t provision, train-
ing, or prospects) analyzed. Consequently, the growth of 
non-standard employment and its concentration in small 
fi rms will have profound implications for shaping the 
distribution of job quality in the modern era. 
 Conclusion 
 In this study, we assessed job quality in Canada using an 
internationally inspired multidimensional framework 
that covers six broad aspects: income and benefi ts, career 
prospects, work intensity, working-time quality, skills 
and discretion, and social environment. The descriptive 
results show diverse patterns of job quality across sectors 
and socio-demographic groups. In particular, some of the 
largest labour market segments, such as hospitality and 
personal services, exhibited lower job quality features in 
multiple dimensions. We also showed that the concerns re-
lating to the youth labour market involve more than just a 
high level of unemployment or low participation. Marked 
differences in job quality were more apparent along the 
education line and, to a lesser extent, the gender line. 
 LCA identifi ed four very distinct job quality profi les. 
About 37 percent of all workers were predicted to hold a 
high-quality job associated with many good job features 
in all six quality dimensions, whereas 23 percent had a 
overall poor-quality job, which lacks many good features 
in most dimensions. On average, 28 percent of workers 
held a job with manageable work demands but poor 
benefi ts and social environment, and the remaining 12 
percent were considered to have a job with decent work 
benefi ts and social context but less in terms of working-
time quality as well as skills and training opportunities. 
 The results indicate that non-standard employment 
arrangements are strong predictors of job quality classes: 
the majority of part-time or atypical contract workers were 
predicted to be either in the overall poor-quality jobs or 
in jobs with poor social environment and employment 
benefi ts. Moreover, fi rm size was positively associated 
with job quality, a result that suggests demand-side fac-
tors also play a role. 
 Finally, fi ndings on job quality profi les for groups 
at risk of NSW suggest that workplace exclusion, either 
through lower pay or poorer access to other job quality 
features, can pose challenges to inclusive growth. Because 
many women, youth, and less-educated people today are 
engaging in part-time or non-standard contracts, either 
voluntarily or involuntarily, a growing dispersion of job 
quality along these lines could stand in the way of inclu-
sive growth and a robust economy. The work done as part 
of this study provides partial guidance for future studies 
that could shed more light on gender, youth, occupational, 
or sectoral patterns of job quality. 
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 Notes 
 1 Although we follow the Eurofound framework and guide-
lines to construct job quality indicators, we should note that 
the proposed indicators from the GSS are not exactly the 
same as those from the EWCS surveys. The GSS does not 
collect all workplace-related questions as does the EWCS. 
However, the information is suffi cient enough to allow 
construction of indicators that cover the majority of the job 
quality dimensions mentioned. 
 2  Note that the GSS did not include data on earnings or 
wages. As a result, we derived information on hourly wage 
from an auxiliary source (the March 2016 LFS). This study 
focussed on hourly wages rather than monthly earnings (as 
in Eurofound) because the latter also depends on hours of 
work. High monthly income therefore cannot be regarded 
as a good job quality if it was a result of involuntary long 
working hours. 
 3  The industry groups were constructed on the basis of the 
2012 one-digit North American Industry Classifi cation Sys-
tem. We bundled the “other services” category with “hos-
pitality” because of small sample size. The occupational 
groups were constructed on the basis of a variant version 
of the National Occupational Classifi cation, which consists 
of 10 categories similar to the one-digit level in the Interna-
tional Standard Classifi cation of Occupations. For the sake 
of parsimony, we combined the categories “industrial and 
equipment operation trades” and “workers in transport 
and construction” into “machine operators”; similarly, we 
combined “nature resources, agriculture occupations” and 
“processing, manufacturing and utilities labourers” into 
“elementary.” 
 4  In this study, a cell in question is regarded as signifi cantly 
better than average if its value is greater than the average for 
positive indicators (or lower than the average for negative 
indicators) with the estimated difference (between-groups 
mean and overall mean) being signifi cant at the 1 percent 
level (i.e.,  p ≤ 0.01), better than average if the difference is 
signifi cant between the 1 percent and 10 percent level, and 
within the average if the difference is not signifi cant at the 
10 percent level. The notion of signifi cantly worse than av-
erage and worse than average is defi ned in an analogous 
manner. 
 5  For a negative job quality indicator (e.g., may lose job in six 
months), workers without such a quality are considered to 
have a “good” feature in that dimension. 
 6  In comparison, part-time rates were lower for men (12 per-
cent) and for highly educated workers (14 percent). See Sta-
tistics Canada Tables 14-10-0018-01 and 14-10-0020-01. 
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 Appendix     
Table A.1: Job Quality and Life and Job Satisfaction
Job Quality Dimension and Indicators
Positive (+) or 
Negative (–) 
Indicator
Answer to Job Quality Question
Life Satisfaction Score of 
at Least 8/10
Job Satisfaction Rating of 
Very Satisfi ed or Satisfi ed
Yes No Yes No
Prospects      
May lose job in the next 6 months – 51.6 67.7 72.6 86.9
Job offers good prospects for career advancement + 73.6 55.6 93.3 75.6
Work intensity      
Workload not often manageable – 54.2 70.2 75.1 89.0
Can't often fi nish assigned work during regular working hours – 56.2 67.8 78.5 86.9
Working-time quality      
Involuntary irregular (rotating, split, on-call) shift job – 58.0 67.0 74.2 86.8
Can choose start and end time of your work day + 67.6 63.2 87.7 82.7
Easy to take 1 or 2 hours off for personal matters + 67.9 57.6 88.0 76.6
Skills and discretion      
Can choose the sequence of tasks + 69.6 58.9 90.3 75.6
Have opportunities to provide input into decision + 69.6 49.6 91.0 64.1
Had formal training paid by employer + 69.2 62.0 88.3 82.3
Had informal or on-the-job training + 65.1 64.8 85.8 83.3
Social environment      
Experienced verbal, sexual or physical violence at work – 52.6 68.3 72.9 87.6
Received support from managers + 70.4 60.2 91.3 77.2
Had a formal job performance assessment + 67.1 61.9 86.1 82.8
Covered by a union contract or collective agreement + 67.8 63.7 85.4 84.5
Income and benefi ts      
Hourly earnings a + n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Workplace pension plan + 72.9 60.0 89.3 81.8
Paid sick leave + 72.3 59.7 89.0 81.6
Paid vacation leave + 71.0 57.4 87.9 80.7
Disability insurance + 72.3 59.7 89.2 81.5
Supplemental medical/dental care + 70.6 60.2 87.9 82.0
Worker's compensation + 70.9 59.3 88.1 81.5
Maternity, parental or layoff benefi ts + 72.0 59.9 88.6 81.9
Notes: The sample was restricted to workers (including those who were self-employed) aged 18 y and older. The number of overall obser-
vations is 10,680. Actual sample size, however, varies across indicators because not every person in the sample answered all the job quality 
questions. The life satisfaction question was answered on a scale ranging from 0 (very dissatisfi ed) to 10 (very satisfi ed). The job satisfaction 
question was answered on a scale ranging from 1 to 5 (1 = very satisfi ed, 2 = satisfi ed, 3 = neither satisfi ed nor dissatisfi ed, 4 = dissatisfi ed, 5 = 
very dissatisfi ed). n.a. = not available.
a  Answers to the satisfaction questions were not available for hourly wages indicator, for which information was drawn from the Labour 
Force Survey, not the General Social Survey.
Source: Authors’ calculations from Statistics Canada, 2016 General Social Survey.
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 Table A.3 : Estimated Coeffi cients for Four-Class LCA Regressions, by Specifi cation Relating to Part-Time and Full-Time Status 
( N = 8,001) 
 Relative Risk Ratios for Jobs with 
 Specifi cation and Covariate  Decent Work Benefi ts & Social Environ-
ment, Poor Working-Time and Skills: Class 2 
 Manageable Work Demands, Poor 
Benefi ts & Social Environment: Class 3 
 Poor Overall 
Quality: Class 4 
 LCA 1_1       
 Intercept  0.261*  0.486*  0.486* 
 Part time (vs. full time)  1.423  6.272*  5.968* 
 LCA 1_2       
 Intercept  0.258*  0.520*  0.515* 
 Women (vs. men)  0.918  0.822  0.927 
 Part time (vs. full time)  0.915  7.187*  6.097* 
 Women  ×  part time  1.712  0.893  1.040 
 LCA 1_3       
 Intercept  0.240*  0.393*  0.431* 
 Ages 18–29 (vs. Ages 30–44)  0.960  4.045*  2.111* 
 Ages 45–59 (vs Ages 30–44)  1.274  0.612*  1.454* 
 Ages  ≥ 60 (vs. Ages 30–44)  1.675*  1.091  1.863* 
 Part time (vs. full time)  3.792*  10.744*  13.779* 
 Ages 18–29  × part time  0.117  0.664  1.095 
 Ages 45–59  × part time  0.195*  0.278*  0.212* 
 Ages  ≥ 60  × part time  0.184*  0.388  0.349* 
 LCA 1_4       
 Intercept  1.436  1.270  1.209 
 High school (vs. post-secondary)  2.655  4.528*  3.328 
 University (vs. post-secondary)  0.117*  0.176*  0.302* 
 Part time (vs. full time)  6.284*  24.355*  19.052* 
 High school  × part time  0.335  0.459  0.558 
 University  × part time  0.745  0.431  0.284 
 Notes: Class 1 is the reference class. The sample was restricted to workers aged 18 y and older, with valid answers to all job quality questions 
in the General Social Survey. LCA = latent class analysis. 
 * Statistically signifi cant relative risk value from the 95% confi dence interval. 
 Source: Authors’ calculations from Statistics Canada, 2016 General Social Survey. 
Table A.2: Comparison of Baseline Models (N = 8,004)
No. of Classes Log-Likelihood Degrees of Freedom No. of Estimated Parameters AIC BIC
2 –833.6 703 25 1,717.2 1,891.9
3 –646.6 690 38 1,369.1 1,634.6
4 –567.3 677 51 1,237.0 1,593.4
5 –521.6 664 64 1,171.2 1,618.4
6 –482.6 651 77 1,119.1 1,657.1
Notes: The sample was restricted to workers aged 18 y and older, with valid answers to all job quality questions in the General Social Survey. 
Total number of observations = 8,001. The degree of freedom is calculated as the number of unique observed job quality patterns, minus the 
number of parameters that are freely estimated, minus 1. In our case, with 6 (3-category) job quality response variables, there are 3 x 3 x 3 x 
3 x 3 x 3 = 729 possible patterns. So the degree of freedom in a 4-class model, for example, would be 729 − 3 (number of latent class mem-
bership probabilities) – 48 (number of item-response probabilities estimated) − 1 = 677.
Source: Statistics Canada, 2016 General Social Survey.
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 Table A.4 :  Estimated Coeffi cients for Four-Class LCA regressions, by Specifi cation Relating to Employment Contract Type 
( N = 8,001) 
 Relative Risk Ratio for Jobs with 
 Specifi cation and Covariate  Decent Work Benefi ts & Social Environment, 
Poor Working-Time and Skills Jobs: Class 2 
 Manageable Work Demands, Poor 
Benefi ts & Social Environment: Class 3 
 Poor Overall 
Quality: Class 4 
 LCA 2_1       
 Intercept  0.270*  0.602  0.579* 
 Atypical contract (vs. regular)  1.609  5.754*  9.082* 
 LCA 2_2       
 Intercept  0.257*  0.469*  0.460* 
 Ages 18–29 (vs. Ages 30–44)  0.970  3.960*  2.669* 
 Ages 45–59 (vs Ages 30–44)  1.128  0.555*  1.221 
 Ages  ≥ 60 (vs. Ages 30–44)  1.558  1.133  1.667* 
 Atypical contract (vs. regular)  1.510  4.239*  6.920* 
 Ages 18–29  × NSW  0.721  1.724  1.953 
 Ages 45–59  × NSW  1.831  1.487  1.280 
 Ages  ≥ 60  × NSW  0.504  0.617  0.957 
 LCA 2_3       
 Intercept  3.394*  3.106*  2.899* 
 High school (vs. 
post-secondary) 
 7.673  13.449*  11.118* 
 University (vs. post-secondary)  0.103*  0.113*  0.169* 
 Atypical contract (vs. regular)  2.736  7.651*  11.274* 
 High school  × NSW  0.149  0.282  0.233 
 University  × NSW  0.532  1.761  0.970 
 LCA 2_4       
 Intercept  0.267*  0.475*  0.427* 
 Atypical contract (vs. regular)  1.524  5.243*  7.392* 
 Part time (vs. full time)  1.486  6.146*  6.054* 
 NSW  × part time  0.449  0.460  0.509 
 LCA 2_5       
 Intercept  0.382*  0.500*  0.637* 
 Firm size <20 (vs. 20–99)  0.762  3.586*  2.507* 
 Firm size 100–500 (vs. 20–99)  0.958  0.200*  0.442* 
 Firm size  ≥ 500 (vs. 20–99)  0.580  0.006*  0.259* 
 Atypical contract (vs. regular)  0.930  4.842*  6.185* 
 Firm size <20  × NSW  3.263  0.732  2.563 
 Firm size 100–500  × NSW  0.719  0.352  1.172 
 Firm  ≥ 500  × NSW  1.557  67.046*  1.093 
 Note: Class 1 was the reference class. Sample was restricted to workers aged 18 y and older, with valid answers to all job quality questions in 
the General Social Survey. LCA = latent class analysis; NSW = non-standard work. 
 * Statistically signifi cant relative risk value from the 95% confi dence interval. 
 Source: Authors’ calculations from Statistics Canada, 2016 General Social Survey. 
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